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This research tried to explore different stages of the Zionist "penetration" of British political circles, and to identify the strategies and tactics, which were employed by the "Zionist lobby" organisations in order to win over the British public. The focus of this research was on the Zionist lobby organisations’ methods in Britain, where pro-Israel organisations run "soft" and "hard" pressure tools including publicity, propaganda, direct advertising, editorial advertising, public relations, and funding, to influence the attitude of the British public. The research found that the the pro-Israel lobby had intensified its activities in the last decade, to counter a British public opinion that appeared to have become more sympathetic and understanding of the Palestinian narrative.

This study aims to define the interests and goals of the United States in the Arab region by answering two main questions: how does the Obama administration differ from its predecessors in view of its promises of change, particularly following the tragic transformations raging in the Arab region at present? And to what extent does the strategy of this administration reflect its public diplomacy regarding democracy, freedom, and justice in the region? The study explains how Obama raised the ceiling of expectations when he did not limit his promises to a change in American policy only, but included putting an end to the mentality that had pushed the United States into war. Despite the difference in style and method between the Obama and Bush Junior administrations, the overall goals and the regional strategy can be summarized in terms of three key interests: the priority of ensuring free access to energy supplies in the region; maintaining American supremacy over all other global powers; and the containment of all Arab objections to ensure the dominance of the US strategic agenda in the Arab region, including the guarantee of Israel's security.

The Gulf states, collectively and individually, no longer enjoy the luxury of stability and security they did over the three decades that preceded the outbreak of the Arab Spring. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) now faces new kinds of threats more serious than any since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime at the hands of American forces in 2003. Notably, to date the GCC States have been among the states that have benefited most from the fall of dictatorial regimes in countries such as Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. The UAE, for instance, has benefited in particular, becoming the favored destination for direct foreign investment in the region. The growing spread of regional instability however has created what could be called an unstable backyard for the Gulf, as its security and stability is threated in unprecedented fashion on a number of fronts, locally, regionally, and internationally. The GCC states must therefore adjust and change their political and strategic practices and policies so as to become more capable and more flexible in confronting and managing conflicts and crises. Ultimately, it is not just their security which is under threat but their very existence.

​Qatari foreign policy presents a challenge for students of international relations. Whereas major theories within the field tend to privilege structural factors in explaining the action of states, and particularly small states, in the case of Qatar, the quality of leadership and the strategies that leadership employs to navigate through the structural constraints—primarily geography—are equally important. One of the main findings of this paper is that the strategies adopted by the Qatari elite since 1995 did alleviate many of the structural constraints which the country would otherwise have faced. Moreover, during the short-lived Arab Spring of 2011-2013, Qatar tried to reshape the political landscape in the Middle East to its favor, challenging the two regional hegemons Saudi Arabia and Iran, in Egypt and Syria respectively. Yet, the paper concludes, geopolitical factors and the relative capabilities of states remain instrumental in assuring a state’s sustained capacity to continue playing a key role. This is particularly true in a region where elite thinking continues to be defined by realpolitik.

The potential impact of the Covid- 19 pandemic on populist governments has been the subject of a heated debate among specialists. There are scholars for who the pandemic will negatively impact populist governments. Here, populist governments are perceived as ill-equipped to respond to the multifaced challenges risen by the complexity of the pandemic. Conversely, many scholars that argue that the pandemic will strengthen populist governments because populism flourishes during crises. This article contests these two narratives. It asserts that any evaluation of the impact of the pandemic on populist governments should distinguish between their actions and their discourse. Thus, the study undertakes an analysis of US president Trump’s discourse, demonstrating that during the first year of the pandemic, it is twofold. First appears a “disconnected discourse” that continuously questions the reality of the pandemic, despite the important proactive actions taken by his government to mitigate the pandemic's economic, social, and sanitary impacts. Second, a “demonstrative discourse” arises, in which the pandemic was instrumentalized to enhance the legitimacy of one of the most important and controversial elements of the populist discourse: the idea of external threat.

This study examines US foreign policy and the changes that occurred under former President Donald Trump, compared to other post-Cold War administrations, assessing their impact on the future of US hegemony and the liberal international system, with projections for current president Joe Biden's rule. Two main questions arise: First, what foreign policies did Trump pursue? Second, what impact do they have on the future of US hegemony and the liberal international order? The analysis studies the concept of hegemony in international relations theory. It concludes with three possible scenarios awaiting the future of US hegemony under Biden's rule, with his administration likely to move between partial reform and catastrophic failure.

The phenomenon of shale oil has returned to the forefront of politics. Unconventional oil and gas have been known to exist for some time and are available in large quantities. But the high cost of production has prevented their commercial extraction in the past. The rise of the price of oil since early 2001, however, has reignited interest. This paper examines this new interest and its impact on the price of oil in international markets. It also looks at the possible repercussions that could emerge in the long run among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States on the economic, political and geostrategic levels. The oil shale resources available globally could enable this resource to become one of the most important unconventional fuel sources in the world. In addition to its ubiquitous presence in North America, it is available in large quantities in Brazil, historic Palestine, Jordan, Indonesia, China, Australia, Estonia, France, Spain, Sweden, Britain, and South Africa. If these countries, which include major industrial nations and others on their way to become significant industrial forces, were to begin extracting their oil, all the economic, political and geostrategic calculations that have been based on conventional fuel will have to be reconsidered.

The “zero problems” foreign-policy approach adopted by Turkey towards its neighbors, and its expansion to cover the Middle East and North African space, with which it shares an important historical and cultural field, has strengthened Turkey’s orientation towards consolidating relations with Algeria. This has also been aided by similarity in positions and views on many central issues, foremost among them the Palestinian cause which for both countries has great religious and historical symbolism, and represents a meeting point between the two countries’ positions. In this regard, Turkish diplomacy has undergone something of a change, since it began to adopt attitudes and positions hostile to Zionists, a position long held by Algerian foreign policy since independence. On this basis, the influence of religious and historical factors becomes clear in setting the new directions for Turkish foreign policy with regards to Algeria and the intensification of its efforts to consolidate relations. This can be ascribed to feelings of belonging to the Islamic nation and a shared history which form starting points for Turkish foreign policy.

This study provides a reading of the implications and significance of the most recent Iranian presidential election results in light of the available numerical data. It analyses the cultural, political, and economic factors that shaped Iranian mentality within both opposition and loyalist circles. The study discusses the challenges facing the new president, Hassan Rouhani, and examines part of the political struggle over the concept of “moderation” chosen by Rouhani as a motto for his term in office. The study finds that the election results confirm the Iranian political arena’s continued reliance on the old approach in the management of its conflicts. It expects the debate over moderation to be settled in practical terms through the new government’s political performance. Settling this debate will have a huge impact on Rouhani’s relationship with Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei and influential forces in the regime, on one hand, and with loyalist and opposition political currents on the other. As such, the practical answer to the question of “moderation” will remain the determining factor for the course and outcome of Rouhani’s presidential experiment.

This paper highlights the role of the armed forces and their impact on the process of political transition, and discusses civil-military relations in their various aspects: the state, society and the armed forces per se, in order to reveal the main pillars that constitute a balance between the power of political institutions (legislative and executive) and the military power of the army. Such a balance would lead to the subduing of the army to the civil authority, and confine military activities to security and defense. The paper focuses on the common characteristics shared by states that have succeeded in building democratic armies. To conclude, the author presents a set of recommendations addressed to activists and democrats, on what ought to be done and what should be avoided in the security-defense field during the process of democratic army building.