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The spark of Arab protests reached Morocco by means of the February 20 movement. The protests would probably have developed further were it not for the pre-emptive maneuver of the king in proposing constitutional amendments and in quickly passing legislation. Although the Justice and Development Party (PJD) did not back the movement, it was the main beneficiary of it, in that it won the elections with unprecedented support that enabled it to lead the government in prime political and constitutional conditions under the slogan "reform with continuity". While it might be premature to judge whether the experience has been a success or a failure, given that the PJD government is still in its early days, the preliminary assessment makes clear that the PJD has not, until now, pushed to bring about basic institutional reforms that would drive progress in various sectors. It seems that the logic of continuity has outweighed the logic of reform, or has restricted reforms as far as possible. The government may continue despite its limited achievements, but if matters remain as they are, the Islamist-oriented PJD will lose a lot of the goodwill it has gained, just as happened with other experiences of political parties in Morocco.

From an economic standpoint, this study aims to comprehend the reasons for the popular uprising outbreak, as well as the chances for democratic transition from a political economy angle. It examines the influence of the rentier state economic growth regime on the political prospects of citizens, particularly young people, who are convinced that such a regime will not lead to their ultimate safety, but rather to their economic marginalization due to the system's poor performance. It turns out that adopting a more comprehensive and long-term growth approach has become even more critical. As time goes by, it became evident that reform comes at a hefty cost on all fronts. Rather than being a tributary and assistance to the continuance of economic reforms, political reforms became an impediment and took on even greater importance than economic reform itself. The Algerian situation, according to the study, is an example of the intractable model of democratic transition in all its manifestations, since the incumbent system was pleased with restricted constitutional arrangements, notably elections. This has strengthened the rentier state in all its forms, including the political system's fragility and the succession of crises it has faced since independence till today.

The presence of the external factor is usually related to the context of the popular hirak, the periods of political transition and the transitional phases in many countries. This factor is evident in countries with a geopolitical position in regional and international competition. This study discusses the variable of the external factor in the 22 February 2019 hirak in Algeria by examining the limits of international and regional interventions in steering the course of the popular hirak compared to other Arab cases where the external factor seemed to be more influential. It aims to discuss the determinants of Algeria's relations with regional and international powers and to explain the issue of the lack of external interference in the popular hirak, ending with the modalities of the future of the turbulent political path and discussing the possibilities of transformation from abroad. The study concludes that the lack of regional and international intervention in the popular hirak is mainly related to geopolitical and strategic constraints, far from value and normative considerations. The behaviour of external forces is determined by Algeria's geopolitical situation. The risks of instability in the country would create highly complex security challenges in the Mediterranean region. Added to this is the importance of Algeria in assessing the strategic balances in the region, especially for European security.

This article examines how the Hirak illustrates a renewal of nation-building and civic practices in contemporary Algeria. To do so, it takes a look at the use of history and identity during the mobilization of 2019 and 2020. The Hirak has produced a joint social and political distinction process through the exchanges of discourses and representations about Algeria's history in a moment of contentious politics; doing so, the Hirak has used portraits of former political figures and historical events to propose an alternate view of Algeria's history, now appropriated by the people. Concerning identity, the widespread use of the Berber flag and solidarity practices throughout the national territory, following its informal ban, shows the emergence of a pluralist conception of the Algerian society. The paper concludes that Algerians are on the way to establish a polity beyond primordialism and patron-client's relationships, and that a modern citizens' nationhood is on the brink of emergence.

The splitting, renaming and merging of factions can lead to the start of new rivalries, or in some cases, end existing ones. A new faction may inherit the original faction's previous rivalries with other groups, and if a faction name change results in a total restructure, it may signal the end of the rivalry. However, this was not the case when Jabhat al-Nusra renamed itself Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, and later Tahrir al-Sham. It was considered a 'cosmetic' and superficial change because it did not develop a new structure. This article will shed light on exclusionary politics and the political ramifications of sectarianism caused by certain jihadist movements, such as Jabhat al-Nusra (presently known as Tahrir al-Sham), enabling us to analyse its practices, especially towards minorities, and sectarian ideologies present in Idlib, and which ultimately led to the expulsion of many who fled outside the governorate. The article also calls attention to the roles of regional and international powers in Idlib against the backdrop of opposition factions, and their physical and ideological influence on Islamist forces that frequently facilitated displacement within and outside the city.

As the first study to address the very recent issue “secret evidence,” this paper relies on primary and unstudied sources. It reviews the context of recent changes in the European justice system and the impact Hamas has left in filing its petition to have the group lifted from the list of terrorist groups in late 2010. The political dimension in the new law is also considered, including how it was given a legal guise to appear consistent with the requirement of justice. The timid international legal positions and reactions to these developments, the role played by the US and Britain, as well as the mimicry of Israel with regard to the secret evidence law are also discussed. The study concludes by tackling the implications of the new law, and the possibility of Hamas succeeding or failing to have itself removed from the terror list.

This study monitors the role of external factors in the stability of Moroccan authoritarianism and controling the liberalization methods pursued by the government over two stages: the final years of the Cold War and the 2011 Arab Spring. As much as these factors contributed to widening the margin of liberalization in the Moroccan political arena, they also contributed to limiting this liberalization (September 11, the post-2013 counterrevolutionary movement), especially given the lack of internal will to mature it. While it is true that these factors have made an impact, this remained within certain limits that allowed actors abroad (the United States, the European Union and donor institutions) to control the transformations of Moroccan politics and to manage contradictions, thus creating an environment hostile to democratic transition in Morocco.

The war in Syria caused large numbers of people to flee the country, a large proportion of which entered Jordan as refugees. This has depleted the resources of the Jordanian government, and significantly impacted upon Jordanian society in all respects. This paper analyses the impact of the influx of refugees into Jordan and highlights the humanitarian, economic and social challenges and opportunities their arrival presented to Jordanian society. The paper suggests that refugees can be an important addition to host countries, making a positive contribution to the economy and development.

Most initial readings have exhausted their explanations for failure, or stumbling, of the democratic transition process in Tunisia. Given the country’s weak political performance, lack of economic achievement, and worsening corruption, the need has emerged to consider the role of political culture in events since the Tunisian revolution up until President Kais Saied declared a state of emergency on 25 July 2021. Contrary to the prevailing trend in the literature on democratic transition, which has often overlooked the importance of a minimum level of civil political culture taking root, there is an urgent need to recognize its vital role in ensuring the success of any transitional process, especially in the early stages. This paper argues that the absence of a minimum level of political culture has contributed to the fragility of the transitional process in Tunisia, making democracy vulnerable to failure and to the reproduction of authoritarian patterns. Therefore, strengthening this culture becomes a necessity to ensure the sustainability of the democratic transition and avoid setbacks.

Early in the transitional justice process during and after the Tunisian revolution, the need arose to develop a full-fledged legal framework guaranteeing the rights of victims and, at the same time, of perpetrators. However, no sooner was transitional justice legislation ratified than progress towards the objective faltered. In an atmosphere of partisan political turbulence, the legislation resulted in weak outcomes. This led to the conclusion that the foremost problem of transitional justice does not lie in an absence of political will as much as in the philosophy on which it is founded. This philosophy adheres to liberal democratic values in facing the painful past and restoring rights to victims of despotism – by stipulating a set of rights that put the victim and the executioner on the same footing, without the slightest consideration of the balance of power between them. Consequently, perpetrators and torturers tend to dodge justice and recognition of truth, equating reconciliation with accountability.