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​The 20 February movement was formed out of a defining moment in modern Moroccan political history, and forced the ruling regime to undertake a process to reform and give up some of its powers. This study takes a look at the path of the 20 February movement as it took shape in 2011. It looks at the defining role played by the group in the Arab Spring protests. It analyzes the components of the movement and the stages of its development and decline in addition to presenting factors that explain the potentials and setbacks it faced months after its beginning. These are related to the existing political and social opportunities in Morocco, in particular the nature of its political system, the position of main actors, as well as the regional and international atmosphere. The social framing of the movement and the limits of its ability to instigate a wide social movement among the poor and vulnerable social classes is also considered, as well as how the movement went about promoting its ideas, apart from the difficulties related to creating a common identity that can unite its contradicting components.

Despite high levels of mass mobilization in the past, Palestinian society today finds itself polarized and demobilized. The Palestinian Authority (PA) has gained control as a governing apparatus and has become increasingly authoritarian in nature. But the PA does not have complete control over the territories. This variation in control allows isolation of the effect of the PA's authoritarian nature on mobilization patterns and social dynamics. The study argues that mobilization has systematically declined in places where the PA has more direct control. Counter-intuitively, political mobilization today is more prevalent in areas under direct Israeli occupation. Findings suggest the PA has a direct role in this dynamic, using selective cooptation and repression. Overall, authoritarian strategies in the Palestinian territories have led to decreased capacity for mobilization.

This paper seeks to uncover the roles played by truth commissions in Latin America in establishing transitional justice, in a comparative study that draws upon three main experiences: Argentina, Chile, and Peru. It highlights the contexts that allowed these experiences to adhere to the democratic transformation and absorb its complexities, by questioning the dynamics that accompanied the establishment of truth commissions, and identifying the roles of actors in managing tension between the demands of victims and the requirements of reconciliation and civil peace. The paper demonstrates that the establishment of truth commissions was linked to the nature of the challenges faced by Latin countries undergoing democratization and transcending the legacy of previous violations. Inasmuch as these challenges reduced the crisis of legitimacy that ravaged these systems and led them to engage in this transformation, they also highlighted the potential that these committees have provided for actors to manage the sequence of this shift.

This study employs digital sociology approaches to trace networked communities and the contexts of their formation, development, or disintegration in relation to the social and political environment in which they emerge, with a particular focus on the impact of their culture on shaping public opinion in Morocco. The study assumes that contemporary communities, despite the digital nature of their medium, remain structurally connected to their traditional meaning grounded in similarity and cohesion, while being reconfigured within a networked society that fosters the rise of a "mass self". Based on network analysis, the study explores the transition of the individual from an autonomous unit to an active "collective person" within decentralized networked spaces that have contributed to reshaping the relationship between power and society, and between individuals and institutions. It also highlights the shift of political and symbolic conflict to the networked sphere and the emergence of new forms of participation, mobilization, and influence, turning networked communities into a social force capable of shapin – and at times producing – public opinion.

This article looks at Algeria's security policy in general and its security doctrine in particular, analysing its changes and dilemmas in a turbulent regional environment and in the context of an internal Hirak. It argues that these doctrines have undergone minor changes to meet regional security needs, which precludes fundamental change at this stage. It also argues that the tension between the moral-normative imperative and the security imperative, on the one hand, and the principle of dual non-interference (political and military), on the other, constitute two major dilemmas confronting Algerian politics and security doctrine. Starting from these two elements, the article, after setting out my concept of the subject, examines the formation and nature of Algerian politics, ideology, and transformations. It then looks at the constitutional decision on the participation of Algerian armed forces in international peacekeeping operations, analysing their context (domestic and foreign), their motives and justifications, and the reservations they face. Finally, it analyses Algeria's regional security strategy as an alternative to intervention. The article comes to three main conclusions. First, there is a limited adjustment to the issue of external interference depending on the needs of the security interest. Second, the end of the absolute refusal to use armed forces outside the borders. Third, it is likely that the tension between moral-normative and security considerations will escalate if the unrest continues within its geographical boundaries.

The study concerns the armed Shiism in Iraq and its most prominent embodiment, the Mahdi Army (MA). It deals with the relationship between the MA and the Sadrist movement, as a case og the relationship between political organizations and their armed wings. It explores the specificity of this relationship, whereby the MA arose within the Najaf Shiite's Hawza . Hence, the MA was not a typical armed wing, but was more like a general beacon of mobilization for the Shiite community in Iraq. MA was the first organizational step for the movement as much as its presence as the armed wing remained an essential pillar, controlling and determining the development of the movement. The study argues that the debate over the extent of armed action led to a struggle over the identity of the movement, between two wings: remaining an armed organization, or turning to political action. Therefore, the leadership's efforts to control MA were intersects with the political struggle between its wings.

This study advances a new approach to theorizing the Arab state after the popular uprisings. It does this in two steps. Suspending the western European model of state formation and bringing the Arab world's experience in conversation with other parts of the Global South, it examines alternative state formation and state building sequences, trajectories, and temporalities in the making of Arab states. It thus historicizes the process of state formation and state building in the Arab world as compared to the western European one and other regions in the Global South. This first step liberates us from explicit and implicit comparisons with the European model of state formation. The second step surveys alternative theorizations of the Arab state after the uprisings. Tracing the causal assumptions embedded in these theories reveals how much they rely on the European model of state formation and state building as an implicit point of analytic departure and critical comparison. This survey unpacks the assumptions these theories make about the state, the difference between states and regimes, state and non-state actors, the private and public realms, and the formal and informal sectors. The objective of this study is to not only de-exceptionalize states in the Arab world, but, more importantly, borrowing from Gurminder Bhambra, 'unmake' our understandings of state formation and state building in the Arab world and thus contribute, following Walter Mignolo, to a knowledge production that serves a form of 'epistemic reconstitution' of alternative historical trajectories and possibilities.

This study analyses the dynamics of state fragility in Arab countries from 2006–2024 using the Fragile States Index (FSI, Fund for Peace) and World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI). The findings indicate that state fragility in the Arab world is complex and multidimensional, influenced by domestic structural factors, as well as internal and external shocks. Despite an overall increase in fragility, variations were observed among countries; Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Palestine experienced significant increases, while the Gulf countries remained stable, and Iraq and Morocco showed relative improvement. Based on inflection points in the regional FSI series, the study divides the dynamics of fragility into four phases: relative stability (2006-2011), rising fragility (2012-2016), stability at high fragility levels (2017-2020), and slight improvement in indicators (2021-2024). The findings indicate that higher poverty, malnutrition, and low education exacerbate fragility, whereas improvements in GDP per capita, education, health, and economic openness help reduce it. The study highlights that addressing fragility requires long-term policies focused on enhancing governance, social justice, economic diversification, and human development to build more resilient Arab societies in the face of crises.

ﺗﺒﺤﺚ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻓﺮض اﻟﺨﺪﻣﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ ا ﻟﺰاﻣﻴﺔ وﺧﻄﻮات ﺗﻨﻔﻴﺬﻫﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺛﻼث دولٍ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﺘﻌﺎون ﻟﺪول اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ؛ ﻗﻄﺮ، وا ﻣﺎرات، واﻟﻜﻮﻳﺖ، واﻟﺘﻲ أﻋﺎدت ﺗﻄﺒﻴﻘﻪ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺗﻮﻗﻒ دام ﺧﻤﺴﺔ ﻋﺸﺮ ﻋﺎﻣًﺎ. وﺗﻔﺴﺮ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺔ اﻟﺠﺪﻳﺪة، ﺑﻤﺎ ﻳﻌﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ اﻟﺘﺠﻨﻴﺪ اﻟﺰاﻣﻲ ﻣﻦ ﺗﻌﺰﻳﺰ اﻟﻬﻮﻳﺔ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻴﺔ واﻟﺘﻔﺎﻋﻞ اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻲ ﻟﻠﺸﺒﺎب، وﺑﻤﺎ ﻳﺘﻴﺤﻪ ﻟﻘﻮات اﻻﺣﺘﻴﺎط ﻓﻲ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺒﻠﺪان اﻟﺘﻲ ﺑﺎﺗﺖ ﻣﺆﺧﺮًا أﻛﺜﺮ ﻧﺸﺎﻃ ﺎ ﺧﺎرج ﺣﺪودﻫﺎ، ﻓﻀﻠ ﺎ ﻋﻦ أن اﻟﺘﺠﻨﻴﺪ اﻟﺰاﻣﻲ ﻳﺴﺘﻘﻄﺐ وﻳﺪرب ﺷﺒﺎﻧ ﺎ ﻏﺎﻟﺒًﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻔﺘﻘﺮون إﻟﻰ اﻟﺘﻌﻠﻴﻢ، وﻳﻜﻮﻧﻮن ﻋﺎﻃﻠﻴﻦ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻌﻤﻞ وﻣﻌﺘﻠﻲ اﻟﺼﺤﺔ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: ﻗﻄﺮ، اﻣﺎرات، اﻟﻜﻮﻳﺖ، اﻟﺘﺠﻨﻴﺪ اﻟﺰاﻣﻲ. This article explores the introduction and implementation of mandatory military service, in three of the six Gulf monarchies that constitute the membership of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Two of these states, Qatar and the UAE, have never before imposed conscription while the third, Kuwait, decided to reintroduce it after a fifteen-year hiatus. The new policy, the essay argues, has been motivated by several reasons. First, conscription will build up the reserve forces of these states that have recently become more active in projecting military power beyond their borders. Second, it will strengthen national identity and the political socialization of young men and, to a lesser extent, women. Third, it will engage and train often poorly educated, unemployed, and unhealthy youths. Finally, the article contends, there is little chance of compulsory military service being introduced in the other three GCC states.

This study reads the performance of Egyptian political forces from the time of Mohamed Morsi’s election as president of the republic to the coup against him on July 3, 2013. In its first section, the study concludes that the behavior of all political actors can be understood as a search for allies from within the old regime’s centers of power; this despite the fact that these forces were the targets of the January 25 Revolution. Nonetheless, political parties seek out old guard forces hoping they will provide leverage for a position of power. This reality allowed the old regime – with its enormous capabilities—to rejoin the map of political forces instead of being held accountable. In its second section, the study tries to read the map of the protest movement on June 30, comparing this new map with one of the nation’s politics during the crisis of the constitutional declaration in November 2012. It concludes that the most important development in the nation’s political sphere has been the ability of the “deep state” to learn the skills of popular mobilization in the street. This came after it had failed to do so in the previous 36 months. Using its connections with a wide spectrum of social groups through networks of patronage and influence, which it had not thought of using in the spectacular “battle of the squares,” the “deep state” was able to become an active and influential political player capable of taking matters back to square one.