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The study defines the "external factor" and determines its impact on the transition process. The study notes that the role of these factors in transition is different from that of "democratization" if the external influence of the revolutions is minimal. This is especially so in the case of spontaneous popular revolutions where the external factor may be influential in the democratic transition, although its impact is decisive only when accompanied by facilitating domestic factors. The study shows the relationship between the external factor and the geostrategic location of the Arab state whereby the external factor becomes more important according to the importance of the state. The study follows the evolution of the principle of supporting democracy in US politics, which has been linked to US interests and has ended up supporting regime stability. It also monitors a regional and international trend of "promoting autocracy".

This study tries to demonstrate that the removal of the Gadhafi regime created new symbolic and political boundaries in Libya that go beyond the simplistic divide between those for the revolution and those against. These boundaries took on the guise of purity and impurity, honor and dishonor. They were also skillfully employed in the complex conflict for power that developed on the heels of the transition to the post-Gadhafi state. The author argues that the Gadhafi regime was highly personality based, and therefore the state also collapsed when the center collapsed. This fact left a set of local powerbrokers in its wake – from militias and revolutionary brigades to local councils, tribes, and local leaders, among them people with Islamist leanings, all of whom are competing for power and influence. The creation of these symbolic boundaries and their objective embodiment in the real world is likely to hinder the efforts of Libya to transform itself into a functioning and viable state.

Despite the state attracting considerable attention as a topic of study from Arab thinkers and intellectuals since the 19th century, the study of individual-level orientations toward the state using survey data has remained relatively marginal, both in English and in Arabic scholarship. Indeed, we still do not know much about Arab citizens' positions toward many of the debates that have long been present in Arab intellectual circles regarding the ontological nature of the so-called "Arab state" and the preferable ideological form it should take. This study seeks to fill this gap by focusing on the post-2011 period. It analyses how Arab citizens understand the state, the extent to which they distinguish it from the ruling regime, their orientations toward the ideological debate around the unified Arab state versus the nation-state, as well as around the religious Islamist state versus the civil state. It also examines the individual-level determinants of these orientations.

The relationship between economies and polities is one of vital importance to the outcome of the contemporary intensifying struggle between authoritarians and democrats. Investigating this relationship in Egypt is therefore of relevance for the world as a whole, increasingly divided as it is between countries with political economies informed by authoritarian or democratic models. This study will explore manifestations of that vital relationship in Egypt. It will commence by outlining the global and national contexts within which the economy operates, and both shape it and present challenges that must be met to achieve more rapid growth. How economic factors have contributed to the rise of Sisi's new authoritarianism will then be investigated. This will be followed by reversing that relationship, analyzing the economic consequences of the Sisi regime. Whether those consequences will better enable Egypt to compete economically, or will undermine its capacities to do so, is addressed in the fourth section. That is followed by an effort to answer the related question of what the key building blocks of a more successful economic strategy might be. In the conclusion scenarios of alternative futures of Egypt's political economy are considered.

A chemical weapons attack by the Syrian regime on August 21, 2013, led to a massacre of civilians in the towns of East Ghouta and West Ghouta on the outskirts of Damascus and marked a turning point in the Syrian conflict. US President Barack Obama had previously undertaken to respond militarily if such an attack took place, provided that Congress would support such a decision. Such a direct US military intervention remained likely despite opposition among the American public and within Congress itself, up to and until a Russian proposal, quickly accepted by the Assad regime in Damascus, which would place all of Syria’s chemical weapons under international supervision before they were destroyed by Moscow. This paper examines how the Obama White House dealt with the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. The paper also deals with declining international interest in a diplomatic resolution to the Syrian crisis, with the world community now shifting its focus from punishing the Assad regime to accepting the destruction of those weapons.

Alongside two constitutions, an old one brought down by a revolution and a new one drawn up by the "constituent power", the state enters a transitional phase during which it is usually ruled by "interim constitutions", enforced by the "transitional constituent" to act as a bridge between the two major constitutions in temporarily regulating the transition and the relationship between authorities. Since the "transitional constituent" wields "authority" outside of constitutional legitimacy, and since contingency and intentionality are inherent features of interim constitutions, a question arises about the extent of the "transitional constituent's" impact on shaping the constituent power, and the legacy of the interim constitutions in drawing up the permanent constitution. The study explores this question, addressing the Egyptian and Tunisian experiences in a comparative context, within a timeframe that begins with the regime collapse in early 2011 and ends with the entry into force of the current constitution in both countries in early 2014. The study seeks to understand the repercussions of the constitutional designing of the transition on the foundational process, and the constitutional regime that it has produced today in the two countries.

ﺗﺴﻌﻰ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ إﻟﻰ اﺳﺘﻜﺸﺎف أﻧﻤﺎط اﻟﺘﻌﺒﺌﺔ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ ﻣﻨﺬ اﻧﻘﻼب اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻣﻦ ﺗﻤﻮز/ ﻳﻮﻟﻴﻮ 2013. وﺗﺨﺘﺒﺮ ردة ﻓﻌﻞ اﻟﻘﻮى اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻘﻤﻊ اﻟﺸﺪﻳﺪ اﻟﺬي ﻳﻤﺎرﺳﻪ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﻟﻤﺼﺮي ﺗﺠﺎﻫﻬﺎ، وﺗﺠﺎدل ﺑﺄﻧ ﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﺘﻀﻴﻴﻖ واﻟﻘﻤﻊ اﻟﺘﻲ ﻳﻤﺎرﺳﻬﺎ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم ﺗﺠﺎه اﻟﻘﻮى واﻟﺤﺮﻛﺎت اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ واﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ، ﻓﺈن ﺛﻤﺔ أﺷﻜﺎﻟ ﺎ وأﻧﻤﺎﻃ ﺎ ﻣﺘﻨﻮﻋﺔ ﻟﻠﺘﻌﺒﺌﺔ واﻻﺣﺘﺠﺎج ﻇﻬﺮت ﺧﻼل اﻟﺴﻨﻮات اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻴﺔ ردة ﻓﻌﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺎت اﻟﻘﻤﻌﻴﺔ. وﻗﺪ راوﺣﺖ ﻫﺬه اﻧﻤﺎط وا ﺷﻜﺎل ﺑﻴﻦ ﺗﻌﺒﺌﺔ ﺳﻠﻤﻴﺔ وأﺧﺮى ﻋﻨﻴﻔﺔ، ﻛﻤﺎ اﺧﺘﻠﻔﺖ ﻃﺒﻴﻌﺔ اﻟﻘﻀﺎﻳﺎ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺮﻛﺰ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺘﻌﺒﺌﺔ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻗﻀﺎﻳﺎ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ واﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ وﺣﻘﻮﻗﻴﺔ. ﻟﺬا ﺗﺤﺎول اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ اﺧﺘﺒﺎر اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ اﻟﺠﺪﻟﻴﺔ ﺑﻴﻦ اﻟﻘﻤﻊ وأﺷﻜﺎل اﻻﺣﺘﺠﺎج ودرﺟﺎﺗﻪ، وﻣﺎ إذا ﻛﺎن اﻟﻘﻤﻊ ﻳﺆدي إﻟﻰ ﺗﻘﻠﻴﻞ اﻻﺣﺘﺠﺎج أم زﻳﺎدﺗﻪ وﺗﺼﻌﻴﺪه، ﺑﻄﺮق وأﺳﺎﻟﻴﺐ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: اﻧﻘﻼب 2013، اﻟﺘﻌﺒﺌﺔ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ، اﻟﻤﻘﺎوﻣﺔ، ﻣﺼﺮ. This study explores political mobilization in Egypt after the coup of July 3, 2013, and the way in which regime oppression shaped the responses of political forces within the country. The author argues that novel and varied forms of political mobilization have emerged in Egypt in the past few years in spite of regime oppression. The nature of the response was also dictated on the relevant group’s focus. This paper shall attempt to unravel the dialectical relationship between state repression and political dissent in Egypt, seeking to determine the ways in which state repression shapes the form and intensity of political dissent

This article discusses the failure of the Iraqi political elites to resolve the key problems brought about by the occupation of Iraq in April 2003, even after the declaration of the Iraqi constitution in 2005. The article holds that the new constitution could not be implemented and was unsustainable for purely internal reasons. It was unable to provide answers to the new questions and facts, and the new tactical alternatives it created to produce hybrid regimes from 2006 were incapable of overcoming the structural crisis of the regime. This was especially the case since the attempts described as consensual, aimed to preserve the delicate political situation on the basis of the existing balance of power—rather than on the basis of a governing frame of reference accepted by all—did not transform into binding political conventions for the political groupings representative of the ethnic and religious components of Iraq, and at a minimum did not transform into agreements respected by all sides.

This paper argues that hybrid regimes help to create an environment that encourages the transformation of political disputes into identity conflicts. In such regimes, there is no resolution to the advantage of a particular party, since there is neither full authoritarianism that prevents the existence of any form of competition, rivalry, or conflict, or full democracy that permits the existence of democratic competition according to principles of pluralism, the peaceful transfer of power, and legal guarantees. In the environment of these hybrid regimes there are some features of democracy and many features of authoritarianism, and so political competition usually begins as a dispute over points of view and intellectual assumptions and ends up as an identity conflict leading to the dissociation of society.

The purpose of this paper is to study the Algerian experience with the Arab spring by identifying the nature of the protests movements in Algeria, to search the adaptation mechanisms of the Algerian political regime with the protest act and to answer the question: why the change in Algeria is so hard to happen? Next, this paper will expose a range of the most important political bets to understand better the Algerian exception by searching the roots of the crisis which has been overcomed in searching a radical and real reform. Finally, this paper will be concluded by addressing the prospects of political, institutional and economical changes and by exposing a future scenarios of the hard transition in light of internal and external challenges.