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The Islamic Republic's foreign policy, grounded in a revolutionary commitment to Shi ʿ i transnationalism, has long been viewed as a central mechanism for securing Iran's regional influence and post-revolutionary identity. Yet recent developments, most notably the June 2025 war with Israel, raise critical questions about the sustainability of this approach. While much scholarship has explored Iran's identity-driven foreign policy, less attention has been paid to the chronic contradictions it generates within Iran's ontological security framework, or how these contradictions both shape and constrain Iran's regional conduct. This study approaches the problem by theorising Iran's predicament as an ontological trap, a condition in which identity-affirming foreign policy routines produce chronic insecurity rather than stabilisation. It introduces the concept of a security dilemma of influence to explain how transnational networks (once strategic assets) now provoke nationalist contestation and narrative fatigue in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon.

This paper attempts to study a wider trend of jihadist groups with a globalist outlook, a phenomenon which was not entirely clearly understood when the Syrian revolution broke out. Since only the broad outlines of this trend are apparent, leaving many of the details as yet unclear, the author shall attempt to illuminate the environment in which these groups operate. Specifically, the paper examines “Nusra Front” (known in full as the “Nusra” or “Salvation” Front for the People of Syria). The paper follows the foundation of the group and the circumstances which allowed it to flourish and spread across Syria through to the internal divisions which led to its fragmentation before it made way for the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. The conclusion of this paper surveys some of the immediate and secondary consequences of the spread of both of these groups.

​The Muslim response to colonialism has varied country to country and region to region. The dawn of colonialism created ruptures in Muslim political reasoning, forcing them to find and reconfigure an Islamic response to the changing political realities. The Indian subcontinent never came under an Islamic Caliphate of the Umayyad or Abbasid Empires. Most military expansionist ambitions in India stemmed from the volatile Central Asian Khanates who played a major strategic role between the Caliphate and Indian subcontinent, preventing the Caliphate from controlling India directly and maintaining an advanced independent politics. This paper profiles the political context of Muslim political thought and its response to the rise of nation-state, which was shaped more of political realism, setting aside the Islamic vocabularies of Dar al Islam or Dar al Harb. This paper concludes that, the South Asian Muslim mind had accepted nation-state either in its composite or in a distinctively Muslim format which resulted in the two nation-states of India and Pakistan. Both formats have evolved within a strong Islamic context that challenges Pakistan's "Islamic credentials" against India.

​The Muslim response to colonialism has varied country to country and region to region. The dawn of colonialism created ruptures in Muslim political reasoning, forcing them to find and reconfigure an Islamic response to the changing political realities. The Indian subcontinent never came under an Islamic Caliphate of the Umayyad or Abbasid Empires. Most military expansionist ambitions in India stemmed from the volatile Central Asian Khanates who played a major strategic role between the Caliphate and Indian subcontinent, preventing the Caliphate from controlling India directly and maintaining an advanced independent politics. This paper profiles the political context of Muslim political thought and its response to the rise of nation-state, which was shaped more of political realism, setting aside the Islamic vocabularies of Dar al Islam or Dar al Harb. This paper concludes that, the South Asian Muslim mind had accepted nation-state either in its composite or in a distinctively Muslim format which resulted in the two nation-states of India and Pakistan. Both formats have evolved within a strong Islamic context that challenges Pakistan's "Islamic credentials" against India.

Given the unrest boiling in the region, this paper considers the possibility of partitioning the countries of the Levant. Given the state of affairs and current political indicators in Syria and Iraq, which suggest the Kurds have started to regain their national unity and awareness, the group is now the only faction in the Levant fighting on nationalist or ethnic bases. What makes it easier for them to establish a viable Kurdish entity, at the local level, is the fact that they have huge economic, political, human, and military potential. This paper examines local and international contexts and obstacles to the establishment of a Kurdish state. It also argues that it will be unlikely, meanwhile, that sectarian entities could be created in Syria and Iraq given current local and international circumstances. Indeed, sectarian tension is nothing more than social tension that is the result of imbalance in the distribution of wealth and power, and the result of political authoritarianism. Therefore, the warring groups are not part of the framework of separatist tendencies; though they are liable to turn into sectarian nationalisms due to foreign intervention and agendas.

This study conducts research on the traditional academic methods used in the Arab scholarly community. Specifically, it employs the case of legal science when addressing the following questions: Is the Arab academy in its field suffering from academic dependency? What forms does this take and what are the reasons behind it? Where does reviewing theoretical or conceptual frameworks of legal science fall in this? This study focuses on law as a method of social control in the methodological crisis undergone by the social sciences. This study refers to two crises examined by Arab legal science: identity crisis and functional crisis. These are illustrated by two main indicators: The gap between the quantitative growth of the number of law students and the weak production of legal research knowledge, the gap between the quantitative development of the educational institutions of law and of legal structures.

This article deals with the post-2003 consociationalist experiment in Iraq. It examines the reasons why this experiment has failed in producing a reasonably coherent governing formula. It argues that, because of their emphasis on identity politics and not on making mutual concessions in the interest of serious statebuilding, the main players in this experiment (Shia, Sunni and Kurdish political elites) failed to appreciate the complexity of the consociationalist arrangement, let alone use it for public interest. The article focuses on the central role that the Shia Islamist parties played in making this failure happen, highlighting, as reasons, their insistence on an essentially sectarian rhetoric and their attempt to enforce it as a national identity. The article finally proposes a different rhetoric that can accommodate Iraq's ethnic and religious diversity.

This paper discusses what it sees as turmoil in Turkish policy towards the Syrian crisis, a policy that is marked by constant fluctuations. For example, the passive stance towards ISIL’s occupation of the Kurdish town of Ain al-Arab/Kobani stood in contradiction to Turkey’s subsequent air attacks on ISIL positions inside Syria following the explosions in Suruc, only for Turkey to then change tactic again by bombarding the rear lines of the PKK in northern Iraq. Even after Turkey opened up the Incirlik airbase to coalition forces, Turkey did not participate in the campaign against ISIL beyond a few strikes, while its air power was continuously targeting PKK positions. Turkish policy in Syria has not developed much, and is being pulled into the political crisis and acts of violence at home, which have crippled the country since the elections of June 7, 2015. In addition, the situation in Syria has forced Turkey to focus on its southern borders, putting it in contact with the various active parties in Syria with their conflicting interests. Furthermore, the Syrian crisis has forced Ankara to reconsider its management of the Aegean coast and its northern borders, to keep refugees on its territory and so maintain good relations with the EU.

This study explores the origins of Qatari-US relations, the foundations on which they are based, and the rules that govern them. It begins by examining relations between the two countries from the 1970s up until the Trump era. The paper finds that Qatar's need for US security assurances did not prevent it from adopting independent policies that occasionally contradicted US strategy. Accordingly, the Qatari-US relations have been upended, and exposed to crises due to diverging interests, concerns and challenges. While Qatar has embraced a foreign policy independent of Washington, it has also tried not to alienate it and has established itself as an asset for the US, both in terms of the military facilities it provides and the unique role it plays through maintaining ties with parties that the US cannot communicate with directly. Mutual dependency has enabled Qatari-US relations to overcome all the challenges they have faced over the past three decades, including those that emerged under the Trump administration.

This paper addresses problematic aspects of the concept of "terrorism" from within its present-day setting, exploring the futile conflict between "terrorism" and "counter-terrorism" which has been utilized to marginalize the discourse on democracy, justice and national liberation. The paper argues that the categorization of an event as a terrorist act based on the identity of the perpetrator, and regardless of the victims, leads to a logical fallacy. One consequence of categorizing all armed acts by non-state actors as "terrorist" is the erosion of distinctions between terrorist acts and acts of national liberation, resistance to foreign occupation and armed opposition to state violence against civilians. One conclusion of the paper is that blurring the distinctions between terrorist and legitimate acts is counterproductive to the war on terror.