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​This report highlights some of the major milestones of the Arab democratic transition. The countries covered include Tunisia, Egypt, Libya,Syria and Yemen.

​Milestones in Democratic Transition in the Arab World 1/1-28/2/2021.

Following a return to armed conflict, the Turkish authorities abandoned, in 2015, a policy of political reconciliation with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The new approach is based on, first, the idea that no capable Kurdish negotiating partner exists for the Ankara authorities to negotiate with. Secondly, it is based on a full-scale military confrontation against the PKK and on weakening the Democratic Peoples' Party (HDP) through a variety of means. Thirdly, the new approach is based on an openness to alternative Kurdish groups to represent the Kurds in the future and is also based on strengthening the Kurdish conservatives. Despite the achievements of the AKP and the incumbent government in this regard, they continue to face on-the-ground challenges. This paper seeks to answer a set of questions: Can the HDP be weakened or lost in future parliamentary representation, or will it still represent a large segment of Kurds? Would support for the AKP's Kurdish allies be enough to allow them to negotiate on behalf of Turkey's Kurdish population? How feasible is the AKP government's present approach and how successful is it?

On April 30, 2014 the first Iraqi parliamentary elections since the American withdrawal in 2011 were held. These were the third elections since the US occupation of Iraq in 2003, and had special importance because of the impact they will have in determining the structure of the political system in Iraq with its future implications for the Iraqi state. The alliances of the political forces competing in the elections will also have a major impact on society, positive or negative, given that they come after the popular uprising in Anbar and the sharp increase in the conflict between the Iraqi army and ISIL. This paper tries to explain the dimensions of the political conflict in Iraq by means of the results of the 2014 parliamentary election and a comparison with previous elections. It explains the circumstances in which the elections were held, the nature of the electoral blocs, the results, and the possibilities for forming a government.

This study investigates the circumstances under which military governments leave power. It shows that there is no single path to get the military out of power, as there are no general rules for all cases. Nevertheless, several lessons are learned of which the most important is that military officers never relinquish power on their own. Rather, they are usually forced to leave it. In most cases, forcing the military to hand over authority requires a democratic opposition bloc that reaches a national consensus and agrees on a clear political strategy with an explicit goal. This will get the military out of power and establish a civilian government. A consensus or democratic bloc enables reformist democrats to change the balance of power for the benefit of democratic transition.

This article discusses the failure of the Iraqi political elites to resolve the key problems brought about by the occupation of Iraq in April 2003, even after the declaration of the Iraqi constitution in 2005. The article holds that the new constitution could not be implemented and was unsustainable for purely internal reasons. It was unable to provide answers to the new questions and facts, and the new tactical alternatives it created to produce hybrid regimes from 2006 were incapable of overcoming the structural crisis of the regime. This was especially the case since the attempts described as consensual, aimed to preserve the delicate political situation on the basis of the existing balance of power—rather than on the basis of a governing frame of reference accepted by all—did not transform into binding political conventions for the political groupings representative of the ethnic and religious components of Iraq, and at a minimum did not transform into agreements respected by all sides.

This study reads the performance of Egyptian political forces from the time of Mohamed Morsi’s election as president of the republic to the coup against him on July 3, 2013. In its first section, the study concludes that the behavior of all political actors can be understood as a search for allies from within the old regime’s centers of power; this despite the fact that these forces were the targets of the January 25 Revolution. Nonetheless, political parties seek out old guard forces hoping they will provide leverage for a position of power. This reality allowed the old regime – with its enormous capabilities—to rejoin the map of political forces instead of being held accountable. In its second section, the study tries to read the map of the protest movement on June 30, comparing this new map with one of the nation’s politics during the crisis of the constitutional declaration in November 2012. It concludes that the most important development in the nation’s political sphere has been the ability of the “deep state” to learn the skills of popular mobilization in the street. This came after it had failed to do so in the previous 36 months. Using its connections with a wide spectrum of social groups through networks of patronage and influence, which it had not thought of using in the spectacular “battle of the squares,” the “deep state” was able to become an active and influential political player capable of taking matters back to square one.

This paper presents a survey of political developments in Libya since the fall of Muamar Gaddafi. The author argues that, today, social and economic tensions have driven Libya to the edge of a precipice. It has become abundantly clear that a plan for transitional government, first envisioned by the National Transitional Council in 2014, has evaporated. To this has been added institutional stalemate, accompanied by violence, instability and direct confrontations between various Libyan factions. In this setting, a group associated with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant has been able to expand its power in the country. Finally, the author suggests that the 2012 national elections in Libya were not in reality, as widely perceived, a competition between Islamists and liberals, but, in fact, a contest for power and influence between representatives of various tribal groups and local leaders.

This study addresses the extent to which the "participatory" framework is compatible with the networks of Tunisian elites since the Revolution of 2011. The author seeks to understand, analyze and interpret the theoretical approaches which allowed Tunisian politicians to reduce the level of political divisions within the country. The author further illustrates how Tunisia's formal political parties adapted and developed in the post-revolutionary setting, despite the revolution unraveling the vast extent of a societal rift in Tunisia which has dominated the country's political debates since that time. Finally, the study explores in depth the role and influence of Tunisian political elites as it relates to the praxis of participatory democracy, something which could not have been possible without the consciousness and awareness of these elites and their duty to fulfill their roles.

This study deals with transnational Shiism and the dynamics of relations between the Shiʿi religious establishment and the post-colonial state in Iraq. It sheds light on two aspects of transnational Shiism. First, the evolution and internal dynamics of religious authority, especially in terms of adapting its transnational domain to the Iraqi national context. The study argues that the relationship between Shiʿi religious establishment and the state was often characterized by tension, as the state sought to consolidate its power within its borders. Yet, after 2003, the nature of relations between the two has significantly changed, leading to new configurations of authority. Second, the increasing polarization between activist transnational Shiism, which is today led by the Iranian state, and Iraq-centric Shiism became a key factor in shaping power relations in post-2003 Iraq.