Latest Articles

This study discusses the institutional legacy of economic liberalization policies in shaping the contemporary reality of civil-military relations in Arab Spring states, and the future challenges of democratic transformation in these countries. It argues that economic openness through the application of liberalization policies has led to the emergence of a military oligarchy operating under a civilian cover, formally extending the dominance of the Arab armies from the political to the economic sphere. The outcome of this dynamic was the consolidation of the positions and political dominance of the military, which poses great challenges to the future of democratic transition in these countries. The study reviews its hypothesis through the cases of Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan and Algeria, and draws analytical comparisons between them.

The Assad regime was quick to accept the terms of a Russian proposal to destroy its stockpile of chemical weapons following a chemical weapons attack on civilians under siege in East and West Ghouta. Within days of the attack on August 21, 2013 the regime’s chemical weapons stockpile was made available to international observers, with the Syrian regime even making an application to join the Chemical Weapons Convention on September 20 of the same year—Damascus had previously insisted that Israel join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty before it signed up to the CWC. This paper seeks to understand (the possible) increased acceptance of Bashar Al Assad by the global media, which might presage a rehabilitation of his image, pending his presentation on the world stage as a legitimate head of state for Syria in the wake of the chemical weapons deal his country has struck.

This study addresses the extent to which the "participatory" framework is compatible with the networks of Tunisian elites since the Revolution of 2011. The author seeks to understand, analyze and interpret the theoretical approaches which allowed Tunisian politicians to reduce the level of political divisions within the country. The author further illustrates how Tunisia's formal political parties adapted and developed in the post-revolutionary setting, despite the revolution unraveling the vast extent of a societal rift in Tunisia which has dominated the country's political debates since that time. Finally, the study explores in depth the role and influence of Tunisian political elites as it relates to the praxis of participatory democracy, something which could not have been possible without the consciousness and awareness of these elites and their duty to fulfill their roles.

Current Russian policy is based on a nationalism that rests on state capitalism, and that speaks to nationalist sentiment built on the rejection of Western exploitation. This patriotic nationalist position becomes evident through the lack of any ideologically derived principles driving Russia’s position: state interests including national security are what drive current policy. The drivers for this new Russian policy mean that Russia can simultaneously suppress a separatist movement by armed force in one region and champion another separatist movement with armed force in another. In this sense, the Russian Federation has no fixed positions but only fixed interests, and even its interests can change. In Syria, critics suggest that the proximate aim of Russia’s policy is to defend the Assad regime, Moscow’s ally, from collapse. Saving the regime is not, however, an end in itself. Rather, it is a means of self-assertion and another step toward the goal of becoming a global superpower, this time in the Middle East. If the Syrian regime believes its rescue is the exclusive objective of Russia’s intervention, it is wrong. The exertion of Russian influence will at most provide a temporary respite. The mere fact of Russia’s military presence in Syria means that the regime is no longer master of its own destiny and no longer even a player on the international stage, since Russia is now its proxy at any international negotiations.

Why did the January 25, 2011 revolution in Egypt descend into a state of violent oppression of the revolutionaries on the grounds of securing stability and fighting terrorism? This paper examines how the manner in which regime change took place following the January 25 revolution impacted on the democratic transition and its trajectory. The author looks specifically at those transformations which served to divert the course of revolutionary momentum, turning an uprising previously centered on "democratization" in the broadest sense, including the change in the system of government and the protection of personal and social liberties, into a movement which is often described in academic literature as an "electoral revolution". In other words, revolutionary momentum was focused exclusively on procedural questions and the filling of vacant executive and legislative positions following the collapse of the Mubarak regime before the more fundamental precursors to democracy could be established. This first transformation took place before the "electoral revolution" was itself diverted into a "counter revolution" which targeted all of the revolutionary forces behind the original uprising, making way for the establishment of a totalitarian mode of government.

This study investigates the circumstances under which military governments leave power. It shows that there is no single path to get the military out of power, as there are no general rules for all cases. Nevertheless, several lessons are learned of which the most important is that military officers never relinquish power on their own. Rather, they are usually forced to leave it. In most cases, forcing the military to hand over authority requires a democratic opposition bloc that reaches a national consensus and agrees on a clear political strategy with an explicit goal. This will get the military out of power and establish a civilian government. A consensus or democratic bloc enables reformist democrats to change the balance of power for the benefit of democratic transition.

This study adopts a comparative approach to investigate the impact of the reciprocal fears of internal and external parties on the stances of key actors during the 2011 transitions. Apparently, the uncertainty that accompanies any democratic elections has not been a local factor in the Arab cases because regional and international forces have an interest in hindering democracy, being a potential threat to the status quo. The study examines four interrelated problems related to external factors. It concludes that the external factors that have hindered democracy in non-Arab cases were not inevitable because addressing them seems to have been related to changes in the international system and the emergence of domestic democratic blocs that are able to exert pressure on external forces and get them to change their positions.

This study reviews the various Syrian military groups currently active against the Syrian regime, and discusses the circumstances that led to their formation as well as their intellectual and political orientations, links, and funders. The study sees that in general these groups can be divided into two main currents: one with a secular orientation and one with an Islamist orientation. It argues that these military groups were formed spontaneously, in response to the violence of the regime, rather than as an intentional political act. In addition, uneducated sectors were confronted with the task of forming most of the leaderships of these military groups and actually leading them, which helped make their visions lack clarity. This study is a contribution toward filling the gap in Arab academic research on armed Syrian opposition forces.

This paper investigates the factors that have led to the collapse of Baath-ruled Syria. It argues that the abandonment of the rentier – distributive economic system that had traditionally propped up the social base of the Baath party (labourers, farmers, and rural populations) and the adoption of liberal economic policies was key to the crisis. The end of the Cold War, the passing of resistance discourse, with the start of the Middle East peace process, and the information revolution have contributed to weakening the cultural and ideological hegemony of the Syrian Baath-ruled state. This led to increasing reliance on the security apparatus to control an increasingly young and educated society. The loosening economic grip of the state resulting from the abandonment of the public sector, and the rise of crony capitalism accompanied by the declining role of political socialisation (in schools and universities), and the loss of control over the flow of information, left the regime with no other option but resorting to violence to deal with the crisis. The peaceful opposition movement hitherto was transformed into an armed revolution, and then into a regional and international proxy war, with the rising role foreign interference in the crisis.

This study examines the impact of post-truth discourse during the 2019 Sudanese Revolution and the subsequent transitional period, as well as the role played by social media platforms in promoting this discourse and mobilizing broad segments of the population behind it. The study also explores the susceptibility of social media users to follow false news in contrast to their engagement with factual reporting. It argues that the Sudanese Revolution and the transitional phase (2019 – 2023) coincided with the emergence of a new media landscape rooted in a politically and socially divided environment, characterized by diverse perspectives and the growing influence of social media. These platforms played positive roles in the dynamics of the revolution, significantly contributing to the mobilization of large popular groups to participate in demonstrations and sit-ins that ultimately led to the regime's overthrow. However, they also generated confusion and uncertainty among these groups due to the rise of post-truth discourse fueled by fake news, which in turn intensified polarization among revolutionary youth and activists.