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This paper presents a survey of political developments in Libya since the fall of Muamar Gaddafi. The author argues that, today, social and economic tensions have driven Libya to the edge of a precipice. It has become abundantly clear that a plan for transitional government, first envisioned by the National Transitional Council in 2014, has evaporated. To this has been added institutional stalemate, accompanied by violence, instability and direct confrontations between various Libyan factions. In this setting, a group associated with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant has been able to expand its power in the country. Finally, the author suggests that the 2012 national elections in Libya were not in reality, as widely perceived, a competition between Islamists and liberals, but, in fact, a contest for power and influence between representatives of various tribal groups and local leaders.

From an economic standpoint, this study aims to comprehend the reasons for the popular uprising outbreak, as well as the chances for democratic transition from a political economy angle. It examines the influence of the rentier state economic growth regime on the political prospects of citizens, particularly young people, who are convinced that such a regime will not lead to their ultimate safety, but rather to their economic marginalization due to the system's poor performance. It turns out that adopting a more comprehensive and long-term growth approach has become even more critical. As time goes by, it became evident that reform comes at a hefty cost on all fronts. Rather than being a tributary and assistance to the continuance of economic reforms, political reforms became an impediment and took on even greater importance than economic reform itself. The Algerian situation, according to the study, is an example of the intractable model of democratic transition in all its manifestations, since the incumbent system was pleased with restricted constitutional arrangements, notably elections. This has strengthened the rentier state in all its forms, including the political system's fragility and the succession of crises it has faced since independence till today.

This article poses the question of reform of the security sector in the period of Arab democratic transition by looking at the terms of reference for reform, the intersection between security policies and the political regime, and the enabling factors for security reform within an Arab context. The fundamental question facing Arab states concerns how to couple security and freedom and security and rights and justice. That is, how can the security agencies carry out their job without impinging on fundamental individual rights and freedoms? How can the state guarantee security and defend liberties at the same time? The article takes the view that security sector reform is part of the political transition process in Arab countries. Because the security establishment was a means to strengthen the regime and endorse its authoritarianism, any democratic transition aspiring to overcome the elements of the crisis must take into account the need to review the security sector.

Documents of Democratic Transition in the Arab World in Algeria and Sudan.

​​​​​​This section highlights the most significant political document related to democratic transformation in the Arab world. In this issue, we present document from Syria covering the period from July 1 to August 31, 2025.​​​

This study tries to demonstrate that the removal of the Gadhafi regime created new symbolic and political boundaries in Libya that go beyond the simplistic divide between those for the revolution and those against. These boundaries took on the guise of purity and impurity, honor and dishonor. They were also skillfully employed in the complex conflict for power that developed on the heels of the transition to the post-Gadhafi state. The author argues that the Gadhafi regime was highly personality based, and therefore the state also collapsed when the center collapsed. This fact left a set of local powerbrokers in its wake – from militias and revolutionary brigades to local councils, tribes, and local leaders, among them people with Islamist leanings, all of whom are competing for power and influence. The creation of these symbolic boundaries and their objective embodiment in the real world is likely to hinder the efforts of Libya to transform itself into a functioning and viable state.

Most initial readings have exhausted their explanations for failure, or stumbling, of the democratic transition process in Tunisia. Given the country’s weak political performance, lack of economic achievement, and worsening corruption, the need has emerged to consider the role of political culture in events since the Tunisian revolution up until President Kais Saied declared a state of emergency on 25 July 2021. Contrary to the prevailing trend in the literature on democratic transition, which has often overlooked the importance of a minimum level of civil political culture taking root, there is an urgent need to recognize its vital role in ensuring the success of any transitional process, especially in the early stages. This paper argues that the absence of a minimum level of political culture has contributed to the fragility of the transitional process in Tunisia, making democracy vulnerable to failure and to the reproduction of authoritarian patterns. Therefore, strengthening this culture becomes a necessity to ensure the sustainability of the democratic transition and avoid setbacks.

The experience of the Troika in government in Tunisia is a unique one when compared with developments in other Arab Spring states during the transitional period. The Troika was based on an alliance between more than one party, with the forces making up the Troika coming to power via the ballot box. The government formed represented the free will of the Tunisian people and represented them in the constitutional assembly. The experience of the Troika in Tunisia no doubt faced various obstacles, but it recorded some important successes. This study tries to examine the nature of the tripartite ruling alliance, its composition, the level of concord or discord between its components, how solid the alliance is, and its ability to endure in the face of the challenges of the coming political stages and milestones. It concludes that the Troika was able to survive despite factors pulling it apart, dissonance between its components, and the difficult political obstacles that warned of a real split in its structure. It is expected that the experience of a tripartite rule will be repeated in different circumstances, perhaps most significantly in terms of the Tunisian opposition forming a united front to take on the Troika.

This paper provides descriptive statistics on Arab public opinion towards the US over time, using the Arab Opinion Index from 2011 to 2019/2020. While Obama attempted to let pragmatism lead his foreign policy, Trump's policies upended the status quo of many issues, hastening conflict in the Arab region. How did this impact Arab opinion of the US and its foreign policy? Did these rapid shifts affect Arab citizens in their view of the US? Or does the Arab citizen find the content of this foreign policy indistinguishable from before, albeit with a different tone? The paper demonstrates that Trump's policies, which confused many international organizations and alliances, and caused chaos, especially in the Arab world, led to a rapid decline in the positive evaluation of the United States in the Arab world.

This paper presents an overview of trends in public opinion in four Arab countries—Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine (covering the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) towards events in the Syrian crisis. The data presented in this paper draws on opinion polls, comprising of face-to-face interviews with representative samples within each of the countries named above, and conducted as part of the 2012 Arab Opinion Index. The results of the survey demonstrate that there is no sharp divide in public attitudes towards the Syrian crisis, with firm majorities across all countries believing that an ideal solution to the Syrian crisis lies in the overthrow of the current regime. Only 8% of respondents held the view that the best solution to the crisis in Syria would lie in the total vanquishing of the opposition.