Latest Articles

Oil is not just related to economics but is also connected to political development. This paper looks at the effect of oil on democracy by relying on a theoretical and empirical study using the tools of descriptive statistics, regression analysis, and statistical tests in the light of political economy in the form of the “resource curse.” It studies how authoritarian regimes have used hydrocarbon resources to prevent democratization by means of a range of mechanisms such as the tax impact, group formation, the effect of spending, and repression. The statistical analysis reveals that there is a statistically-significant inverse relationship between democracy and oil production. It can be said therefore that the oil states are less likely to become democratic. Although most Third-World states have been afflicted by the resource curse, it is not possible to view it as inevitable, but rather the result of dependence on the track represented by the inability to diversify resources or weakness in doing so. The resource curse does not apply to all states rich in natural resources, such as Norway.

​​This study examines the redefinition of civil–military relations in Sudan, arguing that the prevailing approach in the country reduces these relations to the issue of military reform and reduces that reform to preventing the army from carrying out a coup, removing it from politics, or restricting its economic activity. The study begins with a critique of Samuel Huntington's traditional theory and presents alternative approaches that advocate integrating the military into society and expanding its roles under civilian control. It also offers a typology of armies based on four models according to their political and economic engagement, applying this framework to the Sudanese army and its transformations since the independence (1955). The study concludes that building a more sustainable relationship requires rethinking the framework that shapes civil–military relations in Sudan. It calls for involving military personnel in formulating national policies and regulating their economic activities through governance in ways that strengthen national security and support the political process.​

Economic inequality is one of the most pressing issues in the twenty-first century, given that a small minority controls the global economy and most influential power. This has led to an escalation of political instability and a decrease in social inclusion, as evidenced by studies related to the Arab Spring and the ongoing turmoil in the MENA. This quantitative study investigates the effect of capital formation and the rate of return on capital on economic inequality in countries of the region. The results demonstrated that the factors used to measure the formation of capital, such as total domestic savings and total fixed capital formation, positively correlate with economic inequality - increasing the inequality gap. Conversely, factors used to measure the rate of return on capital, such as real interest and the interest rate on deposits, correspond negatively with economic inequality. When the interest rate on deposits increases, economic inequality decreases. It is necessary to review fiscal and monetary policies to reform taxes and benefits to increase their impact on equity and redistribution, and to avoid the impact of capital and power accumulation.

Since the time of President Thomas Jefferson, and on through the presidents of the 20th century, the United States has talked about itself as the propagator, protector, and defender of democracy around the world. Yet America has never showed any qualms of forming military and political alliances with authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. The US justifies these international alliances on the basis that “not all dictatorships in the world are enemies of the United States, but all the United States’ enemies are dictatorships.” The US therefore adopted a two-track diplomacy: while working to spread democracy (directly or by means of international organizations and NGOs) the US has no issue in supporting autocratic governments when its interests are involved. How did US policy apply to the democratic transformation in the former Eastern bloc states in Europe on the eve of the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and subsequently, when American values and interests went hand in hand, and how did it then apply to the Arab Spring of 2011, when US values and interests were congruent in some cases and out of sync in others, according to the situation in each country and its strategic importance from America’s perspective? What are the results of these policies and what differences emerge from such a comparison of the Arab and East Europe cases.

Since the publication of Horowitz's Ethnic Groups in Conflict, comparative political scientists have increasingly converged on their classification of ethnic identities. But there is no agreement on the definition that justifies this classification— and the definitions that individual scholars propose do not match their classifications. I propose a definition that captures the conventional classification of ethnic identities in comparative political science to a greater degree than the alternatives. According to this definition, ethnic identities are a subset of identity categories in which membership is determined by attributes associated with, or believed to be associated with, descent (described here simply as descent-based attributes). I argue, on the basis of this definition, that ethnicity either does not matter or has not been shown to matter in explaining most outcomes to which it has been causally linked by comparative political scientists. These outcomes include violence, democratic stability, and patronage.

This section lists the most prominent political documents related to the democratic transition in the Arab world. In this issue we publish documents related to the reaction of Tunisian political currents on the issue of dissolving parliament and dismissing the government, the reaction of the coordination framework of Shiite forces rejecting the election results in Iraq, and the reaction of the Sudanese government and the Sudanese Association to the coup measures taken by the President of the Sudanese Sovereign Council, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan . We will stop when the documents are published between September 1 and October 31, 2021.

Politicians are increasingly adopting populist rhetoric that is appealing to people's emotions and biases rather than their rational judgments. This rhetoric includes claims of representing the people (us) as opposed to the establishment and the traditional elite (them). Anti-elitist populism manifests in its opposition to facts, with populists becoming the main players who distort facts and spread disinformation. Therefore, populism and disinformation reinforce one other, creating a cycle of manipulation that undermines democracy. By conducting a comparative qualitative analysis of the speeches of Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in Egypt and Kais Saied in Tunisia, this study argues that there are four tactics, rely on disinformation, used by authoritarian populists to legitimize the obstruction of constitutional and institutional constraints and suppress the opposition: (1) constructing the people by creating the enemy; (2) attacking the media and democratic institutions; (3) creating illusion by amplifying achievements; and (4) employing conspiracy theory and misinformation to justify failure at fulfilling promises.

​​​​This article examines the "intuitive knowledge" as one of the most important sources for understanding the trajectories of the Arab revolutions, despite the scarcity of studies that focus on it. We explore intuitive knowledge by examining its observable manifestations, such as its role as an alternative to "ideology" in expressing social and political views, its practical application in shared traditions, its flexible interpretation of relational life emphasising its habitual and voluntary aspects, its pragmatic evaluation of social and political phenomena, and its expression of distrust in "elites" who distance themselves from ordinary people's lives. Building on these premises, we explore the relationship between intuitive thought and charismatic phenomena or volatile populism, as well as the formation and dissolution of loyalty relationships, particularly in the neoliberal era. In this context, we emphasise the importance of viewing intuitive knowledge as a starting point for analysing the relationship between political and social revolution. We argue that the separation of these two types of revolution has created additional opportunities for counter-revolution.​

The study criticizes the general framework that has governed the broader current of the researchers in civil-military relations, their method of thinking about the military institution since the inception of the field, the paper presents the theoretical and practical gaps in that literature, in particular the researchers of "Coup-Proofing". The study shows the weakness of the explanatory capabilities of the field in extrapolating and analyzing the historical era that the research seeks to reveal its theoretical and historical ambiguities, which is the phase of political pluralism in Syria between 1954 - 1958 , which the researchers viewed as a democratic phase. The paper examines why did the army step down from the presidency and allowed civil forces to engage in political action at the time, in spite of that phase is in the midst of two series of coups. The paper is based on a basic premise that the army as a military institution do represent wings, sectors, units, brigades, and power relations, before it is an expression of any other social segments, which is in contrast to what the literature says in examining the sociological backgrounds of the officers.

This study argues that the political system resulting from the post-2003 political process in Iraq contributed to the reproduction of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities within a homogeneous political identity, without taking into account the multiplicity of ideological orientations within the minorities themselves. These minorities have become political minorities, but they are powerless and unable to change or influence the political decision-making process in Iraq. This means that political practice in Iraq, including general electoral practice, remained a practice based on the reproduction of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, and did not turn into a real political practice. In other words, the identity marker (sect, ethnicity, etc.) comes before the political manifesto. This political reality imposed on ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities a political behaviour represented in voting for their ethnic, religious and linguistic parties, just as they were in the one-party era.