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Milestones in Democratic Transition in the Arab World March 1th - April 30 th, 2021.

According to the World Bank indicators, the Maghreb youth unemployment rate is among the highest in the world. After the Arab Spring uprisings (2011), the youth aspirations and expectations clashed with the economic difficulties and political reality in the Maghreb countries, which are unable to provide employment opportunities and efficient solutions to youth major problems. In the light of this situation, we analyzed (using quantitative methods) the satisfaction degree of young people under the effect of economic challenges and political transformations in the Maghreb region. It is clear from the results that the Maghreb youth adhere more to the economic priority, despite other priorities related to administrative corruption, the lack of public services, the fight against terrorism and insecurity. The second conclusion is that the youth economic expectations create a kind of homogeneity in this region. In all the observed countries, most young people consider the economy as the first priority, as well as the entire population.

Conference "Christian Arabs in the Greater Mashreq: Determinants of Continuity, Emigration and Forced Migration"

This paper compares the results of the Fragile States Index issued by the Fund for Peace, a charitable organization, with indicators established in the Arab Opinion Index, an annual survey undertaken by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies in a number of Arab countries. These indicators reflect the assessments provided by Arab respondents of economic, social and political issues and what their views mean in light of the specific country contexts. The paper also examines whether citizens' views can be relied upon as indicators of the vulnerability of the state and the extent to which the indicators of state vulnerability are accurate by comparing them with the opinions of citizens in different areas. In this context, based on the Arab Index survey, the paper relied on nine indicators out of 12 adopted by the Fragile States Index in order to interpret economic, social and political opinions expressed by respondents.

This paper presents public opinion trends in the Arab region towards government performance in providing basic services, through the 2019/2020 Arab Index data issued by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. It focuses on reviewing the Arab public opinion trends towards government performance in public policies and basic services; and comparing them with previous Arab Index data. In addition, it highlights the relationship between government performance evaluation and government trust, and how public services are assessed among the priorities of the Arab region's citizens. Finally, the paper briefly concludes with some insights on how Arab public opinion trends towards public health services and government trust affects the behaviour of citizens during the Covid-19 pandemic.

This study evaluates the strength of the legislative bodies in three Arab countries both on paper and in public opinion. It utilizes an existent measure, the parliamentary power index, to gauge the strength of parliamentary bodies, before comparing that with public perception. The study asks if the power given to legislative bodies reflects the actual impact on policy from the point of view of Arab citizens. This study uses the questions in the ACRPS Arab Opinion Index on the legislative councils of Jordan, Morocco and Kuwait, in comparison with the parliamentary power index, to make this assessment.

This study investigates the role of the police apparatus in Egypt during the 2011 revolution and the subsequent counter-revolution following the 2013 coup. It begins by examining the relationships between the Military Council, President Mohamed Morsi, and the police apparatus. The study then explores how the Ministry of Interior and its security agencies reverted to their previous repressive practices, including extrajudicial killings and torture. The research highlights that the security apparatus remained fragmented, marked by overlapping authorities and a focus on resource competition rather than coordination. However, the existential threat posed by the 2011 revolution compelled the apparatus to unify against the tangible threat of popular unrest. Following 2013, the military, security and intelligence agencies furthered the suppression of opposition in various forms, largely evading accountability.

By making use of the data provided by the Arab Opinion Index during the periods 20172018- and 20192020-, a survey implemented by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies in 13 Arab countries, this paper deals with Arab public opinion towards Iran in two periods – before and after 2011 – based on an analysis of survey respondents' views of Iranian foreign policy, as conveyed in their answers. It answers a set of sub-questions: How has Iran's involvement in Syria and Yemen affected its image in the Arab world? Is Iran seen as a threat in the Arab world? Did Iran's policy towards Palestine contribute to improving its image in the Arab world? Are sectarian goals seen to be driving Iran's foreign policy towards the Arab world?

​The fourth annual Conference on the Arab Democratic Transition was convened by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies in Tunis, Tunisia. The 2015 meeting was devoted to theme of violence and politics in contemporary Arab societies. In total, 45 academic papers were rpesented over two days from 12 to 13 September. It came at a time when the Arab region, and particularly those countries within it that witnessed the Arab Spring, was engrossed in massive violence.

This study examines the explanatory power of realism in the context of the Grand Renaissance Dam crisis between Egypt and Ethiopia, drawings on concepts from deterrence theory, and the counter hegemonic challenges posed by revisionist states. It adopts a broader understanding of hegemony incorporating the concept of hydro- hegemony, where Ethiopia's behaviour is seen as a direct challenge to Egypt's established hegemony in the Nile Basin. The study concludes that the dam crisis illustrates both the strength and weaknesses of the realist perspective. On one hand, it affirms realist assumptions regarding the significance of power dynamics, alliance building, conflict of interests, relative gains, and the influence of the international system on state behavior. Conversely, the crisis also reveals the limitations of realism, particularly its to overlook internal factors and the importance of non-material sources of power in advancing states' interests and reinforcing their hegemony.