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This study discusses successive Palestinian governments and provides a reading of their features, focusing on the 15th, 16th and 17th governments, five years after Rami Hamdallah became prime minister. The first section examines the emergence and development of governments since 1994. The second section gives an overview of the three cabinets in question and their agendas while the third section examines the failures of these governments and the impact of that failure on the Palestinian political scene. The final section examines the traditional operating assumptions of the political system. The study argues that the origin of the problem lies in the political system that has emerged since 1994 which restricts the operations of Palestinian governments, and that the formation of "technocratic" cabinets has only exacerbated the Palestinian political crisis.

This paper seeks to investigate the reasons behind the latest Palestinian national reconciliation, signed on April 23, 2014, and the circumstances in which it took place, and which prompted Fatah and Hamas to set aside their long-standing divisions which had pitted the West Bank against the Gaza Strip. The paper attempts to determine if this latest reconciliation between the two largest Palestinian political factions will be any more successful than previous attempts to end Palestinian in-fighting. It also seeks to understand what drove the present (Fatah-led) Palestinian National Authority based in Ramallah to defy both the White House and the Israeli government in seeking to turn a page with Hamas. Where do the prospects for the success of this latest reconciliation stand?

​Settlement and occupation of Arab lands constitute paramount values in Zionist ideology and are highly important in the politics of all Zionist currents, be they secular, religious, leftist or rightist. Settlement in the West Bank and the occupied Eastern Jerusalem is a constant central colonial policy through which Israel seeks to achieve what it failed to do in the 1948 war, that is control the largest surface area of lands accommodating the least number of Arab-Palestinian citizens. As soon as Israel occupied the remaining Palestinian territories in the six-day war in June 1967, it started building settlements. Since 1967, Israel has gradually developed its colonial settlement project in the occupied Palestinian territories. This paper examines the stalling policy that Israel is adopting by using double standards: it caves to international pressures at times, while it expedites its settlement pace at other times.

This study distinguishes between three Interrelated theoretical approaches prevalent in writings of researchers seeking to understand the emergence of the Islamic Resistance Movement, "Hamas". The first of these approaches examines the movement from the portal of ideology, stressing the importance of international and regional dimensions and the rise of political Islam after the "setback" (Naksa) of the 1967 Six Day War. The second approaches Hamas as representing a social movement seeking to revisit the historical narrative of Palestinian society. The third considers it to be the heir of the Palestinian national liberation movement, attributing its rise to transformations witnessed in Palestinian identity and the Palestinian community's definition of itself. Although the three readings do not contradict each other, a focus on one of them can lead to oversimplification or exaggeration: emphasis on the first approach is at risk of overlooking transformations in the movement in its later stages and a marginalization at the micro level of local dimensions; emphasis on the second approach can result in the overestimation of the effectiveness of collective action; exaggerated emphasis on the third approach deprives social actors of their effectiveness. Hence this study proposes situating Hamas in the ​intersection of these three approaches.

With the expansion of donor entities and the growth of their various activities, the questions about foreign aid and the strategic objectives behind it have become essential. This paper asks the following questions: Why do donor entities provide aid to poor countries? What are the most important objectives of these donors? Are humanitarian motives the main factor determining the conduct of donors? Theoretical and empirical studies have addressed these questions in depth from various theoretical backgrounds looking at many areas of the world, but there remains no agreement regarding the most important motives and objectives governing the conduct of donor countries in providing aid to poor countries. This paper seeks to answer these questions by reviewing, analyzing, and adapting the most important studies in international development and international relations to highlight the most important features of the global debate on this issue.

This paper presents an overview of trends in public opinion in four Arab countries—Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine (covering the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) towards events in the Syrian crisis. The data presented in this paper draws on opinion polls, comprising of face-to-face interviews with representative samples within each of the countries named above, and conducted as part of the 2012 Arab Opinion Index. The results of the survey demonstrate that there is no sharp divide in public attitudes towards the Syrian crisis, with firm majorities across all countries believing that an ideal solution to the Syrian crisis lies in the overthrow of the current regime. Only 8% of respondents held the view that the best solution to the crisis in Syria would lie in the total vanquishing of the opposition.

The aim of this Study is to provide policy options for Pakistan in relation to the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) dispute with India. A special focus is on the crisis following the Indian revocation of J&K's special status in August 2019. Since then there is not just a complete blackout in J&K but also another low in the India-Pakistan relationship. Based on the analysis of the diplomatic support that Islamabad has received from the international community in general and the Muslim world in particular, this paper argues that Pakistan has to mainly rely on what it can do on its own. By examining how the present crisis is a direct outcome of how this conflict has transpired and evolved over the last seven decades, this paper draws a series of measures which the Pakistani government can take at its own and in collaboration with international actors to obtain support for a sustainable solution to the J&K dispute.

​The study is premised on the assumption that the US-Iranian tensions under the Trump administration represents a new chapter in the crisis in the US-Iranian relationship. This extreme hostility was related to US domestic politics and the bordering on personal rivalry of President Trump with his predecessor, President Barack Obama, in domestic and foreign policy. One of the most important policy manifestations of this administrative divergence concerns the Nuclear Agreement with Iran, signed in 2015. Opposition to the Nuclear Agreement united Gulf players such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, who considered shared hostility towards Iran as a bridge to strengthen their relations with the US on the one hand; while also forming a strong front, in the presence of Israel, to weaken the Iranian regime without necessarily replacing it.