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This paper examines those Arab Spring states in which political Islamists are actively engaged. Specifically, it looks at the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, in which political Islamists were involved in regime change, as well as Morocco and Jordan, which did not experience regime change but in which Islamists were actively engaged in the political process and a protest movement. Following an examination of the individual circumstances which prevail in each of these states, the author asserts that there remains a number of pressing questions related to the future roles of political Islamists that merit attention. The first question surrounds the political and ideological project that the Islamists want to promote: will Islamists be capable of shedding their ideological burden, and forwarding a novel political program? This paper demonstrates the limitations of the long-standing ideological promulgations of the Islamists, especially as it pertains to questions of the nation-state, democracy, pluralism, civil liberties and minority rights.

The Tunisian Tamarod (Rebellion) Movement replicated the experience of the Egyptian movement of the same name after the latter’s success in changing the nation’s head of state. The study analyzes the factors that led to the emergence of the Tunisian Tamarod Movement, such as the difficulties facing the transitional process, the slow pace of reforms, and the failure to achieve the goals of the revolution. This long list of grievances ranges from the failure to create jobs and provide justice for victims of injustice, to the continuation of widespread poverty and unemployment in the cities, and the problematic struggle for influence instead of power sharing leading to polarization not only between al-Nahda Party and the Nidaa Tounes Movement, but also between the ruling coalition and the opposition. The study explores the most important commonalities and differences between the Egyptian Tamarod Movement and the Tunisian Tamarod Movement, wondering whether the latter can change from a protest phenomenon to a force for change, and what its future holds in light of the new developments in the urban and political scene in Tunisia today.

This paper presents a survey of political developments in Libya since the fall of Muamar Gaddafi. The author argues that, today, social and economic tensions have driven Libya to the edge of a precipice. It has become abundantly clear that a plan for transitional government, first envisioned by the National Transitional Council in 2014, has evaporated. To this has been added institutional stalemate, accompanied by violence, instability and direct confrontations between various Libyan factions. In this setting, a group associated with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant has been able to expand its power in the country. Finally, the author suggests that the 2012 national elections in Libya were not in reality, as widely perceived, a competition between Islamists and liberals, but, in fact, a contest for power and influence between representatives of various tribal groups and local leaders.

Examined in this article are a number of aspects of Tunisia's 2014 constitution, specifically, the relationship between the presidency and the parliament; the status of the newly created constitutional court; the higher judicial council; constitutional controls and restrictions; the role of religion and the status of women in the new constitution; and administrative decentralization within the constitution. Adopting a comparative approach, the author examines each of these topics in their proper regional and historical context. This allows for a clearer understanding of what factors have allowed Tunisia's constitutional politics to advance so quickly when compared to other states in the region. Through successful dialogue, the Tunisian people were able to prove that ideological differences do not necessarily lead to conflict or stagnation. The author further argues that the pragmatic approach of Tunisian parties to the national dialogue provided a model of conflict resolution to be emulated across the globe.

The conflict in Syria is rooted in its important geopolitical location and its significance in regional alliances and international rivalries. This paper argues that the Syrian Revolution, especially after its transition from non-violence to militarization, fell victim to an intense rivalry in the context of the game of nations over three things: the direction of the ongoing conflict, the future of the country, and its political orientation. Although the essence of the conflict has not changed much since the beginning of the crisis - both with respect to the objectives of local actors and the interests and alliances of influential powers - the regional context has seen important changes. Perhaps the most prominent of these are the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the return of the army to the political stage; the decline of Turkey’s regional status as a result of the setbacks faced by the leadership of the Justice and Development Party; and the possible predominance of pragmatic thinking in Iranian foreign policy after the presidential election in Iran. In addition, the Saudi decision to abandon its traditional caution and move toward a direct confrontation with the Iranian project in the region presents another momentous change. Amid this changing regional landscape, the Syrian crisis remains at a standstill - a military solution is not possible and a political solution is not viable - in the context of a state of regional and international polarization, and the absence of an effective international that will to put an end to this tragedy.

In association with the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies held a three-day conference (January 21-23, 2016) to study the developments associated with the Arab Spring in the intervening five years.

This study discusses the most important developments in global climate negotiations since the Rio de Janeiro’s conference of 1992 until the Paris ‘conference in November 2015 that main focus was to control global warming rates. Nevertheless, these rates continue to rise in an unprecedented manner posing dangerous direct threat to all humanity. The study shows the most important achievements accomplished and the most important agreements that the international negotiations have arrived to, indicating the main shortcomings and gaps of these negotiation’s that may hinder the international efforts for reducing emissions’ gasses. The study emphasizes the importance of concentrating on environmental aspects, as well as on financing energy and economy so it would fit the needs of sustainable development, especially in developing countries.

Results from the Arab Opinion Index indicate that the Arab public is strongly conscientious of the threat posed by Zionism. Since 2011, Israel has continuously been identified by Arab respondents as the single greatest threat to collective Arab security, ahead of both the United States and Iran. The survey data also demonstrate that the Arab peoples are opposed to mutual diplomatic recognition between their countries and Israel, despite the fact that a number of Arab countries have already concluded peace treaties with Israel. When asked to justify their positions, respondents offered explanations which went beyond security concerns, describing Israel as a “colonialist” and “expansionist” state which is racist towards Arabs.

Is the American Century Over? [English]

Scholarship explains impediments to democratic transition in Middle Eastern countries as forms of neopatrimonialism - a combination of patrimonial tradition and cosmetic electoral procedures. However, this approach conflates two spheres of governance: firstly, the government as a sphere of appointed or elected politicians, secondly, the state's bureaucracy as a sphere of administrative staff necessary for the government to execute its planned actions. The impediments Hamas governments (2006-2007) faced highlight the difference between the two spheres. Accordingly, I conceptually differentiate between two types of government: government in office and government in power. While the Hamas government was supposed to rule, the administrative personnel refused to comply. Thus, the elected government in office faced local-institutional and external constraints which prevented its functioning, and provoked power struggles that led to internecine war and the collapse of the electoral democracy.