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This study explores the origins of Qatari-US relations, the foundations on which they are based, and the rules that govern them. It begins by examining relations between the two countries from the 1970s up until the Trump era. The paper finds that Qatar's need for US security assurances did not prevent it from adopting independent policies that occasionally contradicted US strategy. Accordingly, the Qatari-US relations have been upended, and exposed to crises due to diverging interests, concerns and challenges. While Qatar has embraced a foreign policy independent of Washington, it has also tried not to alienate it and has established itself as an asset for the US, both in terms of the military facilities it provides and the unique role it plays through maintaining ties with parties that the US cannot communicate with directly. Mutual dependency has enabled Qatari-US relations to overcome all the challenges they have faced over the past three decades, including those that emerged under the Trump administration.

Many tropes exist in the public sphere regarding determinants of sectarian sentiments. For example, it is assumed that the less educated and more vulnerable might be more easily swayed by sectarian arguments. However, rather than rely anecdotal evidence, this question can be assessed empirically. The Arab Opinion Index contains a variety of demographic indicators as well as questions capturing sectarian sentiment. Using this data, factors that truly have an effect on the prevalence of sectarian sentiment can begin to be explained.

At the beginning of August 2014 clashes broke out in the Lebanese town of Ersal between armed factions fighting in Syria, among them jihadist groups such as ISIL and the Nusra Front, and the Lebanese army. These clashes continued for five days and ended with the withdrawal of the Syrian fighters from the town as part of an initiative under the auspices of the Association of Muslim Ulema in Lebanon and the Lebanese Institute for Democracy and Human Rights (LIFE). In view of the contradictory accounts and the mutual recriminations, this paper looks at what really happened in Ersal, the background that led the crisis to develop, the positions and calculations of the various sides, and the repercussions in Syria and Lebanon.

​​​This section highlights the most significant political documents related to democratic transformation in the Arab world. In this issue, we present documents from Tunisia and Syria covering the period from January 1 to February 28, 2025.​​

The literature on state capacity is often at odds with what constitutes state capacity, how to operationalize it, and how to measure it. Nevertheless, it is important for us to attempt this endeavor given the importance of state capacity, and its effect on a number of political and social dynamics. With the proliferation of quality surveys in the Arab world in recent years, we also have an unprecedented opportunity to examine state capacity in a new light, according to citizen perceptions in addition to material measures. Thus, in this paper I will examine variations of state capacity measurements using the Arab Opinion Index data. I will provide evidence to show that many political phenomena can only be understood if the conditions surrounding state capacity are accounted for.

​According to Jonathan Grix and Fiona Carmichael, when implementing national sport policies, one of the governments' main objectives is to invest funds into gaining international prestige. Although these national sport policies' objectives have also been identified by several other leading scholars in sport governance, research proposing a measurement of these policies' success or failure remains scarce. In fact, to evaluate if countries have reached international prestige through sports, researchers tend to generally refer to the Olympic Medal Table, while the newly created soft power indicators, the "Soft Power 30", "Soft Power Index" and "Global Soft Power Index" have not managed to use appropriate sport rankings to measure countries' capacities to use sport as an instrument of soft power. The objective of this paper is to identify the inaccuracies of these commonly used indices and propose a new ranking that would evaluate whether the national sport policies implemented by governments have succeeded in developing soft power.