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An agreement signed by the Russian Foreign Minister and his US counterpart in Moscow has taken observers by surprise due to its timing and the surrounding circumstances. The agreement in Moscow was the natural culmination of a series of events impacting the situation in Syria, including changes to the composition of Barack Obama’s Administration and an overall shift in American attitudes towards the Arab Spring. This has presaged a change in American vision towards its interests in the wider Middle East region and Washington’s relations with both regional powers and global players with influence on the Syrian conflict. Finally, the agreement can be regarded as an expression of American uncertainty, as well as the Obama Administration’s inability to formulate a coherent policy towards Syria two years into the revolution.

In September 2014, US President Barack Obama announced a “comprehensive strategy” to degrade and destroy ISIL. Obama stated, “I will not hesitate to take action against ISIL in Syria, as well as Iraq. This is a core principle of my presidency: If you threaten America, you will find no safe haven.” But despite this announcement, questions over the nature, goals, and instruments of US policy towards ISIL still continue to be asked in the context of a debate between those who think that the US is not doing enough to take on ISIL and those who think it would be better for the US not to expand its military involvement in the conflict. This debate has been influenced by internal American political polarizations in the form of the critical position taken by leading Republicans such as Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham, who view the Obama policy as weak, and Middle Eastern regional rivalries over the position towards ISIL and the nature of the political choices that must frame the confrontation with it.

This study traces the evolution and divergence of state–society relations in the Middle East and North Africa through the lens of social pacts and welfare regimes. It asks how governments across the region have responded to popular mobilization during and after the Arab uprisings, and what these responses reveal about the nature of the Arab state – or, more accurately, Arab states – in the region. By situating post-uprising developments within longer post-independence trajectories, the study traces sharply divergent paths since 2010. These varied responses underscore the absence of a single "Arab state" model. Instead, welfare regimes and social pacts across different types of political economies in the region reflect at least three distinct models of Arab statehood. In the oil-rich Gulf monarchies, fiscal surpluses sustain generous welfare systems and ambitious development strategies, while rulers cautiously promote expanded roles for the private sector under tight control. In middle-income states, initial post-uprising concessions, such as expanded social spending and employment, quickly gave way to austerity, debt crises, targeted assistance, and rising repression, resulting in declining welfare provision and shrinking opportunities for the middle class. In low-income and conflict-affected countries, protracted wars and state fragmentation have devastated welfare infrastructures, leaving humanitarian actors to fill governance vacuums.

This article examines a contingent Paradigmatic shifts at the 'ESS 2003 and 'EUGSS 2016'. It mainly argued that, the EUGS's including of 'Resilience' as a strategic priority of EU external and security action settled more security roles to the EU. To address these shifts, the article provide three sections. Firstly, we trace with the help of CST the 'genalogy of resilience', and show how resilience as a rationality of governance endorse an intensified logic of security. latter, we explore the EU's two paradigms, 'Normative' and 'Resilience', their meanings, connotations and applications in the EES 2003 and the EEGSS 2016, and show how the EU display a new institutional mechanisms and security/ defense initiatives in order to fulfill its new paradigm. Thirdly, we, test the limits of these shifts by examining the applications of resilience within the European agenda on Migration.

Book Title: Syria’s Via Dolorosa to Freedom: An Attempt at Contemporary History [Arabic]

Russia has not specified its national interests in the Middle East or the Arab World since the 1990s. This paper discusses Russia’s shift toward a more active and effective role in the Middle East, in particular after Vladimir Putin came to power. Putin’s attempts to strengthen Russia in the Middle East were driven by a mixture of nostalgia and strategic national interests. With the events of the Arab Spring, Russia sensed that Arab revolutions could result in geostrategic changes in the region, which may not comply with its growing ambitions. It is this background against which Russia’s different stances toward each Arab Spring country and the outcomes of their respective uprisings can be read. Putin expressed anti-change reservations in Libya and Egypt, and even more so in Syria, making it one of the major actors in the Syrian crisis. At the same time, however, Moscow had no strong stance on Yemen, Tunisia, or Bahrain. The motives behind Russia’s role can be understood through a look at its internal situation, which is being influenced by waves of democratic change in the Arab Region, as well as its impact on the future of Central Asian countries, particularly Russia’s allies (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus). This paper discusses all of these entanglements in the context of the current Arab situation.

​A one-day academic symposium hosted by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies will bring together experts from Russia, the Arab world and the region to examine Moscow’s latest military intervention in Syria, on Saturday, October 24, 2015. While Russia’s decision to intervene directly in the conflict in Syria comes as the culmination of more than four years of diplomatic and military support for the Assad regime, the move by the Kremlin to deploy its military forces has come as a surprise to many observers, becoming a turning point not only in the militarized revolution within Syria, but also in the broader Middle East and indeed in a larger global arena. To better study the circumstances which gave rise to the Russian maneuver and the outcomes likely to result from it, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies will convene “Russian Military Intervention in Syria: Motives, Objectives and Repercussions”. In the highly volatile climate which the Middle East is presently witnessing, selected participants at the meeting will be asked to examine the fallout of Russia’s actions on the future stability of the region.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is taken here as a nucleus for new policies and powerful alliances that seek to establish a new world order; an order where the organization acts as a main pillar of the international power balance. The SCO has transformed from a regional organization with a specific goal into an international one by shaping new positions distinct from those of the United States. This was demonstrated through the SCO’s position on Iran’s nuclear program, the Korean issue, the Syrian crisis, and security issues in central Asia. Since this new international organization includes two permanent members of the Security Council (Russia and China), as well as nuclear powers, such as India and Pakistan, as observers, a serious look at its program seems essential for projecting the outcome of recent shifts in world politics. This paper thus attempts to answer two central questions: How far can the SCO consolidate multipolarity in international relations away from US hegemony? How will this affect the international power balance?

This paper attempts to study a wider trend of jihadist groups with a globalist outlook, a phenomenon which was not entirely clearly understood when the Syrian revolution broke out. Since only the broad outlines of this trend are apparent, leaving many of the details as yet unclear, the author shall attempt to illuminate the environment in which these groups operate. Specifically, the paper examines “Nusra Front” (known in full as the “Nusra” or “Salvation” Front for the People of Syria). The paper follows the foundation of the group and the circumstances which allowed it to flourish and spread across Syria through to the internal divisions which led to its fragmentation before it made way for the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. The conclusion of this paper surveys some of the immediate and secondary consequences of the spread of both of these groups.

Book Title: Syria’s Via Dolorosa to Freedom: An Attempt at Contemporary History [Arabic]