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The failure of the 15th of July 2016 military coup attempt in Turkey will remain an exceptional landmark in Turkey’s modern history, as well as in the political legacy of the Turkish Justice and Development Party. Declaring the state of emergency, arresting thousands of individuals, temporarily dismissing tens of thousands of governmental employees for investigation, shutting down a number of universities and Islamic endowments under the pretext of fighting the “parallel state”, besides calling for the reconstruction of the military establishment, necessitates analyzing the possible repercussions of this coup attempt on Turkish political life. The paper will address this coup’s consequences by discussing the following: battling the “parallel state”, reconstructing the military establishment, writing a new constitution, and predicting possible turns in Turkish foreign policy.

At the beginning of August 2014 clashes broke out in the Lebanese town of Ersal between armed factions fighting in Syria, among them jihadist groups such as ISIL and the Nusra Front, and the Lebanese army. These clashes continued for five days and ended with the withdrawal of the Syrian fighters from the town as part of an initiative under the auspices of the Association of Muslim Ulema in Lebanon and the Lebanese Institute for Democracy and Human Rights (LIFE). In view of the contradictory accounts and the mutual recriminations, this paper looks at what really happened in Ersal, the background that led the crisis to develop, the positions and calculations of the various sides, and the repercussions in Syria and Lebanon.

Consociationalism is a system of government recommended for ‘divided societies’. Starting with a discussion of its theoretical components and criticisms it has received, this article addresses how consociationalism has been implemented in in post - 2003 Iraq. The article asks whether the Iraqi constitution and institutions formed by it represented a successful case of consociationalism. Key consociational mechanisms such as an electoral system based on proportional representation, governments based on big multi - party coalitions and a federal and decentralized governance were adopted. However, this model was not entirely consociational as some practices that are common in the majoritarian government have also been used. In fact, divisions between majoritarian and consociational perspectives have polarized, and sometimes paralyzed, the political process. In light of this, the article discusses the sustainability of the current model and its likely future trajectories.

Sponsored by the “Safer World” foundation, based in the United Kingdom, this meeting held at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies examined possibilities for the spreading of peace and stability across conflict hotspots around the globe.

Current Russian policy is based on a nationalism that rests on state capitalism, and that speaks to nationalist sentiment built on the rejection of Western exploitation. This patriotic nationalist position becomes evident through the lack of any ideologically derived principles driving Russia’s position: state interests including national security are what drive current policy. The drivers for this new Russian policy mean that Russia can simultaneously suppress a separatist movement by armed force in one region and champion another separatist movement with armed force in another. In this sense, the Russian Federation has no fixed positions but only fixed interests, and even its interests can change. In Syria, critics suggest that the proximate aim of Russia’s policy is to defend the Assad regime, Moscow’s ally, from collapse. Saving the regime is not, however, an end in itself. Rather, it is a means of self-assertion and another step toward the goal of becoming a global superpower, this time in the Middle East. If the Syrian regime believes its rescue is the exclusive objective of Russia’s intervention, it is wrong. The exertion of Russian influence will at most provide a temporary respite. The mere fact of Russia’s military presence in Syria means that the regime is no longer master of its own destiny and no longer even a player on the international stage, since Russia is now its proxy at any international negotiations.

Politicians are increasingly adopting populist rhetoric that is appealing to people's emotions and biases rather than their rational judgments. This rhetoric includes claims of representing the people (us) as opposed to the establishment and the traditional elite (them). Anti-elitist populism manifests in its opposition to facts, with populists becoming the main players who distort facts and spread disinformation. Therefore, populism and disinformation reinforce one other, creating a cycle of manipulation that undermines democracy. By conducting a comparative qualitative analysis of the speeches of Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in Egypt and Kais Saied in Tunisia, this study argues that there are four tactics, rely on disinformation, used by authoritarian populists to legitimize the obstruction of constitutional and institutional constraints and suppress the opposition: (1) constructing the people by creating the enemy; (2) attacking the media and democratic institutions; (3) creating illusion by amplifying achievements; and (4) employing conspiracy theory and misinformation to justify failure at fulfilling promises.

This paper investigates the factors that have led to the collapse of Baath-ruled Syria. It argues that the abandonment of the rentier – distributive economic system that had traditionally propped up the social base of the Baath party (labourers, farmers, and rural populations) and the adoption of liberal economic policies was key to the crisis. The end of the Cold War, the passing of resistance discourse, with the start of the Middle East peace process, and the information revolution have contributed to weakening the cultural and ideological hegemony of the Syrian Baath-ruled state. This led to increasing reliance on the security apparatus to control an increasingly young and educated society. The loosening economic grip of the state resulting from the abandonment of the public sector, and the rise of crony capitalism accompanied by the declining role of political socialisation (in schools and universities), and the loss of control over the flow of information, left the regime with no other option but resorting to violence to deal with the crisis. The peaceful opposition movement hitherto was transformed into an armed revolution, and then into a regional and international proxy war, with the rising role foreign interference in the crisis.

The spark of Arab protests reached Morocco by means of the February 20 movement. The protests would probably have developed further were it not for the pre-emptive maneuver of the king in proposing constitutional amendments and in quickly passing legislation. Although the Justice and Development Party (PJD) did not back the movement, it was the main beneficiary of it, in that it won the elections with unprecedented support that enabled it to lead the government in prime political and constitutional conditions under the slogan "reform with continuity". While it might be premature to judge whether the experience has been a success or a failure, given that the PJD government is still in its early days, the preliminary assessment makes clear that the PJD has not, until now, pushed to bring about basic institutional reforms that would drive progress in various sectors. It seems that the logic of continuity has outweighed the logic of reform, or has restricted reforms as far as possible. The government may continue despite its limited achievements, but if matters remain as they are, the Islamist-oriented PJD will lose a lot of the goodwill it has gained, just as happened with other experiences of political parties in Morocco.

Beginning with a look at Tunisia’s current coalition government, formed by Habib Essid, this paper discusses the challenges that this government faces going forward. It will examine issues of security, economic and social issues, terrorist organizations and organized crime; each of which threaten Tunisia’s prospects for peace and democracy in the post-revolution period. While the new government won a comfortable majority unprecedented among post-revolution governments, some actors believe the composition of this government has not taken into account the marginal and deprived regions of the country, and is more inclined to centralize power in favor of coastal regions or the capital city. This paper argues a different view, however, and suggests that Essid is more concerned with establishing pluralism and gaining the most supporters in the parliament in order to pass a test of confidence. The paper also argues that the composition of the new government was based on a broad pluralistic political/ technocratic coalition that combined secularists, Islamists and non-partisans; characterized by the neutralization of most sovereign ministries.

The Syrian regime opted to hold presidential elections on June 3, 2014. It did this in spite of the dire social catastrophe and sharp political crisis which the country has faced since March of 2011. The race was contended by three candidates, including incumbent president Bashar Al Assad.