Latest Articles

An agreement signed by the Russian Foreign Minister and his US counterpart in Moscow has taken observers by surprise due to its timing and the surrounding circumstances. The agreement in Moscow was the natural culmination of a series of events impacting the situation in Syria, including changes to the composition of Barack Obama’s Administration and an overall shift in American attitudes towards the Arab Spring. This has presaged a change in American vision towards its interests in the wider Middle East region and Washington’s relations with both regional powers and global players with influence on the Syrian conflict. Finally, the agreement can be regarded as an expression of American uncertainty, as well as the Obama Administration’s inability to formulate a coherent policy towards Syria two years into the revolution.

This study adopts a comparative approach to investigate the impact of the reciprocal fears of internal and external parties on the stances of key actors during the 2011 transitions. Apparently, the uncertainty that accompanies any democratic elections has not been a local factor in the Arab cases because regional and international forces have an interest in hindering democracy, being a potential threat to the status quo. The study examines four interrelated problems related to external factors. It concludes that the external factors that have hindered democracy in non-Arab cases were not inevitable because addressing them seems to have been related to changes in the international system and the emergence of domestic democratic blocs that are able to exert pressure on external forces and get them to change their positions.

The environment within which the new Egyptian president and his supporters are operating is facing a series of crises and challenges emerging on both domestic and foreign levels.

Milestones in Democratic Transition in the Arab World Between Septemper 1, 2018 - October 31, 2018.

Book Title: The Lost Narrative [Arabic] Author: Farouk Sharaa Edition: 1st Year of publication: 2015 Publisher: ACRPS, Doha/Beirut Pages: 495

​This paper will present a study of the challenges posed by the Tunisian transitional phase since the country's successful popular revolution; specifically, it will examine the problem from the perspective of the Tunisian General Labor Union. Any appropriate discussion of the Tunisian post-revolutionary transitional phase would call for an understanding of the theory of transitional phases, the author has chosen to focus primarily on the conceptual framework of civil society. He did this, however, only after highlighting some of the theoretical limitations of the concept of a civil society. With this in mind, Tunisia's General Labor Union remains one of the most significant pillars of Tunisian civil society. For the purposes of this paper, "civil society" is defined as those social forces which defend the ideals of justice and dignity and which fight to undo the subcultures and structures which have hindered political freedoms in Tunisia.

This study explores the origins of Qatari-US relations, the foundations on which they are based, and the rules that govern them. It begins by examining relations between the two countries from the 1970s up until the Trump era. The paper finds that Qatar's need for US security assurances did not prevent it from adopting independent policies that occasionally contradicted US strategy. Accordingly, the Qatari-US relations have been upended, and exposed to crises due to diverging interests, concerns and challenges. While Qatar has embraced a foreign policy independent of Washington, it has also tried not to alienate it and has established itself as an asset for the US, both in terms of the military facilities it provides and the unique role it plays through maintaining ties with parties that the US cannot communicate with directly. Mutual dependency has enabled Qatari-US relations to overcome all the challenges they have faced over the past three decades, including those that emerged under the Trump administration.

An academic workshop to be hosted by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies will examine the regional implications of a long-term drop in oil prices on oil producing states in the Arab region. Made urgent by a sharp decrease in the global benchmark oil price, from US$110 per barrel to $40 per barrel in the 12 months leading up to September, “A Drop in World Oil Prices: Implications for Oil-Exporting Countries” will be held at the Al Mukhtasar Hall in Doha’s Ritz-Carlton Hotel on Saturday, November 7, 2015. While participation in the event will be limited to selected experts, attendance will be open to the media and the general public.

Egypt’s soft power is one of the strongest cards and tools of Egyptian power in the region. This study aims at highlighting the ebb and flow of Egypt’s soft power since the end of World War II, if not before. It explores its sources and forms, how it was employed to fulfill national and nationalistic interests as well as the factors and reasons that led to its decline in the Arab world and the region. The study also focuses on the repercussions of this decline on Egypt’s future power and its situation. The study states several factors or variables that must be taken into account to revive Egypt’s soft power which must include political reform, building a democratic state and reshaping and rehabilitating Egypt’s human resources and developing their skills. The study states that the most needed factor to reignite Egypt’s soft power revolves around giving Egypt’s political regime its legitimacy and appeal back.

Current Russian policy is based on a nationalism that rests on state capitalism, and that speaks to nationalist sentiment built on the rejection of Western exploitation. This patriotic nationalist position becomes evident through the lack of any ideologically derived principles driving Russia’s position: state interests including national security are what drive current policy. The drivers for this new Russian policy mean that Russia can simultaneously suppress a separatist movement by armed force in one region and champion another separatist movement with armed force in another. In this sense, the Russian Federation has no fixed positions but only fixed interests, and even its interests can change. In Syria, critics suggest that the proximate aim of Russia’s policy is to defend the Assad regime, Moscow’s ally, from collapse. Saving the regime is not, however, an end in itself. Rather, it is a means of self-assertion and another step toward the goal of becoming a global superpower, this time in the Middle East. If the Syrian regime believes its rescue is the exclusive objective of Russia’s intervention, it is wrong. The exertion of Russian influence will at most provide a temporary respite. The mere fact of Russia’s military presence in Syria means that the regime is no longer master of its own destiny and no longer even a player on the international stage, since Russia is now its proxy at any international negotiations.