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This paper explores the philosophical context of the of political culture on the French radical left. Radical left refers to a group consisting of political and civil activists, intellectuals, writers, scholars, and politicians who assert their commitment to the priority of equality in economic and social conditions over values of freedom, justice, and citizenship. Unlike the moderate left, they believe that the satisfaction of equality claims requires the overthrow of the capitalist system and the abolition of the market economy. In the first section, the paper argues that the thought of the French moderate left, unlike the moderate left in other democratic countries, did not favour a break with the radical left and continued to share with it the idea that true liberation requires eradicating the causes of exploitation and alienation. Even though the moderate left adopted, when it held power, pragmatic policies and committed itself to the respect of democracy and constitutional order, it did not give up the idea of total societal transformation. The second section distinguishes the culture of the new radical left from that of the extreme Marxist radical left in its Trotskyist and Maoist forms. The third section traces the philosophical background of French new radical leftist discourse, writings, and methods.

This article deals with the post-2003 consociationalist experiment in Iraq. It examines the reasons why this experiment has failed in producing a reasonably coherent governing formula. It argues that, because of their emphasis on identity politics and not on making mutual concessions in the interest of serious statebuilding, the main players in this experiment (Shia, Sunni and Kurdish political elites) failed to appreciate the complexity of the consociationalist arrangement, let alone use it for public interest. The article focuses on the central role that the Shia Islamist parties played in making this failure happen, highlighting, as reasons, their insistence on an essentially sectarian rhetoric and their attempt to enforce it as a national identity. The article finally proposes a different rhetoric that can accommodate Iraq's ethnic and religious diversity.

The parliamentary experience in Morocco continues to excite the interest of politicians, researchers, academics, and those working in the press and media. This importance is heightened with the experience of the sixth parliament (1997-2002), which followed the adoption of the 1996 constitution, and which witnessed a decisive historical landmark in the form of two prominent events: the first peaceful transition of power in Morocco, and the transfer of rule from the late King Hassan II, who died on July 23, 1999, to King Mohamed VI. This experience made King Mohamed VI keen on historical continuity and the approach of the bicameral system (representative and consultative), and the rotation of power. The importance of this study derives from the relative paucity of relevant studies, and its attempt to understand this experience. This requires examining the constitutional amendments, the legislative elections and what accompanied them, as well as the outputs and successes of the practice of the parliamentary process.

​In this interview, Cheikh Rached Ghannouchi recounts his experiences of working with his “brothers” in the Ennahda movement,who, he claims, criticized his “ad hominem” attacks on ousted president Benali, in contrast to party policy—at the time—which forbade direct criticism of the former president. Cheikh Ghannouchi also reasserts his previous position that Islamists should avoid taking the reins of power—even when they win elections. This is to acknowledge, he says, the regional and global orders whichs imply would not tolerate Islamists in power.

This study attempts to understand the concepts of democratic consolidation and of dictatorship, and explains which is closer to coming about in the Turkish state after the experience of the past sixty years. Despite the reforms undertaken by the AKP since it came to power in 2002 that aimed to curtail the constitutional and legal pretexts allowing the military to intervene in political life, there have been notable changes in the Turkish scene, especially in 2013 and 2014. It has been implied that Turkey is on course to consolidate dictatorship, and this makes the third and final phase of democratization in Turkey subject to very different assessments. On this basis, the study attempts to answer a key question: where is Turkey heading, towards democratic consolidation or towards dictatorship?

​This review discusses the main findings of the report issued by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral entitled The Global State of Democracy 2021: Building Resilience in a Pandemic Era.

Following the ouster of President elect Mohamed Morsi after only one year in power, this paper looks at the future of elections in Egypt. Without any political party that holds the support of the masses, or the possibility of making up for this by building strong partisan alliances, the paper examines the rules of political practice and the nature of legislations based on the 2014 constitution in order to find a way forward amid a current deadlock. It finds a current legal and legislative condition that has restored Mubarak-era rules, characterized by weak partisan influence and a lack of the necessary political pluralism that accompanies democracy. It finds that, despite accelerating steps towards building partisan alliances and electoral consensuses, there are still structural obstacles hindering the establishment of a genuine parliamentary system, partly due to the weakness of political parties and the limitation of their legislative and procedural structure.

This study provides a discussion and analysis of the circumstances that led to the military occupation of the core of the state and government in contemporary Algeria, and the ramifications for the process of building political and legal institutions, and the democratic transition experience. The study employs the concepts of populism and neopatrimonialism to paint a picture of the path taken by the government in Algeria since independence. Populism describes the ideology that sanctified the one-party state and revolutionary legitimacy, while neopatrimonialism is the resulting shape taken by the exercise of political power. Framing these two concepts within their historical context provides an understanding of the circumstances of the army's seizure of power and its identification with the state. It clarifies the reasons for its refusal to redistribute power within the society after the establishment of political pluralism in the 1989 Constitution.

This study examines the constitutional management of political transition in Algeria following the popular protests of February 2019 (the Hirak). After setting out the basic tenets of Transitional Constitutionalism, the study investigates the extent to which peaceful political change can be achieved through constitutional mechanisms or arrangements derived from inherited texts. In contrast to similar Arab cases, the Algerian experience was characterized by the adoption of a political plan to manage the transitional phase, based on constitutional measures derived from the texts in force. But it was not convincing for a large segment of the Hirak, who believed that these arrangements would restrict the path of change to reproduce the existing system at the expense of achieving peaceful political change. In this sense, managing the transitional political phase according to the applicable constitutional texts did not set a precedent. Rather, in Algeria, a kind of precedent was set in the restriction of the concept of constitutional solution to the literal requirements of the functional constitutional text, without partial constitutional amendments, nor a fundamental revision of the inherited legislative structure.

The results of the June 15, 2015 parliamentary elections in Turkey have taken observers by surprise. While pollsters had predicted that Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) would be less popular than in earlier elections, most predictions had given the AKP 290 seats in the country’s legislature, the “Grand National Assembly of Turkey”. In other words, most had predicted that the AKP would continue to command an outright majority. In the end however, the AKP won 41% of the ballots cast, equating to 258 of the total of 550 seats available in the Turkish parliament. This surprise was compounded by the fact that the Kurdish People’s Democratic Party had finally crossed the 10% threshold of the popular vote to enter the chamber, and in fact secured 80 seats by winning 13% of the vote.