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Consociationalism is a system of government recommended for ‘divided societies’. Starting with a discussion of its theoretical components and criticisms it has received, this article addresses how consociationalism has been implemented in in post - 2003 Iraq. The article asks whether the Iraqi constitution and institutions formed by it represented a successful case of consociationalism. Key consociational mechanisms such as an electoral system based on proportional representation, governments based on big multi - party coalitions and a federal and decentralized governance were adopted. However, this model was not entirely consociational as some practices that are common in the majoritarian government have also been used. In fact, divisions between majoritarian and consociational perspectives have polarized, and sometimes paralyzed, the political process. In light of this, the article discusses the sustainability of the current model and its likely future trajectories.

This article deals with the post-2003 consociationalist experiment in Iraq. It examines the reasons why this experiment has failed in producing a reasonably coherent governing formula. It argues that, because of their emphasis on identity politics and not on making mutual concessions in the interest of serious statebuilding, the main players in this experiment (Shia, Sunni and Kurdish political elites) failed to appreciate the complexity of the consociationalist arrangement, let alone use it for public interest. The article focuses on the central role that the Shia Islamist parties played in making this failure happen, highlighting, as reasons, their insistence on an essentially sectarian rhetoric and their attempt to enforce it as a national identity. The article finally proposes a different rhetoric that can accommodate Iraq's ethnic and religious diversity.

The paper studies the Iraqi-Syrian-Turkish conflict over the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, from a geopolitical perspective. It argues that this conflict has historical and political roots, not solely tied to the natural availability of water in the Tigris and Euphrates, but rather connected to the policies of different parties in managing water resources. The paper includes three essential elements. The first examines the geographical and hydrological characteristics of the Tigris and Euphrates. The second explores the political and academic discourse in the 1990 s regarding the "water war" theory. The third and final element analysed the characteristics of the new conditions that have distinguished the three countries since the beginning of this century, imposing on Syria and Iraq the need to devise a new vision for managing their available water resources. The research concludes with the inevitability of negotiation for the joint management of the Tigris and Euphrates water resources as it is not in Turkey's interest to ignore the interests of downstream countries. Moreover, Syria and Iraq cannot achieve any results without negotiation and water diplomacy.

​This report highlights some of the major milestones of the Arab democratic transition from 1/1/2016 to 29/2/2016.

The fall of Mosul on June 10, 2014 following the assault by armed factions, with ISIL at the forefront, represented a major point of transformation for the political scene in Iraq, particularly following the withdrawal of the Iraqi military and police, and the succession of cities in northern and western Iraq that fell to ISIL. This paper looks at the accelerating developments in the Iraqi crisis since 2014. It tries to understand and describe the event, and presents two current narratives: the first is that ISIL is the only actor responsible for the planning and implementation of what happened and is happening; and the second observes the revival of the Sunni opposition movements in the context of the Anbar uprising against the Iraqi government. The paper reviews the positions of the forces active internally: the Iraqi government and its allies, the armed factions and their allies, and the Iraqi political forces participating in the political process, and externally in the region and on the global scene.

Despite the dire situation in Syria, the International Organization for Migration states that about one in ten Syrian refugees is returning home. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees predicts that hundreds of thousands of refugees may soon voluntarily return to their devastated homeland. The fear is that this will happen without any prior planning, especially since the Syrian crisis may be relatively unique in terms of its size and the difficulty of predicting its trajectories. Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to identify the lessons learned from the experiences of refugee return, whether voluntary or forced, which illustrate the most important factors for ensuring the sustainable return of Syrian refugees. The study is based on an extensive literature review, consultations and interviews with experts and stakeholders, supported by the researchers' accumulated experience in the field of post-war reconstruction and refugee studies. The study does not aim to analyze the current political or military situation in Syria, or to evaluate any ongoing or planned political talks, nor does it evaluate any proposed political solution.

The literature on state capacity is often at odds with what constitutes state capacity, how to operationalize it, and how to measure it. Nevertheless, it is important for us to attempt this endeavor given the importance of state capacity, and its effect on a number of political and social dynamics. With the proliferation of quality surveys in the Arab world in recent years, we also have an unprecedented opportunity to examine state capacity in a new light, according to citizen perceptions in addition to material measures. Thus, in this paper I will examine variations of state capacity measurements using the Arab Opinion Index data. I will provide evidence to show that many political phenomena can only be understood if the conditions surrounding state capacity are accounted for.

Although the Justice and Development Party (AKP) victory in the 2015 Turkish municipal elections was generally expected, the percentage of votes surprised many, including the leaders of the party. This paper suggests that, despite the best efforts of opposition parties to manipulate a series of crises for the AKP, the voters were able to see past the political maneuvering and took action at the ballot box. By first examining the many factors that had been expected to impact the results, not least of which was its political timing, and the general sense that Turkey’s ruling party was set for victory, this paper explores the political situation in Turkey at the time of the elections, and probes the events leading up to the vote. It begins with events of the year prior, which had witnessed a series of crises for the AKP including: events in Gezi Park and Taksim Square, a series of leaked voice recordings that put leaders in compromising positions, allegations of corruption against some AKP ministers, and most importantly, an ongoing conflict between Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his former ally and leader of the Gulen (Service) movement Fethullah Gülen. Each of these was expected to affect the AKP’s chances of maintaining a strong political position, and was used by the ruling party to bolster its own stance; a tactic that ultimately failed.

​يتضمــن هــذا التقريــر توثيقًــا لأهم الوقائــع الفلســطينية والأحداث المرتبطــة بالصــراع العربي - الإسرائيلي في المدة 1 آذار/ مارس - 30 نيسان/ أبريل2018.

The results of the June 15, 2015 parliamentary elections in Turkey have taken observers by surprise. While pollsters had predicted that Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) would be less popular than in earlier elections, most predictions had given the AKP 290 seats in the country’s legislature, the “Grand National Assembly of Turkey”. In other words, most had predicted that the AKP would continue to command an outright majority. In the end however, the AKP won 41% of the ballots cast, equating to 258 of the total of 550 seats available in the Turkish parliament. This surprise was compounded by the fact that the Kurdish People’s Democratic Party had finally crossed the 10% threshold of the popular vote to enter the chamber, and in fact secured 80 seats by winning 13% of the vote.