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This paper examines the implications of Egypt’s military coup on Gaza and its ruling party Hamas. This study is undertaken in light of the escalation of Egyptian media incitement against Hamas and the Palestinians, including accusations that the movement was involved in violent acts on Egyptian soil during the January 2011 Revolution. These rumored actions are paralleled with apparent recent involvement of Hamas in the “terrorist” attacks in the Sinai. Since media incitement has resulted in the tightening of an Egyptian blockade on Gaza, and the destruction of tunnels that represented the lifeline of people in the coastal enclave, a full investigation of the allegations is critical.​

Alongside two constitutions, an old one brought down by a revolution and a new one drawn up by the "constituent power", the state enters a transitional phase during which it is usually ruled by "interim constitutions", enforced by the "transitional constituent" to act as a bridge between the two major constitutions in temporarily regulating the transition and the relationship between authorities. Since the "transitional constituent" wields "authority" outside of constitutional legitimacy, and since contingency and intentionality are inherent features of interim constitutions, a question arises about the extent of the "transitional constituent's" impact on shaping the constituent power, and the legacy of the interim constitutions in drawing up the permanent constitution. The study explores this question, addressing the Egyptian and Tunisian experiences in a comparative context, within a timeframe that begins with the regime collapse in early 2011 and ends with the entry into force of the current constitution in both countries in early 2014. The study seeks to understand the repercussions of the constitutional designing of the transition on the foundational process, and the constitutional regime that it has produced today in the two countries.

This study reads the performance of Egyptian political forces from the time of Mohamed Morsi’s election as president of the republic to the coup against him on July 3, 2013. In its first section, the study concludes that the behavior of all political actors can be understood as a search for allies from within the old regime’s centers of power; this despite the fact that these forces were the targets of the January 25 Revolution. Nonetheless, political parties seek out old guard forces hoping they will provide leverage for a position of power. This reality allowed the old regime – with its enormous capabilities—to rejoin the map of political forces instead of being held accountable. In its second section, the study tries to read the map of the protest movement on June 30, comparing this new map with one of the nation’s politics during the crisis of the constitutional declaration in November 2012. It concludes that the most important development in the nation’s political sphere has been the ability of the “deep state” to learn the skills of popular mobilization in the street. This came after it had failed to do so in the previous 36 months. Using its connections with a wide spectrum of social groups through networks of patronage and influence, which it had not thought of using in the spectacular “battle of the squares,” the “deep state” was able to become an active and influential political player capable of taking matters back to square one.

This study provides an analysis of Egypt's political system since 2013 , with a particular focus on President Sisi's efforts to establish and manage a "new republic." It explores the internal factors that influence the structure and nature of the regime and examines the regional and international contexts that shape this endeavor and contribute to its support, despite concerns over authoritarian practices and significant human rights violations. the study aims to elucidate the foundational principles, defining characteristics, and key dimensions of the "new republic." It also evaluates its strengths, prospects for success, functional role, and the reasons for substantial international endorsement of the regime. Furthermore, it assesses the extent to which the regime's rhetoric regarding the new republic aligns with practical realities and appraises President Sisi's efficacy in implementing this vision.

This study limits its aim to a discussion of the water policy of Egypt and Ethiopia. It will first lay out the Ethiopian view and the nation's reaction to the escalation of Egyptian media coverage calling for a direct war against Ethiopia after the country's insistence on the construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam on the Nile, which would disrupt the flow of water to Egypt. With Egypt regularly in control of 85% of the Nile's water, the dam would create a massive change in the water situation in the country. This paper shows the history of the conflict over the water of the Nile between Ethiopia (an Upstream Country) and Egypt (the only Downstream Country) and the position of Ethiopia on old agreements between the parties. The paper presents Ethiopian writings published since the revolution of January 25, 2011 by way of understanding the nation's viewpoint on the issue. ​

​It was mostly British colonisers who came to consolidate the political, economic and military interests of the motherland and did what they used to do: play football. Apart from spending their time, football worked as a colonial instrument both "civilising" and "disciplining" the colonised populations. The first clubs in North Africa and the Levant restricted membership for non-Westerners and non-whites, but soon football also became a transnational transmitter of independence movements, the stadiums becoming important social spaces on the local and national levels. Such was the emancipatory force of football that it has been preserved across the region ever since the colonial era, prominent again in the Arab Uprisings. However, the massive wealth of the Gulf States and their decision to invest in football's soft power has changed the equation. The article thus describes emancipatory and counter-emancipatory trends in MENA football history from a longue durée perspective.

ﺗﺘﻨﺎول ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ اﻟﺒُﻌﺪ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮي ﻓﻲ اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ، ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ﺗﺴﻠﻴﻂ اﻟﻀﻮء ﻋﻠﻰ ا دوار اﻟﺘﻲ اﺿﻄﻠﻌﺖ ﺑﻬﺎ اﻟﻘﻮات اﻟﻤﺴﻠﺤﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪول اﻟﺘﻲ اﺟﺘﺎﺣﺘﻬﺎ رﻳﺎح اﻟﺜﻮرات؛ إذ ﻧﻠﺤَﻆ أن اﻟﺠﻤﺎﻫﻴﺮ اﻟﺸﻌﺒﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﺤﺘﺠﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ اﺻﻄﻔﺖ إﻟﻰ ﺟﺎﻧﺒﻬﺎ ﻫﺬه اﻟﻘﻮات ﻧﺠﺤﺖ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻠﻮغ ﻣﺮادﻫﺎ، ﺑﻴﻨﻤﺎ ﻟﻢ ﺗﺴﺘﻄﻊ اﻟﺸﻌﻮب اﻟﺘﻲ ﻟﻢ ﺗﺪﻋﻤﻬﺎ اﻟﺠﻴﻮش اﻟﺼﻤﻮد ﻓﻲ وﺟﻪ ﻗﻤﻊ اﻟﻘﻮات اﻟﻨﻈﺎﻣﻴﺔ. إن ا دوار اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ أﺧﺬت اﻟﺠﻴﻮش اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ ﺗﺆدﻳﻬﺎ اﻟﻴﻮم ﻻ ﺗﺆﻛﺪ ﻓﺎﻋﻠﻴﺔ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺠﻴﻮش وأﻫﻤﻴﺘﻬﺎ وﺣﺴْ ﺐ، وﻟﻜﻨﻬﺎ ﺗﺤﺚ أﻳﻀ ﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ إﺻﻼح اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺒﻠﺪان. وﻗﺪ أﺧﺬ ﺳﺆال إﺻﻼح ﻗﻄﺎع اﻣﻦ واﻟﺪﻓﺎع ﻳﺒﺮز ﺑﻘﻮة ﻓﻲ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﺔ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻌﺪ اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ، ﺗﺠﺎوﺑًﺎ ﻣﻊ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﺘﻀﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻻﻧﺘﻘﺎﻟﻴﺔ. وﻓﻲ ﻫﺬا اﻃﺎر، ﺗﺮﻛﺰ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺠﻮاﻧﺐ اﻟﺒﻨﻴﻮﻳﺔ ﺻﻼح اﻟﻘﻄﺎع اﻣﻨﻲ واﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮي ﻓﻲ دول اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: اﻟﺠﻴﻮش اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ، إﺻﻼح ﻗﻄﺎع اﻣﻦ، اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ. This paper explores the military aspect of the Arab Spring, and specifically the role played by formal armies in the Arab Spring states. Specifically, this paper focuses on the fact that popular revolutions during the Arab Spring were successful in those countries in which the military sided with the protestors, whereas revolutionary momentum could not face down the regimes in those countries where the armies did not side with the revolution. The political functions which Arab armies carry out serve to highlight not only their significance and effectiveness as institutions, but also the need for military reform. The question of military and security sector reform has become increasingly pressing in the post-Arab Spring transitional phase, driving the author to probe the structural aspects of reform to the military and security sectors of the Arab Spring states.

This review covers selected samples of Israeli writings on the Arab Spring produced by think tanks, academic centers, universities in Israel

The paper investigates and analyzes the regional and international interactions with the conflict in Libya, focusing on the period following the December 2015 political agreement in Skhirat, Morocco. The paper argues that this agreement is the result of a limited consensus among domestic and regional forces. These forces have moulded their foreign policies, over the course of the conflict, based on a balance between concerns over the political and economic effects of the Libyan democratic transition and their interests and ambitions for greater control and influence. The conflict of interests between the external forces was a substantial factor along with other internal determinants that have contributed to obstructing the democratic transition process. Therefore, this paper explores a series of research questions, mainly focusing on the role and behavior of the influential external forces in Libya's domestic politics.

This study distinguishes between three Interrelated theoretical approaches prevalent in writings of researchers seeking to understand the emergence of the Islamic Resistance Movement, "Hamas". The first of these approaches examines the movement from the portal of ideology, stressing the importance of international and regional dimensions and the rise of political Islam after the "setback" (Naksa) of the 1967 Six Day War. The second approaches Hamas as representing a social movement seeking to revisit the historical narrative of Palestinian society. The third considers it to be the heir of the Palestinian national liberation movement, attributing its rise to transformations witnessed in Palestinian identity and the Palestinian community's definition of itself. Although the three readings do not contradict each other, a focus on one of them can lead to oversimplification or exaggeration: emphasis on the first approach is at risk of overlooking transformations in the movement in its later stages and a marginalization at the micro level of local dimensions; emphasis on the second approach can result in the overestimation of the effectiveness of collective action; exaggerated emphasis on the third approach deprives social actors of their effectiveness. Hence this study proposes situating Hamas in the ​intersection of these three approaches.