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Book Title: Syria’s Via Dolorosa to Freedom: An Attempt at Contemporary History [Arabic]

* باحث مصري مختص بقضايا التحول الديمقراطي وسوسيولوجيا الأديان. Egyptian researcher specialized in democratic transition and sociology of religion.

Since the time of President Thomas Jefferson, and on through the presidents of the 20th century, the United States has talked about itself as the propagator, protector, and defender of democracy around the world. Yet America has never showed any qualms of forming military and political alliances with authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. The US justifies these international alliances on the basis that “not all dictatorships in the world are enemies of the United States, but all the United States’ enemies are dictatorships.” The US therefore adopted a two-track diplomacy: while working to spread democracy (directly or by means of international organizations and NGOs) the US has no issue in supporting autocratic governments when its interests are involved. How did US policy apply to the democratic transformation in the former Eastern bloc states in Europe on the eve of the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and subsequently, when American values and interests went hand in hand, and how did it then apply to the Arab Spring of 2011, when US values and interests were congruent in some cases and out of sync in others, according to the situation in each country and its strategic importance from America’s perspective? What are the results of these policies and what differences emerge from such a comparison of the Arab and East Europe cases.

​Five years prior, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies brought together a group of young activists whose dedication and courage gave ris eto what would become the Arab Spring. The group of activists, gathered again in Doha on January 15-16, 2016, appeared to have been completely changed by the intervening months. With the initial ecstasy of the fall of tyrants across the region now faded, the young revolutionary activists had matured ideologically and politically. It was a maturity born of suffering and setbacks, and revealed a realism towards the coming battle for freedom. One unchanging fact was their continued hope for freedom, and their belief in its possibility.

This study limits its aim to a discussion of the water policy of Egypt and Ethiopia. It will first lay out the Ethiopian view and the nation's reaction to the escalation of Egyptian media coverage calling for a direct war against Ethiopia after the country's insistence on the construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam on the Nile, which would disrupt the flow of water to Egypt. With Egypt regularly in control of 85% of the Nile's water, the dam would create a massive change in the water situation in the country. This paper shows the history of the conflict over the water of the Nile between Ethiopia (an Upstream Country) and Egypt (the only Downstream Country) and the position of Ethiopia on old agreements between the parties. The paper presents Ethiopian writings published since the revolution of January 25, 2011 by way of understanding the nation's viewpoint on the issue. ​

The author here examines the experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian political process after the victory of the January 25 Revolution with a focus on former president Mohamed Morsi's one year in office. The paper begins by analyzing the structural developments and accompanying political strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood while it was a force in the country's political opposition, and how the party reflected on its behavior after the January Revolution in general, but especially during Morsi's reign. The paper focuses on what is considered an exceptional moment in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood: when it went from being an opposition group to taking power in a formal government setting. It examines this extraordinary shift in light of the major challenges of managing the Egyptian state. The paper concludes that the Muslim Brotherhood will not disappear from the political scene given its deep integration into the Egyptian social fabric, and discusses strategies and paths that the organization could adopt in the post-coup era.

​This paper examines the state of Political Science in Egypt, suggesting that the Egyptian school of Political Science is facing a crisis and analyses the reasons why. It particularly focuses on the experience of the Department of Political Science at the Faculty of Economics, Cairo University, as the first specialized school for Political Science in Egypt, in view of the increasing roles played by its graduates in the public sphere. The study focuses on three key dimensions: the perceptions of this scholarly community regarding the role entrusted to political science in Egyptian society and politics, the changes in academic curricula, and the ideological and political contexts influencing teaching and research in political science in Egypt. The study concludes that the crisis of political science in Egypt is twofold: the crisis within the field in general and specific issues within the Egyptian context itself.

Book Title: De quoi la Palestine est-elle le nom? [Translated into Arabic]

​Five years prior, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies brought together a group of young activists whose dedication and courage gave ris eto what would become the Arab Spring. The group of activists, gathered again in Doha on January 15-16, 2016, appeared to have been completely changed by the intervening months. With the initial ecstasy of the fall of tyrants across the region now faded, the young revolutionary activists had matured ideologically and politically. It was a maturity born of suffering and setbacks, and revealed a realism towards the coming battle for freedom. One unchanging fact was their continued hope for freedom, and their belief in its possibility.

The struggle for political legitimacy has been central to political polarization in Egypt since the 2013 coup. Given the regime's pronounced authoritarian features, the traditional form of legal electoral legitimacy proved insufficient and ineffective. As a result, the regime adopted alternative strategies to reinforce its political legitimacy. Drawing on theories of political legitimacy and literature on citizenship in authoritarian regimes, this study explores the measures and practices implemented by the July 2013 regime to achieve legitimacy across its three dimensions: the system's effectiveness and competence, citizens' beliefs in its legitimacy, and their behaviours that signal recognition.