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​If deterrence fails and diplomacy falters, how can small states defend themselves against adversaries that outnumber, outgun and outmatch them? This study seeks to contribute to the ongoing scholarly discourse on how "the few" can achieve a military upset - not just a political or a propaganda one- against "the many." In an era where asymmetric war has become the most anticipated type, understanding the innovative ways of warfare that enable the smaller forces to endure and even prevail is of paramount importance to strategic analysts, military commanders, and policymakers alike. To do so, the study coins a definition for the concept of "Hybrid Defence," contributes a new definition of "Multi-Domain Combined Arms Operations" and examines their correlations with, and impacts on, "Military Effectiveness" and "Combat Effectiveness." It then analyses selected operational arts and tactical adaptations employed by the relatively smaller forces - such as the Ukrainian Military and Security Forces, as well as nonstate forces, exemplified by the Palestinian Resistance Factions in Gaza - for confronting numerically and technologically superior adversaries. The study extracts seven key lessons and concludes with their comparative implications for the defence policies of small states, particularly in the Arab world and beyond.

The potential impact of the Covid- 19 pandemic on populist governments has been the subject of a heated debate among specialists. There are scholars for who the pandemic will negatively impact populist governments. Here, populist governments are perceived as ill-equipped to respond to the multifaced challenges risen by the complexity of the pandemic. Conversely, many scholars that argue that the pandemic will strengthen populist governments because populism flourishes during crises. This article contests these two narratives. It asserts that any evaluation of the impact of the pandemic on populist governments should distinguish between their actions and their discourse. Thus, the study undertakes an analysis of US president Trump’s discourse, demonstrating that during the first year of the pandemic, it is twofold. First appears a “disconnected discourse” that continuously questions the reality of the pandemic, despite the important proactive actions taken by his government to mitigate the pandemic's economic, social, and sanitary impacts. Second, a “demonstrative discourse” arises, in which the pandemic was instrumentalized to enhance the legitimacy of one of the most important and controversial elements of the populist discourse: the idea of external threat.

​This paper agrues that although the Arab Gulf is strategically located and of economic importance to China, the Gulf states did not fall along the original routes demarcated by the Belt and Road initiative roadmap. Nevertheless, both China and these states have begun to engage with the initiative and its projects by signing strategic partnerships, and to enmesh these projects with perspectives on national development in the Gulf. This has unsettled the United States and its allies, some of whom have begun to view this expansion as a serious challenge. As a result, there has been an attempt to impede the initiative's projects through debt-trap debate, geopolitical alliances, and putting forth alternative economic proposals. This study argues that the Gulf is of great concern to China and the requirements of the Belt and Road initiative, identifying where the Arab Gulf states are located on the initiative map and illustrating the way in which each state has gradually become involved in associated projects. It considers Western mechanisms and alternative projects in response to respond to and impede the initiative and the degree to which these mechanisms may apply to the Gulf states. The paper presents deductive observations as to China's likely approach in the event that the initiative is obstructed and its interests undermined. Will it modify its foreign strategy – and will this impact the Gulf?

This study aims to define the interests and goals of the United States in the Arab region by answering two main questions: how does the Obama administration differ from its predecessors in view of its promises of change, particularly following the tragic transformations raging in the Arab region at present? And to what extent does the strategy of this administration reflect its public diplomacy regarding democracy, freedom, and justice in the region? The study explains how Obama raised the ceiling of expectations when he did not limit his promises to a change in American policy only, but included putting an end to the mentality that had pushed the United States into war. Despite the difference in style and method between the Obama and Bush Junior administrations, the overall goals and the regional strategy can be summarized in terms of three key interests: the priority of ensuring free access to energy supplies in the region; maintaining American supremacy over all other global powers; and the containment of all Arab objections to ensure the dominance of the US strategic agenda in the Arab region, including the guarantee of Israel's security.

This article explains underlying drivers of the general contours of Chinese foreign policy. Since the Cold War, China has increasingly been playing the role of a major power but demonstrates hesitancy in some theatres and has not developed its full capacities to that end. This article attends to the study of “Strategic Culture”, a framework which helps explain ideas generated from the history, culture, and societal narratives of a state, and which place general parameters that indicate preferred foreign policy options. Strategic Culture does not cause action, but helps define potential acceptable options. It is complementary to other explanations around the importance of factors such as distribution of material capabilities, decision maker’s idiosyncrasies, and alliance commitments. In particular, strategic culture helps understand long-term foreign policy patterns.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is taken here as a nucleus for new policies and powerful alliances that seek to establish a new world order; an order where the organization acts as a main pillar of the international power balance. The SCO has transformed from a regional organization with a specific goal into an international one by shaping new positions distinct from those of the United States. This was demonstrated through the SCO’s position on Iran’s nuclear program, the Korean issue, the Syrian crisis, and security issues in central Asia. Since this new international organization includes two permanent members of the Security Council (Russia and China), as well as nuclear powers, such as India and Pakistan, as observers, a serious look at its program seems essential for projecting the outcome of recent shifts in world politics. This paper thus attempts to answer two central questions: How far can the SCO consolidate multipolarity in international relations away from US hegemony? How will this affect the international power balance?

​عنوان الكتاب الأول بلغته الأصلية: The End of American World Order. عنوان الكتاب: نهاية النظام العالمي الأميركي. المؤلف: أميتاف أشاريا Amitav Acharya. دار النشر: Polity. سنة النشر: 2018. عدد الصفحات: 138. عنوان الكتاب الثاني بلغته الأصلية: Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order. عنوان الكتاب: اللفياثان الليبرالي: أصول وأزمة وتحول النظام العالمي الأميركي. المؤلف: جون إكنبري Gilford John Ikenberry. دار النشر: Princeton University Press. سنة النشر: 2011. عدد الصفحات: 372.

International alliances, cooperation, and coordination are no longer limited to state bodies or international organizations; criminal and terrorist groups working in organized crime have also formed international networks in order to develop activities, implement plans, and achieve objectives. Despite the differences in structure and purpose between terrorist networks and criminal groups, converging interests have led to cooperation and mutual coordination. This increases the strength of both and makes it hard for authorities to control and define them. North Africa is a living example of these alliances, particularly around drug trafficking given the geographic characteristics of the region that spans Asia, Africa, and Europe. This means North Africa is a key route for drugs smuggled from around the world to Europe in particular. It is also a strategic region for terrorist groups, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in particular. With drug networks in need of protection to secure safe passage of goods, and terrorist groups’ need for sufficient funds to finance and implement plans; the region has witnessed a dangerous alliance between the two parties. This alliance has created a major challenge for countries in the region, which have been forced to confront a double threat. This treat necessitates the development of new strategies.

​This paper addresses a theoretical model for the concept of "consociational democracy", beginning with the concept's roots in the Austrian Marxist tradition before describing its elaboration in 1969 by the Dutch-American political scientist Arend Lijphart. Lijphart's work was part of his wider critique of Gabriel Almond's categorization of Western political systems. This study presents a structural criticism of the term "consociational democracy" and its usage, arguing that the practice of "consociational democracy" was born of pragmatic policies before maturing into a theoretical model. It argues that the subsequent contributions of Lijphart were merely an extrapolation from a set of examples without "theory" to underpin it and that "power sharing" does not necessarily lead to democratization. The study thus draws up several theoretical observations that help distinguish "consociationalism" from "consociational democracy". Finally, the paper contrasts the suitability of this theoretical model for both Northern Ireland and Lebanon.

Globally, many countries are implementing decentralization programs as a means of promoting both democratic and developmental objectives. Unfortunately, however, scholarship has yet to offer a comprehensive framework within which to assess and reform central-local relations. This article seeks to overcome the "division of labor" that has long separated analyses of administrative and political structures, and to provide stronger conceptual vocabulary for describing and analyzing the complexities of centralization and decentralization in both administration and politics. After developing two distinct continua of administrative and political centralization/ decentralization, the paper then combines them in a single matrix able to highlight the wide range of strategies and outcomes that emerge from the complex interplay of the two spheres. Depending on where a country lies within the matrix, it is argued, decentralization strategies may do more harm than good. Devolution strategies are especially problematic in settings with strong local leaders, and should never be attempted without careful analysis of the preexisting character of central-local ties.