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ISIL is the legitimate child of the crisis of the political regime that developed in Iraq after 2003. The eight-year rule of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki instituted a monopoly

This report chronicles some of the most significant developments relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

This paper explores the findings of a general opinion survey conducted among Palestinian citizens of Israel. Findings reveal that the respondents are generally unsatisfied with governmental performance in the economic and social fields as well as in their day-to-day lives. A majority of the respondents also believe that the Israeli government discriminates against its Arab citizens when compared to Jewish Israelis. The vast majority of respondents report perceiving governmental mistreatment of Arab citizens; that the government treated Jewish citizens preferentially; and that they felt that Israeli democracy extended only to Jewish citizens. A majority of Palestinian Israeli citizens responding to the survey also voiced the opinion that the Israeli government had no desire for peace with the Palestinian Authority. Nonetheless, the results also indicate a preference among the respondents for a two-state solution ending the conflict, as opposed to a Bi-national state.

This paper shall explore the historic shift in relations which has brought Russia and Turkey closer together, with a focus on the domains in which these two powers now cooperate. It shall examine in particular the impact of this new level of cooperation on their policies in the Arab region. The specific set of economic and political circumstances prevailing at the beginning of the twenty-first century have driven Russia and Turkey to revisit the nature of their centuries-long relations, which have previously been dominated by conflict and competition for influence. As two neighboring, great powers both of which are looking to adopt a new strategy to reclaim their imperial pasts on the world stage, Russia and Turkey are now compelled to cooperate, particularly in the economic domain. Yet even as the shared interests of these two countries expand, it has not brought an end to their contradictory sets of regional alliances in the Middle East which have placed them in a zero-sum game.

A convergence of interests between the Houthi militia and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh have served to undermine the National Dialogue for the country, which had earlier formed an implementation mechanism for the GCC Initiative. Previously, the aims of that Dialogue were intended to further the cause of a federalist, democratic state which decentralized power. This would have changed the status quo, in which power was concentrated in what Yemenis call the “Holy Center”, a tribalist-sectarian concentration of political and financial power which been in place for a millennium and which survived into the reborn, unified and modern-day Yemen of 1994.

It is not easy to talk about the future of the Houthi movement given the current circumstances in Yemen. The facts on the ground are changing rapidly, making it difficult to predict the course of events and the future of the actors. Making things more difficult is the complexity of the landscape, the opposing agendas of internal and external actors, and the nature of the Houthi movement itself, which has mysterious objectives and organizational structure as well as limited experience and secret internal and external alliances. Accordingly, what can be said about the future of the Houthi movement cannot go much beyond theoretical opinions, whose conclusions could change as a result of events that are not taken into account. Therefore, this paper will develop scenarios that could benefit future studies where the level of certainty is very low. This approach gives us the ability to forecast the future with a high level of coherence within the prevailing conditions, despite some apparent contradictions.

Examining the conditions of active groups in the Yemeni political arena, this paper will highlight the groups' most important wagers in managing the conflict. The many groups, each carrying out vendettas against past acts, create complex intersections. The coalition of the "clique" and Al-Islah party with the General People's Congress Party in the war of the summer of 1994 is one example, as is the alliance between the Houthis and the former regime against the forces of February 11, 2011 that drove Saleh out of power. So too can the role of Maj. Gen. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar in the confrontations with the Houthis in the six wars between 2004 and 2006 be read into the current political scenario. In explaining the division of national identity into southern and northern groups, and the popular mood against everything that is northern, the paper tackles the escalating sectarian conflict and the systematic undermining under Saleh's regime of the foundations of a modern civil state. It further addresses the weakening of modernizing forces in favor of traditional ones, and the weakening of the center in favor of the peripheries. The paper argues that any treatment that does not address these issues will be unsuccessful. It suggests that any political settlement among the warring parties could only postpone cyclical war and instability, and act as a gap for foreign intervention and tutelage.

Hardly a day passes without seeing or hearing the terms 'extremism' or 'extremists.' Used today to describe political views and attitudes, or methods in political action, the terms today are linked to particular images, and hold specific implications charged with prejudice, half-truths, and presumption. This paper asks: Is the term extremism useful to understand the ideas, views, or practices of those who are labeled as such? Are there common traits among those labeled as extremist that renders this label a useful concept in the classification of the ideas of political groups and their objectives and methods? Or, is 'extremist' simply an expression of a negative attitude agreed to by those with a specific view with the aim of ostracizing specific groups? It then poses an even larger and more critical question: How do groups of people reach the point of burning bridges with existing reality in order to carry out a fight using violent methods? The paper argues that analyzing ideology per se to reach an answer to this question is futile, be this ideology nationalistic, religious, classist, or otherwise.

The European General Court (EGC) decision on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam case cast a shadow so long that it has influenced the Court’s more recent decision to delist Hamas as a terrorist organization. This paper goes back to examine how Hamas movement was initially listed as a terrorist organization, and why this move failed to bring down the party. It then examines Hamas’ appeal to the EGC, the group’s use of soft power to wage political battle with Europe, and the nature of the Court’s decision, as well as the ongoing politicization of the Court as part of a larger move to shift how courts interact with groups like Palestine’s Islamic movement. Based on the EU’s appeal against the Court’s initial decision, the paper discusses EU options in case its motion is denied.

External influence has played a central role in the Yemeni conflict. Powers seeking to extend power and establish dominance have manipulated Yemen’s diversity as a way to gain influence. Other powers seem to be using Yemen as a way to step into regional power vacuums. At the same time, diplomatic activity has been used as a way to maintain interests and sustain polar uniqueness. Each of these areas of influence are key to understanding the current conflict and for determining a path ahead. This paper examines these avenues and specifically looks at key developments leading up to the current conflict. These include the six wars waged by Ali Abdullah Saleh against the Houthis, the political game shifts in Yemen, the weakening of the state and other factors that led to the take-over Yemen’s capital city of Sanaa.