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This is the second section of a study examining the application of good governance in Egypt and Tunisia. The first section, published in issue 42 of the Siyasat Arabiya journal, provided an in-depth theoretical framework for assessing the dynamics of administering governmental affairs, establishing the prerequisites of effective governance, and combatting corruption. This second section argues that administrative corruption is an important obstacle to the quality of public services provided by central government in Egypt and Tunisia, despite various laws and codes calling for tackling corruption and corrupt individuals. This study recommends governmental decentralization; gradually permitting legislative bodies to review the work mechanisms of public administration; adopting organizational philosophies that can serve to improve the process of providing public services; and finally, activating e-government and information and communications technology to achieve more effective public administration operations and services provision and thereby contribute to expanding economic growth.

The study concerns the armed Shiism in Iraq and its most prominent embodiment, the Mahdi Army (MA). It deals with the relationship between the MA and the Sadrist movement, as a case og the relationship between political organizations and their armed wings. It explores the specificity of this relationship, whereby the MA arose within the Najaf Shiite's Hawza . Hence, the MA was not a typical armed wing, but was more like a general beacon of mobilization for the Shiite community in Iraq. MA was the first organizational step for the movement as much as its presence as the armed wing remained an essential pillar, controlling and determining the development of the movement. The study argues that the debate over the extent of armed action led to a struggle over the identity of the movement, between two wings: remaining an armed organization, or turning to political action. Therefore, the leadership's efforts to control MA were intersects with the political struggle between its wings.

This study advances a new approach to theorizing the Arab state after the popular uprisings. It does this in two steps. Suspending the western European model of state formation and bringing the Arab world's experience in conversation with other parts of the Global South, it examines alternative state formation and state building sequences, trajectories, and temporalities in the making of Arab states. It thus historicizes the process of state formation and state building in the Arab world as compared to the western European one and other regions in the Global South. This first step liberates us from explicit and implicit comparisons with the European model of state formation. The second step surveys alternative theorizations of the Arab state after the uprisings. Tracing the causal assumptions embedded in these theories reveals how much they rely on the European model of state formation and state building as an implicit point of analytic departure and critical comparison. This survey unpacks the assumptions these theories make about the state, the difference between states and regimes, state and non-state actors, the private and public realms, and the formal and informal sectors. The objective of this study is to not only de-exceptionalize states in the Arab world, but, more importantly, borrowing from Gurminder Bhambra, 'unmake' our understandings of state formation and state building in the Arab world and thus contribute, following Walter Mignolo, to a knowledge production that serves a form of 'epistemic reconstitution' of alternative historical trajectories and possibilities.

This paper analyses of some of the most salient Israeli laws and legal instruments used to entrench control over Jerusalem and alter the city spatially and demographically. The first of three sections examines the Israeli legal instruments used, since the 1948 occupation of western districts of the city, to control Jerusalem. The second section explores the repercussions of US recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in 2017. The same section also examines the enshrinement of "Jerusalem, the Capital of Israel" law of 1980, amendments to which require an overwhelming majority of Knesset members. The third and final section explores the avenues potentially available to the Palestinians in confronting Israeli plans for the re-settling of Jerusalem, a task which requires the formulation of a clear, multi-faceted strategy implemented by both grassroots and official Palestinians.

​This study examines the management of ethnic and social diversity in the military by comparing the United States of America, a reference case, and Saudi Arabia, which is still in an early stage of institutionalization. It uses a military-sociological approach, which posits that the military reflects the socio-cultural structure of society. It focuses on four key societal indicators: ethnicity, gender, sectarian affiliation, and tribal identity. It argues that the effectiveness of diversity management depends on integrating both normative (legislation and policies) and practical (implementation) levels, while accounting for the societal specificity of each case. The US experience shows that the presence of both normative and practical frameworks does not necessarily yield an ideal type, due to persistent representation challenges, particularly at senior military ranks. In contrast, the Saudi case is characterized by the absence of a clear normative framework and the novelty of the experience, despite emerging indicators of openness, especially after 2017. The study concludes that managing diversity is not merely a social demand, but also a prerequisite for strengthening military effectiveness and institutional cohesion​.

China’s foreign policy is concerned with strengthening relations with states of significance in the world, whether large or small. Its strategic culture plays a key role in shaping its vision of the international order, its objectives, and the tools it employs to enhance its global standing. China has primarily relied on soft power instruments in its relations with other countries, particularly in the economic sphere, and it recognizes the importance of the State of Qatar within the Arab region in general and among energy-exporting countries in particular. Accordingly, China has concluded long-term contracts for the import of substantial quantities of natural gas and has been constructing massive liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers for Qatar. Although Qatar is considered a key ally of the United States, China and Qatar signed a strategic partnership in 2014 covering multiple fields. Both countries seek to further develop this partnership in alignment with China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Qatar’s National Vision 2030.

This study argues that relying on the United States for of security and defense has led to the neglect of the Arab Gulf states to varying degrees. These countries failed to build an independent regional security capacity or develop broad security relations with third parties besides the United States. Since President Barack Obama took office in 2009-2016, before Donald Trump replaced him, questioning the regional balance of power, this reliance has destabilized the most stable part of the Arab world. This study examines the implications of the unprecedented regional reality regarding the strategic and security relations between the United States and the Gulf in the context of the divergent views of Washington and its local partners on regional security management methods, in particular the role of the GCC in managing peace and security.

This study provides a discussion and analysis of the circumstances that led to the military occupation of the core of the state and government in contemporary Algeria, and the ramifications for the process of building political and legal institutions, and the democratic transition experience. The study employs the concepts of populism and neopatrimonialism to paint a picture of the path taken by the government in Algeria since independence. Populism describes the ideology that sanctified the one-party state and revolutionary legitimacy, while neopatrimonialism is the resulting shape taken by the exercise of political power. Framing these two concepts within their historical context provides an understanding of the circumstances of the army's seizure of power and its identification with the state. It clarifies the reasons for its refusal to redistribute power within the society after the establishment of political pluralism in the 1989 Constitution.

The paper provides indications and analysis of the positions of the most influential Shia powers and parties in Iraq after the fall of the predominantly Sunni city of Mosul and the rise of the Islamic State group in 2014. In addition to the Najaf-based supreme Shia religious authority led by ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the Shia parties represented in government since 2003, the paper shed light on the increasingly powerful Iran-backed armed groups Popular Mobilization (Hashd Sha'abi) and how their appeal, visibility and influence had changed after the fall of Mosul. The question of the Iraqi national identity and how it interacts with the Shia identity is addressed in the paper in light of the discourse of the Shia powers and relations between Shia Iraqis and other communities.

This paper adopts the assumption that the series of foreign interventions which served to transform the Syrian crisis from a domestic revolution into a regionalized, and later globalized, conflict were not the result of factors intrinsic to the revolution itself, but rather the consequences of dramatic changes sweeping across the entire Middle East following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. The fallout from 2003 included the collapse of the former tripartite of Arab regional powers: Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. For the first time, the non-Arab regional powers of Turkey and Iran came to be directly involved in intra-Arab affairs. The latter effectively had an overland border tying it to Syria's Mediterranean coast once the US withdrew the bulk of its military forces from Iraq in 2011. While the Syrian regime had worked to strengthen its ties to both Ankara and Tehran in the wake of its losses following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Syria would fall victim to regional power politics between its two regional neighbors. Once the Syrian revolution was militarized, in response to the Damascus regime's iron-fisted approach to peaceful popular protests, Turkish-Iranian rivalry over the future of Syria quickly became bloody. In an attempt to limit the extent of influence not only by Turkey but also its ally Iran, the Syrian regime resorted to seeking out additional foreign support, latterly from Russia.