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The study concerns the armed Shiism in Iraq and its most prominent embodiment, the Mahdi Army (MA). It deals with the relationship between the MA and the Sadrist movement, as a case og the relationship between political organizations and their armed wings. It explores the specificity of this relationship, whereby the MA arose within the Najaf Shiite's Hawza . Hence, the MA was not a typical armed wing, but was more like a general beacon of mobilization for the Shiite community in Iraq. MA was the first organizational step for the movement as much as its presence as the armed wing remained an essential pillar, controlling and determining the development of the movement. The study argues that the debate over the extent of armed action led to a struggle over the identity of the movement, between two wings: remaining an armed organization, or turning to political action. Therefore, the leadership's efforts to control MA were intersects with the political struggle between its wings.

This seminal article is one of the founding texts of Critical Theory in International Relations. In this article, Robert Cox advances a critical alternative to traditional International Relations theory by foregrounding the dialectical relationship between social forces, forms of state, and structures of world order, rather than limiting analysis to interactions among states as isolated units. Cox further distinguishes between problem-solving theory, which takes the existing order as a given and seeks to preserve and improve its functioning, and critical theory, which questions the historical conditions that produced that order, exposes its underlying power relations, and illuminates the possibilities for its transformation. He develops the concept of historical structures as continually evolving configurations composed of material capabilities, ideas, and institutions, and reconceptualizes hegemony as a congruence between power, ideology, and institutions, rather than as the mere material preponderance of a single state.

This study reassesses the experience of political openness in Algeria within the analytical and explanatory categories of political economy. It is built on the premise that the transition from a totalitarian authoritarian regime to a democratic one presupposes the transition from a rentier economy linked to the external market and dominated by rentier groups, to a productive economy based on the national bourgeoisie exploitation of local labour to create wealth. The study argues that the experience of democratic transition in Algeria faltered due to the failure of the rentier groups to undergo capitalist transformation that could have allowed the emergence of the two main sides of the democratic equation: the bourgeoisie and the working class. The political elites that control the rentier economy were willing to accept political but not economic reforms that could have led to a reconsideration of the hegemonic relations within society and liberated it from the grip of power. In this regard, the failure of the economic reforms introduced by the Hamrouche government (1989 - 1991) was a prelude to the disruption of the democratic transition and prevention of the development of a civil society capable of gaining its independence from authority and, on the other hand, the independence of the Algerian state from the global market.

The purpose of this paper is to study the Algerian experience with the Arab spring by identifying the nature of the protests movements in Algeria, to search the adaptation mechanisms of the Algerian political regime with the protest act and to answer the question: why the change in Algeria is so hard to happen? Next, this paper will expose a range of the most important political bets to understand better the Algerian exception by searching the roots of the crisis which has been overcomed in searching a radical and real reform. Finally, this paper will be concluded by addressing the prospects of political, institutional and economical changes and by exposing a future scenarios of the hard transition in light of internal and external challenges.

In September 2014, US President Barack Obama announced a “comprehensive strategy” to degrade and destroy ISIL. Obama stated, “I will not hesitate to take action against ISIL in Syria, as well as Iraq. This is a core principle of my presidency: If you threaten America, you will find no safe haven.” But despite this announcement, questions over the nature, goals, and instruments of US policy towards ISIL still continue to be asked in the context of a debate between those who think that the US is not doing enough to take on ISIL and those who think it would be better for the US not to expand its military involvement in the conflict. This debate has been influenced by internal American political polarizations in the form of the critical position taken by leading Republicans such as Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham, who view the Obama policy as weak, and Middle Eastern regional rivalries over the position towards ISIL and the nature of the political choices that must frame the confrontation with it.

This study builds on the assumption that any change in the structure of the international system in the foreseeable future cannot be immediately ascribed to the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. However, even if the pandemic is purely incidental and unable to change the existing distribution of power, this does not mean it has not introduced a dialogue within International Relations on the impact of epidemics on the structure of the international system, and their ability to intensify some essential - economic, social, and political - factors that contribute to international system change. International power balances before the outbreak of the pandemic indicate the beginning of change of the international system, as if it has been moving towards multipolarity, particularly with many rising powers, such as China, Russia and the European Union, whose international interests challenge those of the US, especially as the latter persistently impedes any rise of rival powers in the foreseeable future.

This study explores the relationship and reciprocal influence between the political authority in Iran, led by the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, and the religious authority in Najaf, led by the Grand Ayatollah and marja', Ali al-Sistani. Rather than focusing exclusively on jurisprudential/ideological doctrines, the paper approaches the subject from a perspective that emphasizes the interactive relationship between the structure and the agency. It suggests that the emergence of the Islamic regime in Iran, based on the principle of Willayat Al-Faqih, had a significant impact on reshaping power relations in the Shi'i theological space and the response of Shi'i religious actors. At the same time, the practices adopted by al-Sistani in Iraq after 2003 , the context he was responding to, and the emergence of the Marji ʿ yya as an extraconstitutional actor, allowed for the formation of an alternative transitional model, which I term a "neo-traditional authority". The study argues for an alternative to two theses: first, the potential decline of the traditional Marji ʿ yya due to the dominance of the Willayat Al-Faqih in Iran, put forward in particular by Mehdi Khalaji, and second, the superiority and continuity of the traditional Marji ʿ yya due to its depoliticization, contended by Linda Wallbridge. The paper also maintains that there is an interpretive framework that meets the two theses in the middle, represented by the rise of the neo-traditional Marji ʿ yya and the possibility it will emerge as an alternative model in the future.

This study focuses on the legal status of the Palestinian Declaration of Independence (PDI) issued in 1988 by the Palestinian National Council of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), in light of the Palestinian Constitutional Court 2018 decision, which granted the declaration a "supra-constitutional" status—placing it above the Basic Law issued by the Palestinian Legislative Council of the Palestinian Authority (PA). The authors characterize the legal nature of the PDI as a "Declaration of Rights" and argue that the Court, in issuing its decision, overstepped its interpretive power, deeming the decision flawed due to the political considerations behind it, aiming at enhancing the legitimacy of the PA by invoking the symbolic legitimacy of the PLO. The study comparatively showcases experiences from the United States, France, Egypt, and Algeria, revealing that none of these jurisdictions have granted Declarations of Rights a status superior to that of the constitution. The authors conclude that the Court's decision was unsound and that the PDI should be treated as a reference constitutional document, but not one that supersedes the Basic Law.

Given the unrest boiling in the region, this paper considers the possibility of partitioning the countries of the Levant. Given the state of affairs and current political indicators in Syria and Iraq, which suggest the Kurds have started to regain their national unity and awareness, the group is now the only faction in the Levant fighting on nationalist or ethnic bases. What makes it easier for them to establish a viable Kurdish entity, at the local level, is the fact that they have huge economic, political, human, and military potential. This paper examines local and international contexts and obstacles to the establishment of a Kurdish state. It also argues that it will be unlikely, meanwhile, that sectarian entities could be created in Syria and Iraq given current local and international circumstances. Indeed, sectarian tension is nothing more than social tension that is the result of imbalance in the distribution of wealth and power, and the result of political authoritarianism. Therefore, the warring groups are not part of the framework of separatist tendencies; though they are liable to turn into sectarian nationalisms due to foreign intervention and agendas.

This article deals with the post-2003 consociationalist experiment in Iraq. It examines the reasons why this experiment has failed in producing a reasonably coherent governing formula. It argues that, because of their emphasis on identity politics and not on making mutual concessions in the interest of serious statebuilding, the main players in this experiment (Shia, Sunni and Kurdish political elites) failed to appreciate the complexity of the consociationalist arrangement, let alone use it for public interest. The article focuses on the central role that the Shia Islamist parties played in making this failure happen, highlighting, as reasons, their insistence on an essentially sectarian rhetoric and their attempt to enforce it as a national identity. The article finally proposes a different rhetoric that can accommodate Iraq's ethnic and religious diversity.