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Russia has not specified its national interests in the Middle East or the Arab World since the 1990s. This paper discusses Russia’s shift toward a more active and effective role in the Middle East, in particular after Vladimir Putin came to power. Putin’s attempts to strengthen Russia in the Middle East were driven by a mixture of nostalgia and strategic national interests. With the events of the Arab Spring, Russia sensed that Arab revolutions could result in geostrategic changes in the region, which may not comply with its growing ambitions. It is this background against which Russia’s different stances toward each Arab Spring country and the outcomes of their respective uprisings can be read. Putin expressed anti-change reservations in Libya and Egypt, and even more so in Syria, making it one of the major actors in the Syrian crisis. At the same time, however, Moscow had no strong stance on Yemen, Tunisia, or Bahrain. The motives behind Russia’s role can be understood through a look at its internal situation, which is being influenced by waves of democratic change in the Arab Region, as well as its impact on the future of Central Asian countries, particularly Russia’s allies (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus). This paper discusses all of these entanglements in the context of the current Arab situation.

The book analyzes China's strategy toward Arab states, exploring its objectives, tools, and implications. The author examines China's strategic goals, its vision for the Arab world, and the methods used to achieve these aims.

This paper presents Arab public opinion trends on the Palestinian issue, through data collected by the ACRPS-conducted Arab Opinion Index. It assesses whether Palestine is a pan-Arab issue or one that concerns Palestinians alone. It also evaluates Arab regional attitudes towards recognition of Israel and towards the positions and policies adopted by some international or regional powers towards Palestine. The paper demonstrates that Arab public opinion strongly leans towards dealing with Palestine on the basis that it is a pan-Arab issue, not specific to the Palestinian people alone. It also shows that public opinion in the region is almost unanimous (at a rate of 88%) in rejecting any national recognition of Israel and that the assessment of Arab public opinion of regional or international powers in the region is determined by their policies towards the Palestinian issue.

This study breaks from the prevailing discourse portraying minorities as victims, presenting them as multi-dimensional historical actors and analysing their relationship with political modernity and national construction. It demonstrates how sectarian differences were sharpened and Ottoman culture facilitated the manipulation of minority groups by religious elites and the ruling clan. The Assad regime, supported by Alawi clientelism, fuelled fear of Sunni Islam. In addition, the revolution that began in 2011, accompanied by severe violent repression, has turned into a civil war. The Assad employs sectarian vocabulary that targets the Sunni majority in favour of the Shia minority and Iran. It views Damascus as the capital of minorities, seeking to restore demographic change in Syria. The study discusses factors to encourage a pluralist future Syria and focuses on the issue of the state model that must be redefined, taking into account the existence of all sects that share the same political culture, and all of them, including the Sunnis, demand guarantees.

Brazil is considered a rising power in the world order of the post-Cold War era, and some see it as an emerging middle power. Several motives and caveats drive Brazil’s stance vis-à-vis the Arab Spring revolutions. Brazil decided not to get involved in the affairs of the Arab world and carefully observed the internal developments in Arab countries and the role of some intervening foreign powers. It also reiterated that the West’s military intervention in the affairs of Arab countries is selective and causes more harm than good. Brazil’s reactions varied, as did its stances and ways of addressing the Arab revolutions. The paper explores and analyzes the conflicting Brazilian reactions and assesses the factors behind the different views. It also mentions some expected outcomes of the Brazilian stance and the possible repercussions on Brazil’s international role and economic interests in the Arab region.

This special issue focuses on academic discussions in the field of water cooperation and diplomacy, which have garnered increased attention in recent decades due to growing threats to the use of shared water resources. The contributions in this special issue aim to understand the challenges of transboundary water cooperation and its prospects in the Arab region. The materials illustrate how water cooperation in the Arab region is essential, necessitating more engaged strategies in water diplomacy and regional collaboration. Arab countries have recently been affected by external dominance policies imposed by neighbouring countries regarding water, often struggling to find appropriate responses. The evolution of international water law has not been sufficient to effectively resolve conflicts between countries. However, this issue also highlights that water diplomacy alone is insufficient to address the multifaceted water issues in the region. Many of these problems stem from decades of failure to develop sustainable water management at the local level.

Following the transformations in the Levant’s regional system since the beginning of World War II to the rise of the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria, this paper examines the new context of the region with regard to Washington’s resumption of direct military intervention. It finds that the Levant – as a soft area easily subject to geopolitical influences – has always been subject to changes based on shifts in world order, from the Cold War, followed by unipolarity, to the relative decline of US power. Thus, while the main actors of the Levant’s regional system were Arabs during the Cold War, the region has become a battleground for non-Arab parties – namely Turkey and Iran – following the invasion or Iraq and the eruption of the Arab Spring revolutions.

This paper seeks to understand Arab public attitudes towards Turkey. The author goes beyond Arab perceptions of Turkey’s regional policies, taking in the general Arab perception of the Turkish people, and the evaluation of Turkey’s democracy and political advancement among Arab respondents. The author reports that one-third of the Egyptian public has a broadly positive view of Turkish society and of Turkish policies. The results also suggest that divisions in Arab attitudes towards specific issues, such as the conflicts in Iraq and in Syria and the Sunni-Shia divide, contribute to a similarly fractured Arab attitude towards Turkey across the wider region. Most Arab respondents voiced the view that Turkey treats the Arab peoples with dignity and respect, while acknowledging that Ankara used its regional policies to advance its own interests.

This paper presents public opinion trends in the Arab region towards government performance in providing basic services, through the 2019/2020 Arab Index data issued by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. It focuses on reviewing the Arab public opinion trends towards government performance in public policies and basic services; and comparing them with previous Arab Index data. In addition, it highlights the relationship between government performance evaluation and government trust, and how public services are assessed among the priorities of the Arab region's citizens. Finally, the paper briefly concludes with some insights on how Arab public opinion trends towards public health services and government trust affects the behaviour of citizens during the Covid-19 pandemic.

This paper presents Arab public opinion trends on the Palestinian issue, through data collected by the ACRPS-conducted Arab Opinion Index. It assesses whether Palestine is a pan-Arab issue or one that concerns Palestinians alone. It also evaluates Arab regional attitudes towards recognition of Israel and towards the positions and policies adopted by some international or regional powers towards Palestine. The paper demonstrates that Arab public opinion strongly leans towards dealing with Palestine on the basis that it is a pan-Arab issue, not specific to the Palestinian people alone. It also shows that public opinion in the region is almost unanimous (at a rate of 88%) in rejecting any national recognition of Israel and that the assessment of Arab public opinion of regional or international powers in the region is determined by their policies towards the Palestinian issue.