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Book Title: The Boy Remains Missing [Hebrew] Original title: הילד עדיין איננו Author: Shoshi Zaid Year of publication: 2016 Publisher: Tel Aviv: Media 10 Pages: 248

​Five years prior, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies brought together a group of young activists whose dedication and courage gave ris eto what would become the Arab Spring. The group of activists, gathered again in Doha on January 15-16, 2016, appeared to have been completely changed by the intervening months. With the initial ecstasy of the fall of tyrants across the region now faded, the young revolutionary activists had matured ideologically and politically. It was a maturity born of suffering and setbacks, and revealed a realism towards the coming battle for freedom. One unchanging fact was their continued hope for freedom, and their belief in its possibility.

From a purely political perspective, tyranny and oligarchic rule have continued to be the dominant characteristic of Arab politics. Authoritarianism has “strangled” the Arab citizen. Will an over-arching Arab liberal tendency be able to overcome sectarian, political and religious tensions to affect a comprehensive reform of Arab political culture? The search for a definitive answer to this question proves difficult. The presumed link between the question of (political) reform within the Arab countries, in general terms, and a liberal perspective from foreign cultural contexts is supported by only a tenuous hypothesis. Such a presumptive hypothesis cannot guarantee results in a cultural and social environment completely alien from the one in which the principles of liberalism first emerged. This author calls for a revitalized conceptualization of liberty which is culturally appropriate to the Arab context while maintaining its connection to global contemporary civilization: it would be a conceptualization which liberates Arab societies from historicism and a blatant emulation of the West.

Given the unrest boiling in the region, this paper considers the possibility of partitioning the countries of the Levant. Given the state of affairs and current political indicators in Syria and Iraq, which suggest the Kurds have started to regain their national unity and awareness, the group is now the only faction in the Levant fighting on nationalist or ethnic bases. What makes it easier for them to establish a viable Kurdish entity, at the local level, is the fact that they have huge economic, political, human, and military potential. This paper examines local and international contexts and obstacles to the establishment of a Kurdish state. It also argues that it will be unlikely, meanwhile, that sectarian entities could be created in Syria and Iraq given current local and international circumstances. Indeed, sectarian tension is nothing more than social tension that is the result of imbalance in the distribution of wealth and power, and the result of political authoritarianism. Therefore, the warring groups are not part of the framework of separatist tendencies; though they are liable to turn into sectarian nationalisms due to foreign intervention and agendas.

In September 2014, US President Barack Obama announced a “comprehensive strategy” to degrade and destroy ISIL. Obama stated, “I will not hesitate to take action against ISIL in Syria, as well as Iraq. This is a core principle of my presidency: If you threaten America, you will find no safe haven.” But despite this announcement, questions over the nature, goals, and instruments of US policy towards ISIL still continue to be asked in the context of a debate between those who think that the US is not doing enough to take on ISIL and those who think it would be better for the US not to expand its military involvement in the conflict. This debate has been influenced by internal American political polarizations in the form of the critical position taken by leading Republicans such as Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham, who view the Obama policy as weak, and Middle Eastern regional rivalries over the position towards ISIL and the nature of the political choices that must frame the confrontation with it.

Examining the path of the Libyan revolution from its beginning in February 17, 2011 until today, this paper goes on to forecast the challenges that Libya will likely face in the future. It examines possible scenarios of the political future of Libya. In this context, the paper focusses on the transitional stage in Libya as the transitional national council set it in the constitutional declaration on August 3, 2011. It does this in order to show the most prominent obstacles that the revolution faced and the eternal instability that the political scene in Libya has witnessed since the fall of the last regime. More broadly, this paper studies the new political map in Libya and the main actors after the fall of Gadhafi.

This paper presents a survey of political developments in Libya since the fall of Muamar Gaddafi. The author argues that, today, social and economic tensions have driven Libya to the edge of a precipice. It has become abundantly clear that a plan for transitional government, first envisioned by the National Transitional Council in 2014, has evaporated. To this has been added institutional stalemate, accompanied by violence, instability and direct confrontations between various Libyan factions. In this setting, a group associated with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant has been able to expand its power in the country. Finally, the author suggests that the 2012 national elections in Libya were not in reality, as widely perceived, a competition between Islamists and liberals, but, in fact, a contest for power and influence between representatives of various tribal groups and local leaders.

Alongside two constitutions, an old one brought down by a revolution and a new one drawn up by the "constituent power", the state enters a transitional phase during which it is usually ruled by "interim constitutions", enforced by the "transitional constituent" to act as a bridge between the two major constitutions in temporarily regulating the transition and the relationship between authorities. Since the "transitional constituent" wields "authority" outside of constitutional legitimacy, and since contingency and intentionality are inherent features of interim constitutions, a question arises about the extent of the "transitional constituent's" impact on shaping the constituent power, and the legacy of the interim constitutions in drawing up the permanent constitution. The study explores this question, addressing the Egyptian and Tunisian experiences in a comparative context, within a timeframe that begins with the regime collapse in early 2011 and ends with the entry into force of the current constitution in both countries in early 2014. The study seeks to understand the repercussions of the constitutional designing of the transition on the foundational process, and the constitutional regime that it has produced today in the two countries.

This study discusses the evolution of transitional justice in Morocco, demonstrating how the work of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission established within the regime has remained subject to the constraints of Moroccan politics. The Commission was declared a success prematurely, but over time it became clear that the Moroccan model needed to be reevaluated. The study concludes that the idea of "justice to the extent possible" obstructed transitional justice. Not only did this slogan serve to obscure the full truth; it also provided insufficient impetus to continue pushing for broader institutional reform. Although Morocco has experienced something of a human rights revival in recent years, it still harbours pockets of "lawful" injustice, broadly signaling an absence of sovereign law.

Military interventions in Sudanese politics can be attributed to a number of factors, most pertinently: excessive politicization throughout society, social institutions, trades unions and syndicates as well as educational and religious institutions. In this sense, the Sudanese was not an exception, merely one of many highly politicized institutions. This paper concludes that the three different military coups which took power in Sudan were only able to do so with the aiding and abetting of civilian political forces, such as the National Umma Party, the Islamic Front and an array of leftist forces all—to varying extents—colluded with the military to further their political aims. With the military ranks reflecting wider societal politicization, military coups were effectively an extension of the political process by other means.