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This study argues that relying on the United States for of security and defense has led to the neglect of the Arab Gulf states to varying degrees. These countries failed to build an independent regional security capacity or develop broad security relations with third parties besides the United States. Since President Barack Obama took office in 2009-2016, before Donald Trump replaced him, questioning the regional balance of power, this reliance has destabilized the most stable part of the Arab world. This study examines the implications of the unprecedented regional reality regarding the strategic and security relations between the United States and the Gulf in the context of the divergent views of Washington and its local partners on regional security management methods, in particular the role of the GCC in managing peace and security.

This study explores the challenges facing Indian foreign policy in West Asia, especially the attempt to balance the forces in the Arab Region in light of competition between West Asian states to spread their influence. It argues that Arab countries have demonstrated a willingness to see India undertake a greater role in maintaining peace and stability in the region. But Indian strategies seem limited, not only requiring bilateral collaboration, but also to rationalize their competitive relations at the regional and global levels. The study argues that India must redraw its strategic vision of the region, as well as its regional and global partnerships with China, Pakistan, Russia and the United States, a process that will undoubtedly have repercussions for India's traditional reluctant West Asia policy.

This article poses the question of reform of the security sector in the period of Arab democratic transition by looking at the terms of reference for reform, the intersection between security policies and the political regime, and the enabling factors for security reform within an Arab context. The fundamental question facing Arab states concerns how to couple security and freedom and security and rights and justice. That is, how can the security agencies carry out their job without impinging on fundamental individual rights and freedoms? How can the state guarantee security and defend liberties at the same time? The article takes the view that security sector reform is part of the political transition process in Arab countries. Because the security establishment was a means to strengthen the regime and endorse its authoritarianism, any democratic transition aspiring to overcome the elements of the crisis must take into account the need to review the security sector.

This paper relies on the academic literature on rebel movements and armed rebellions to better the insurrection presently underway in the Egyptian provinces of the Sinai. The paper seeks to understand the implications for counter-insurgency policies, asking why the insurgency has proven so resilient, and at times expanded. The military capabilities and resources available to the militants will also be scrutinized, along with the Egyptian Army's blundering attempts at counterinsurgency and the prevailing political environment. The paper then moves to studying the tactical patterns and the overall strategy of the ISIL affiliated group active in the Sinai. The author concludes that the failure of counterinsurgency efforts, the continued absence of national reconciliation, the failure to review and revise counterinsurgency policies serve to make the Sinai region fertile ground for insurgents.

This article looks at Algeria's security policy in general and its security doctrine in particular, analysing its changes and dilemmas in a turbulent regional environment and in the context of an internal Hirak. It argues that these doctrines have undergone minor changes to meet regional security needs, which precludes fundamental change at this stage. It also argues that the tension between the moral-normative imperative and the security imperative, on the one hand, and the principle of dual non-interference (political and military), on the other, constitute two major dilemmas confronting Algerian politics and security doctrine. Starting from these two elements, the article, after setting out my concept of the subject, examines the formation and nature of Algerian politics, ideology, and transformations. It then looks at the constitutional decision on the participation of Algerian armed forces in international peacekeeping operations, analysing their context (domestic and foreign), their motives and justifications, and the reservations they face. Finally, it analyses Algeria's regional security strategy as an alternative to intervention. The article comes to three main conclusions. First, there is a limited adjustment to the issue of external interference depending on the needs of the security interest. Second, the end of the absolute refusal to use armed forces outside the borders. Third, it is likely that the tension between moral-normative and security considerations will escalate if the unrest continues within its geographical boundaries.

The fall of Mosul on June 10, 2014 following the assault by armed factions, with ISIL at the forefront, represented a major point of transformation for the political scene in Iraq, particularly following the withdrawal of the Iraqi military and police, and the succession of cities in northern and western Iraq that fell to ISIL. This paper looks at the accelerating developments in the Iraqi crisis since 2014. It tries to understand and describe the event, and presents two current narratives: the first is that ISIL is the only actor responsible for the planning and implementation of what happened and is happening; and the second observes the revival of the Sunni opposition movements in the context of the Anbar uprising against the Iraqi government. The paper reviews the positions of the forces active internally: the Iraqi government and its allies, the armed factions and their allies, and the Iraqi political forces participating in the political process, and externally in the region and on the global scene.

The current Sinai issue poses many questions on the nature of the escalating violence there, the reasons for its emergence

This article discusses the failure of the Iraqi political elites to resolve the key problems brought about by the occupation of Iraq in April 2003, even after the declaration of the Iraqi constitution in 2005. The article holds that the new constitution could not be implemented and was unsustainable for purely internal reasons. It was unable to provide answers to the new questions and facts, and the new tactical alternatives it created to produce hybrid regimes from 2006 were incapable of overcoming the structural crisis of the regime. This was especially the case since the attempts described as consensual, aimed to preserve the delicate political situation on the basis of the existing balance of power—rather than on the basis of a governing frame of reference accepted by all—did not transform into binding political conventions for the political groupings representative of the ethnic and religious components of Iraq, and at a minimum did not transform into agreements respected by all sides.

This study monitors the role of external factors in the stability of Moroccan authoritarianism and controling the liberalization methods pursued by the government over two stages: the final years of the Cold War and the 2011 Arab Spring. As much as these factors contributed to widening the margin of liberalization in the Moroccan political arena, they also contributed to limiting this liberalization (September 11, the post-2013 counterrevolutionary movement), especially given the lack of internal will to mature it. While it is true that these factors have made an impact, this remained within certain limits that allowed actors abroad (the United States, the European Union and donor institutions) to control the transformations of Moroccan politics and to manage contradictions, thus creating an environment hostile to democratic transition in Morocco.

One year has passed since the start of coalition air strikes against ISIL in Syria. Over that year ISIL has endured setbacks and defeats in a number of areas, perhaps the most important of which are Ain al-Arab (Kobani) and Hasaka. However, it succeeded in expanding its influence and incorporated new towns and villages such as Tadmur, the eastern Rif Homs, northern Rif Aleppo, Qalamon, and the Yarmouk refugee camp in the capital into its “state”. In this way it cut up the majority of Syrian territory and threatened strategic centers and urban areas such as Homs and the capital Damascus. The paper concludes that ISIL is imposing the rhythm and variables of battle in various parts of Syria. The international coalition remains unable to eliminate it or degrade it in the short or medium term. Eliminating ISIL may take years if the piecemeal US approach to confronting it continues as now.