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This paper seeks to understand the reason behind Egyptian political parties having resorted to popular protests as a tool of political action, as opposed to conventional means of political action available to formal political groupings, such as electoral competition. It also goes on to highlight the reasons which drive Egyptian political parties to adopt exclusionist rhetoric. Based on public opinion gained from the Arab Opinion Index, this paper argues that the resorting of Egyptian political parties to protests and exclusionist political rhetoric and tactics is rooted in a number of factors. These are largely due to the ineffectiveness of Mohammed Morsi’s presidency and the repeated political errors of the Muslim Brotherhood, all of which contribute to driving Egyptian political parties to other modes of action.

The conflict in Syria is rooted in its important geopolitical location and its significance in regional alliances and international rivalries. This paper argues that the Syrian Revolution, especially after its transition from non-violence to militarization, fell victim to an intense rivalry in the context of the game of nations over three things: the direction of the ongoing conflict, the future of the country, and its political orientation. Although the essence of the conflict has not changed much since the beginning of the crisis - both with respect to the objectives of local actors and the interests and alliances of influential powers - the regional context has seen important changes. Perhaps the most prominent of these are the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the return of the army to the political stage; the decline of Turkey’s regional status as a result of the setbacks faced by the leadership of the Justice and Development Party; and the possible predominance of pragmatic thinking in Iranian foreign policy after the presidential election in Iran. In addition, the Saudi decision to abandon its traditional caution and move toward a direct confrontation with the Iranian project in the region presents another momentous change. Amid this changing regional landscape, the Syrian crisis remains at a standstill - a military solution is not possible and a political solution is not viable - in the context of a state of regional and international polarization, and the absence of an effective international that will to put an end to this tragedy.

This report highlights some of the major milestones of the Arab democratic transition. The countries covered include Tunisia, Egypt, Libya,Syria and Yemen.

This paper explores public attitudes to pan-Arab issues, specifically, the question of intra-Arab relations and intra-Arab cooperation. The results, based on a series of public surveys conducted for the Arab Opinion Index, indicate that a majority across the surveyed countries agree either with the statement “The Arab peoples constitute a single nation, even if certain specificities distinguish the specific peoples”. In contrast, only 14% of the respondents agreed with the view “That the Arab peoples are entirely distinct nations tied together by only tenuous bonds”. This broad consensus among respondents in the countries surveyed is further evidenced by respondents’ answers to a number of other points, such as support for increased intra-Arab cooperation and respondents’ reported desire for increased economic, political and military cooperation between Arab countries.

Iraq’s former foreign minister Naji Sabri al-Hadithi provides an account of the details of the campaign led by the United States against Iraq on August 2, 1990. He explains the measures Iraq took in the period between March 1991 and March 2003 to avoid a second war that was clearly on the way. According to this testimony, the United States began its preparations to wage another war on Iraq the day after the end of the first war, which was brought about by Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. The testimony includes details of the egregious measures that prepared Western public opinion to accept waging another war on Iraq despite the cooperation the country exhibited with American demands. It also explains how many of the measures employed under the cover of international legitimacy aimed to impoverish Iraq and destroy its foundations.

This paper seeks to ascertain the extent of positive Arab public attitudes—or lack thereof—towards the Arab popular revolutions, after more than a year since the revolutions first broke out. The results show an overall positive attitude towards the Arab revolutions among the Arab public. When asked to provide reasons for their positive disposition towards the revolutions, respondents spoke of an "Arab Awakening" which laid the foundations for democratic governance in the Arab region by restoring the democratic rights of Arab citizens. Opposition to the Arab revolutions and their impacts accounted for only 25% of Arab public opinion. A majority of respondents who disapproved of the Arab revolutions blamed the failure of these popular movements to achieve their aims, as well as the resulting economic and political instability. In addition to broad overall support for the Arab revolutions, the Arab public credits the recent revolutions with improved treatment of the public by the police and other government officials in the Arab region.

The spark of Arab protests reached Morocco by means of the February 20 movement. The protests would probably have developed further were it not for the pre-emptive maneuver of the king in proposing constitutional amendments and in quickly passing legislation. Although the Justice and Development Party (PJD) did not back the movement, it was the main beneficiary of it, in that it won the elections with unprecedented support that enabled it to lead the government in prime political and constitutional conditions under the slogan "reform with continuity". While it might be premature to judge whether the experience has been a success or a failure, given that the PJD government is still in its early days, the preliminary assessment makes clear that the PJD has not, until now, pushed to bring about basic institutional reforms that would drive progress in various sectors. It seems that the logic of continuity has outweighed the logic of reform, or has restricted reforms as far as possible. The government may continue despite its limited achievements, but if matters remain as they are, the Islamist-oriented PJD will lose a lot of the goodwill it has gained, just as happened with other experiences of political parties in Morocco.

This study aims to define the interests and goals of the United States in the Arab region by answering two main questions: how does the Obama administration differ from its predecessors in view of its promises of change, particularly following the tragic transformations raging in the Arab region at present? And to what extent does the strategy of this administration reflect its public diplomacy regarding democracy, freedom, and justice in the region? The study explains how Obama raised the ceiling of expectations when he did not limit his promises to a change in American policy only, but included putting an end to the mentality that had pushed the United States into war. Despite the difference in style and method between the Obama and Bush Junior administrations, the overall goals and the regional strategy can be summarized in terms of three key interests: the priority of ensuring free access to energy supplies in the region; maintaining American supremacy over all other global powers; and the containment of all Arab objections to ensure the dominance of the US strategic agenda in the Arab region, including the guarantee of Israel's security.

​The study is premised on the assumption that the US-Iranian tensions under the Trump administration represents a new chapter in the crisis in the US-Iranian relationship. This extreme hostility was related to US domestic politics and the bordering on personal rivalry of President Trump with his predecessor, President Barack Obama, in domestic and foreign policy. One of the most important policy manifestations of this administrative divergence concerns the Nuclear Agreement with Iran, signed in 2015. Opposition to the Nuclear Agreement united Gulf players such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, who considered shared hostility towards Iran as a bridge to strengthen their relations with the US on the one hand; while also forming a strong front, in the presence of Israel, to weaken the Iranian regime without necessarily replacing it.

Israel is following the strategic changes in the region arising from the Arab revolutions with great anxiety. It is aware that its chances to control the process of change underway, and all the changes arising from it, are limited. Despite this, it is trying its utmost to minimize the negative effects of these changes on its standing in the region. This article deals with Israeli positions towards these geostrategic changes, foremost among them the fall of a number of dictatorial regimes, some of which Israel relied upon to guarantee its security. The establishment of democratic regimes in a number of Arab states threatens to disrupt the balance that was tipped in favor of Israel's security. Examined in this study is the decline of American influence in the Arab region, the prospect of change in Israeli-American relations, as well as the possibility of Israel losing its monopoly over non-conventional weapons because of the Arab Spring. To conclude, a review of the Israeli position on the revolution in Syria is also offered.