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​It was mostly British colonisers who came to consolidate the political, economic and military interests of the motherland and did what they used to do: play football. Apart from spending their time, football worked as a colonial instrument both "civilising" and "disciplining" the colonised populations. The first clubs in North Africa and the Levant restricted membership for non-Westerners and non-whites, but soon football also became a transnational transmitter of independence movements, the stadiums becoming important social spaces on the local and national levels. Such was the emancipatory force of football that it has been preserved across the region ever since the colonial era, prominent again in the Arab Uprisings. However, the massive wealth of the Gulf States and their decision to invest in football's soft power has changed the equation. The article thus describes emancipatory and counter-emancipatory trends in MENA football history from a longue durée perspective.

This article is an attempt to study the legitimization of the Moroccan political system by constitutional jurisprudence, considered as a concrete process within the science of constitutional law, and a social field that has witnessed struggles over epistemic authority. The structure and dynamism of this scientific field, and the appropriate political context, led to its transition from profane thought to traditionalism in the wake of the conservative revolution spearheaded by moroccan young researchers. This revolution, which constituted the kingdom of the constitutionalists, will shift from a counter field to a hegemonic one. This enabled the pioneers of traditionalism to participate in the process of legitimizing the political system in Morocco, through the production of constitutional documents broadcast and infused in symbolic violence through the constitutional lesson that will turn them, with the backing of the constitutional document and academic mentoring, into a scientific habitus.

The Gulf states, collectively and individually, no longer enjoy the luxury of stability and security they did over the three decades that preceded the outbreak of the Arab Spring. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) now faces new kinds of threats more serious than any since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime at the hands of American forces in 2003. Notably, to date the GCC States have been among the states that have benefited most from the fall of dictatorial regimes in countries such as Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. The UAE, for instance, has benefited in particular, becoming the favored destination for direct foreign investment in the region. The growing spread of regional instability however has created what could be called an unstable backyard for the Gulf, as its security and stability is threated in unprecedented fashion on a number of fronts, locally, regionally, and internationally. The GCC states must therefore adjust and change their political and strategic practices and policies so as to become more capable and more flexible in confronting and managing conflicts and crises. Ultimately, it is not just their security which is under threat but their very existence.

For months, the transitional phase in Tunisia underwent a critical historical period that almost foiled efforts to establish a newly-born democratic state and undermined the foundational work of the post-revolution state. In fact, the increasing violence, the high living cost, the raging conflict over power, the intermittent rise of partisan, ideological and religious tensions, the return of the old regime media, the emergence of the harbingers of a counter-revolution and the decrease in Tunisia’s sovereign ranking showed followers of the situation that the Arab Spring in its first cradle was at risk. Citizens felt afraid, and they longed for stability and reassurance. The deteriorating political situation based on polarization and dispute between the ruling troika and the opposition added insult to injury. The paper sheds light on the situation of the prominent influential political parties in Tunisia and on the complexities of the political crisis. It also explores the prospects of the upcoming phase.

​Over the past decades, the four Gulf states—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar—have emerged as active donor countries, playing prominent roles in fragile and conflict-affected areas in the humanitarian, developmental, and peace-related fields. While most of their foreign aid is visible in humanitarian and development sectors, their peace-related assistance remains directionally unclear and lacks sufficient analysis due to the absence of an official documentation system issued by Gulf donors in this area. To address this gap, this paper examines the foreign aid flows of Gulf donor countries through the lens of the Humanitarian- Development-Peace Triple Nexus. The analysis suggests that Gulf donor countries do not align their aid with the reform movement led by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) regarding the HDP Triple Nexus. The results reveal that the challenges to fully implementing this approach in the foreign aid policies of these countries include weak coordination among Gulf donors, the absence thereof, inadequate exchange of data, information, and joint .analysis, in addition to operating within a framework of bilateral funding.

We seek, through this special issue, to contribute to the broader scholarly effort aimed at rethinking the trajectory of the formation of the Arab state and its evolution into its current form, by deconstructing its internal structure and analyzing its dynamics in light of its own conditions and contexts. The studies included in this issue also aim to move beyond ready-made and complete interpretive frameworks by approaching the Arab state as a historical, political, and social entity with its own internal logic and distinct paths of development, rather than reducing it to imported explanatory models or external normative projections.

The 2011 Arab uprisings sparked hopes for positive change in the regional politics of the Middle East. The uprisings not only challenged the authority of states at the domestic level but seemed poised to disrupt regional geopolitics and alter the position of the Middle East in the international system. With the outbreak of civil wars in Syria, Libya, and Sudan, military interventions in Bahrain and Yemen, and the unprecedented proliferation of armed non- state actors in the region, the uprisings seem to drive important changes in the nature of the state and its regional and international role. Despite its artificial inception and its puzzling survival throughout the 20 th century, the Arab State faces challenges in the post- 2011 era and its vulnerabilities have been exposed. While the uprisings may have weakened Arab states, changes at regional and international levels created permissive conditions to challenge the regional state system. Hamas's 7 October 2023 operation and Israel's ensuing wars in the region have further exacerbated state erosion and reinvigorated post- 2011 regional dynamics. This paper examines how structural international and regional conditions have reshaped statehood and agency in the region post- 2011. It also explores how the responses of Arab states to international conditions and the regional reverberations of the uprisings have further generated disintegrative effects for the Arab state.

This study argues that the political system resulting from the post-2003 political process in Iraq contributed to the reproduction of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities within a homogeneous political identity, without taking into account the multiplicity of ideological orientations within the minorities themselves. These minorities have become political minorities, but they are powerless and unable to change or influence the political decision-making process in Iraq. This means that political practice in Iraq, including general electoral practice, remained a practice based on the reproduction of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, and did not turn into a real political practice. In other words, the identity marker (sect, ethnicity, etc.) comes before the political manifesto. This political reality imposed on ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities a political behaviour represented in voting for their ethnic, religious and linguistic parties, just as they were in the one-party era.

The concept of soft power continues to receive significant attention from researchers, relevant actors in the international community, and small and rising powers alike. This paper discusses the nature of soft power, how it works, how it can be employed, its effectiveness, and its limits. It critically engages with the existing literature on soft power and argues that soft power does not exist by itself, but rather is made. Accordingly, soft power is not just a strategy as is the case with smart power, nor it can be purchased in its raw form, as is the case with hard power, and it is not of unilateral negative nature, as is the case with sharp power. The paper asserts the need to distinguish between sources of soft power and its tools. It contends that soft power resources can be mobilized and directed towards the target using soft power tools. The paper aims to contribute to discussion of what soft power is and how it works; thus, it offers a theoretical framework on the working mechanism of soft power that takes into account using soft power against non-democratic systems: autocracy, totalitarian, or theocracy.

One of the most important gains of Tunisia’s revolution has been that elections are no longer subject to interior ministry supervision. A look at these elections reveals a process managed by a permanent constitutional body, the Independent High Authority for Elections, which in itself marks a revolutionary success. These events are read within the context of the assassination of Constituent Assembly member Mohamed Brahmi, which caused many to worry that the democratic path would be hindered, as in other Arab Spring countries. More than the elections mechanism, this paper argues that success can also be attributed to the Troika alliance, especially the Ennahda party. It shows how the neutrality of the military institution and the great role played by the country’s General Labor Union in bridging the gap between Tunisian opponents through national dialogue, have largely contributed in the success of the elections.