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The Arab Opinion Index 2019/2020 data on the Algerian Hirak shows the consolidation of the phenomenon of taking to the streets to protest as the dominant form of expression of political, economic, and social demands at a time when forms of institutional political participation, such as party and trade union membership, are declining. The Index results confirmed that tyranny, monopolisation of power and corruption are the main factors that led people to protest and gave the movement the great dynamism that characterises it. Although the Algerian street movement succeeded in forcing Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the former President of Algeria, to resign, preventing him from running for a fifth term as president and raising hopes for an improvement in economic and social indicators, these hopes quickly faded after the conviction grew that the regime had not changed and that the general situation remained as it was before.

This study discusses Saudi-Iranian rivalry in the Persian Gulf, focusing on political, economic, strategic, historical, and religious dimensions. It details the escalation of tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran since 1979 up until 2019, before delving into the agreement to restore diplomatic relations between the two countries in March 2023. The study concludes that countries in the international system tend to maximize their capabilities and enhance their power; which sometimes leads to escalation in hostilities and the pursuit of an arms race. Iran's security strategy also includes enhancing its power and capabilities in pursuit of regional hegemony. Saudi Arabia sees Iran as its greatest security threat, whereby Iran poses multiple air, sea, and cyber security challenges to the Kingdom.​

​This study fits into a broad category of scholarship concerned with transitional periods in various political systems. Specifically, it examines the political transition in post-revolutionary Tunisia since 2011. It does so by comparing the legal provisions of the post-revolutionary transition - the major texts, which define the transitional stage - and the political realities, which take the shape of events, actions and political discourse. A point of particular focus is the 2011 elections to the National Constituent Assembly, which the author analyzes through the rubric of "electoral engineering". One more conclusion of the paper is that electoral engineering remains a feature of Tunisian politics, although it has gone from "authoritarian electoral engineering" to "democratic electoral engineering," reflecting changes which have taken in the country as a whole.

This report highlights some of the major milestones of the Arab democratic transition. The countries covered include Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen.

​يتضمــن هــذا التقريــر توثيقًــا لأهم الوقائــع الفلســطينية والأحداث المرتبطــة بالصــراع العربي - الإسرائيلي في المدة 1 آذار/ مارس - 30 نيسان/ أبريل2018.

Victimization narratives compose a principle element in creating of sub-national identities in societies afflicted by divisions and communal disputes. Little wonder then that narratives of victimization abound in Kirkuk province, which lies at the heart of Iraq’s “disputed internal areas” problem. This paper starts of by analyzing the nature of victimization narratives and how they make use of the past to serve political projects spearheaded by political elites. It then turns to surveying and deconstructing the contending narratives propagated by communal elites in Kirkuk regarding the victimization, whether real or imagined, endured by the province’s demographic components – Kurds, Turkmens, Arabs and Christians. By analytically surveying the narratives of victimization of these four communities, this paper seeks to ascertain the workings of these narratives and to explicate the role they play.

The war against ISIL is a critical US national security interest. It not only threatens to create a major center of terrorism and extremism in a critical part of the Middle East, and one that could spread to threaten the flow of energy exports and the global economy, but could become a major center of international terrorism. It is important to understand, however, that ISIL is only one cause of instability in the region, and only one of the threats caused by spreading sectarian and ethnic violence. Iraq is a key case in point. No defeat of ISIL can bring Iraq security or stability, or give it the unity and independent strength to resist pressure from Iran and threats based in Syria and Turkey. No military course of action can—by itself – create a stable regime and economy, and reduce tension between Iraqi Sunnis and Shiites, and Arabs and Kurds, to workable levels. Like Syria, Libya, and Yemen, military action must be joined to political and economic action and the creation of some form of viable governance.

This study discusses successive Palestinian governments and provides a reading of their features, focusing on the 15th, 16th and 17th governments, five years after Rami Hamdallah became prime minister. The first section examines the emergence and development of governments since 1994. The second section gives an overview of the three cabinets in question and their agendas while the third section examines the failures of these governments and the impact of that failure on the Palestinian political scene. The final section examines the traditional operating assumptions of the political system. The study argues that the origin of the problem lies in the political system that has emerged since 1994 which restricts the operations of Palestinian governments, and that the formation of "technocratic" cabinets has only exacerbated the Palestinian political crisis.

In September 2014, US President Barack Obama announced a “comprehensive strategy” to degrade and destroy ISIL. Obama stated, “I will not hesitate to take action against ISIL in Syria, as well as Iraq. This is a core principle of my presidency: If you threaten America, you will find no safe haven.” But despite this announcement, questions over the nature, goals, and instruments of US policy towards ISIL still continue to be asked in the context of a debate between those who think that the US is not doing enough to take on ISIL and those who think it would be better for the US not to expand its military involvement in the conflict. This debate has been influenced by internal American political polarizations in the form of the critical position taken by leading Republicans such as Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham, who view the Obama policy as weak, and Middle Eastern regional rivalries over the position towards ISIL and the nature of the political choices that must frame the confrontation with it.

This article discusses the failure of the Iraqi political elites to resolve the key problems brought about by the occupation of Iraq in April 2003, even after the declaration of the Iraqi constitution in 2005. The article holds that the new constitution could not be implemented and was unsustainable for purely internal reasons. It was unable to provide answers to the new questions and facts, and the new tactical alternatives it created to produce hybrid regimes from 2006 were incapable of overcoming the structural crisis of the regime. This was especially the case since the attempts described as consensual, aimed to preserve the delicate political situation on the basis of the existing balance of power—rather than on the basis of a governing frame of reference accepted by all—did not transform into binding political conventions for the political groupings representative of the ethnic and religious components of Iraq, and at a minimum did not transform into agreements respected by all sides.