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Supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood had held sit-ins outside the Rab’a Adawiya Mosque, on the edge of a Square located in the Nasr City district east of Cairo, before the forced dispersal by Egyptian security forces led to a massacre on August 2. Using aerial footage, Human Rights Watch estimated that 85,000 protestors were gathered at the square before the massacre. The steps taken to disperse the crowds had totally contradicted assurances by the Egyptian authorities, for example that the process would be gradual; that a security cordon would allow for the safe passage of women and children in particular; and that protestors would have sufficient warning to leave. Clearly, the massacre illustrates that the Egyptian authorities failed miserably in their duty to ensure that any loss of life resulting from the dispersal was kept to a bare minimum. This paper makes use of the evidence documented by Human Rights Watch on the events surrounding the dispersal of the Rab’a Square, concentrating on three main points: the violence of some of the protestors; the high death toll resulting from the dispersal; unjustified killings of protestors; and the lack of any safe exit routes for the protestors.

Supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood had held sit-ins outside the Rab’a Adawiya Mosque, on the edge of a Square located in the Nasr City district east of Cairo, before the forced dispersal by Egyptian security forces led to a massacre on August 2. Using aerial footage, Human Rights Watch estimated that 85,000 protestors were gathered at the square before the massacre. The steps taken to disperse the crowds had totally contradicted assurances by the Egyptian authorities, for example that the process would be gradual; that a security cordon would allow for the safe passage of women and children in particular; and that protestors would have sufficient warning to leave. Clearly, the massacre illustrates that the Egyptian authorities failed miserably in their duty to ensure that any loss of life resulting from the dispersal was kept to a bare minimum. This paper makes use of the evidence documented by Human Rights Watch on the events surrounding the dispersal of the Rab’a Square, concentrating on three main points: the violence of some of the protestors; the high death toll resulting from the dispersal; unjustified killings of protestors; and the lack of any safe exit routes for the protestors.

​This report highlights some of the major milestones of the Arab democratic transition. The countries covered include Tunisia, Egypt, Libya,Syria and Yemen.

This paper seeks to understand the reason behind Egyptian political parties having resorted to popular protests as a tool of political action, as opposed to conventional means of political action available to formal political groupings, such as electoral competition. It also goes on to highlight the reasons which drive Egyptian political parties to adopt exclusionist rhetoric. Based on public opinion gained from the Arab Opinion Index, this paper argues that the resorting of Egyptian political parties to protests and exclusionist political rhetoric and tactics is rooted in a number of factors. These are largely due to the ineffectiveness of Mohammed Morsi’s presidency and the repeated political errors of the Muslim Brotherhood, all of which contribute to driving Egyptian political parties to other modes of action.

This study provides a reading of the implications and significance of the most recent Iranian presidential election results in light of the available numerical data. It analyses the cultural, political, and economic factors that shaped Iranian mentality within both opposition and loyalist circles. The study discusses the challenges facing the new president, Hassan Rouhani, and examines part of the political struggle over the concept of “moderation” chosen by Rouhani as a motto for his term in office. The study finds that the election results confirm the Iranian political arena’s continued reliance on the old approach in the management of its conflicts. It expects the debate over moderation to be settled in practical terms through the new government’s political performance. Settling this debate will have a huge impact on Rouhani’s relationship with Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei and influential forces in the regime, on one hand, and with loyalist and opposition political currents on the other. As such, the practical answer to the question of “moderation” will remain the determining factor for the course and outcome of Rouhani’s presidential experiment.

The conflict in Syria is rooted in its important geopolitical location and its significance in regional alliances and international rivalries. This paper argues that the Syrian Revolution, especially after its transition from non-violence to militarization, fell victim to an intense rivalry in the context of the game of nations over three things: the direction of the ongoing conflict, the future of the country, and its political orientation. Although the essence of the conflict has not changed much since the beginning of the crisis - both with respect to the objectives of local actors and the interests and alliances of influential powers - the regional context has seen important changes. Perhaps the most prominent of these are the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the return of the army to the political stage; the decline of Turkey’s regional status as a result of the setbacks faced by the leadership of the Justice and Development Party; and the possible predominance of pragmatic thinking in Iranian foreign policy after the presidential election in Iran. In addition, the Saudi decision to abandon its traditional caution and move toward a direct confrontation with the Iranian project in the region presents another momentous change. Amid this changing regional landscape, the Syrian crisis remains at a standstill - a military solution is not possible and a political solution is not viable - in the context of a state of regional and international polarization, and the absence of an effective international that will to put an end to this tragedy.

This paper examines the variables that could affect the attitude of armies towards revolutions. These variables are numerous and diverse, and they differ depending on the nature of the armies and the societies from which they emerge, as well as the international climate in which they exist. As such, the paper argues that the fate of revolutions is determined - with rare exceptions - by the attitude of the army in terms of its bias toward the revolution or toward the existing regime confronting it. The paper also explores societal factors and their role in determining the behavior of the army and its attitude towards revolution, especially in societies characterized by ethnic, religious, and sectarian diversity. The paper looks to Syria as a clear model of the phenomenon within the context of Arab revolutions and uprisings. The paper concludes that the ease or difficulty of predicting the behavior of armies towards revolutions varies between different cases given the multiplicity of factors that could affect it.

The Tunisian Tamarod (Rebellion) Movement replicated the experience of the Egyptian movement of the same name after the latter’s success in changing the nation’s head of state. The study analyzes the factors that led to the emergence of the Tunisian Tamarod Movement, such as the difficulties facing the transitional process, the slow pace of reforms, and the failure to achieve the goals of the revolution. This long list of grievances ranges from the failure to create jobs and provide justice for victims of injustice, to the continuation of widespread poverty and unemployment in the cities, and the problematic struggle for influence instead of power sharing leading to polarization not only between al-Nahda Party and the Nidaa Tounes Movement, but also between the ruling coalition and the opposition. The study explores the most important commonalities and differences between the Egyptian Tamarod Movement and the Tunisian Tamarod Movement, wondering whether the latter can change from a protest phenomenon to a force for change, and what its future holds in light of the new developments in the urban and political scene in Tunisia today.

This paper focuses first on the rising role of the army in Egyptian political life after the January 25 Revolution. Starting with its break away from former president Hosni Mubarak, to its assumption of power in taking on the task of managing the transitional period by overseeing the constitutional referendum as well as parliamentary and presidential elections, the paper traces critical moments and shifts in the relationship between the army, the people, and politics. The paper also documents the decline in the role of the army after Mohamed Morsi came to power, and after what is termed a “paradigm shift” represented by ousting Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, Lieutenant General Sami Anan, and other members of the military council from the political scene. The paper then surveys within a theoretical framework the relationship of armies to democracy, offering examples of military interference in political life and comparing these with what happened in Egypt. Finally, the paper turns to Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s ultimatum, his request for authority and the subsequent fallout that put both sides of the crisis in Egypt on the brink of the abyss.

Examining the Egypt's military coup against an elected president on July 3 2013, this paper compares these summer events with similar experiences of countries that were also in the early stages of democratic development, including Venezuela in 2002 and Algeria in 1992. It looks in particular at the relationships between the "deep state," the "street," and the media in shaping the course of a coup's aftermath. In Egypt, the paper shows, it was the alliance liberal and secular forces with private media companies as well as military institution's reliance on its "deep state" network, which played a central role in mobilizing the street against the elected president Mohamed Morsi. This led to a counterrevolution that brought the tyrannical state and its figures back to power. Reading into the post-coup models Egypt's internal circumstances, regional situation, and the nature of the organization itself (different in many respects from the nature of the Islamist political movement that went through the same experience in Algeria), the paper draws out possible scenarios for the future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.