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The contemporary Yemeni state is characterized by strife and complications involving all aspects of the state and society. These complexities go back to the era of its inception and continue today, leaving serious implications for the political, geographic and social unity of Yemen. There are very clear intersections between the internal (political, economic, social) and external components, which contribute to the sustained crisis in the Yemeni state. Successive Yemeni governments have failed to fulfill their assumed duties and functions, thus preventing them from dealing with all kinds of foreign interventions. Moreover, tribal and sectarian roles in Yemen have historically prevailed over other Yemeni political roles, which have not succeeded in transferring Yemen to civil rule. Nor have they managed to build a democratic model that achieves stability and allows Yemenis to participate actively in the political and economic process, consolidate the concepts of citizenship and the rule of law, and safeguard the various rights and freedoms of all members of Yemeni society.

This study distinguishes between three Interrelated theoretical approaches prevalent in writings of researchers seeking to understand the emergence of the Islamic Resistance Movement, "Hamas". The first of these approaches examines the movement from the portal of ideology, stressing the importance of international and regional dimensions and the rise of political Islam after the "setback" (Naksa) of the 1967 Six Day War. The second approaches Hamas as representing a social movement seeking to revisit the historical narrative of Palestinian society. The third considers it to be the heir of the Palestinian national liberation movement, attributing its rise to transformations witnessed in Palestinian identity and the Palestinian community's definition of itself. Although the three readings do not contradict each other, a focus on one of them can lead to oversimplification or exaggeration: emphasis on the first approach is at risk of overlooking transformations in the movement in its later stages and a marginalization at the micro level of local dimensions; emphasis on the second approach can result in the overestimation of the effectiveness of collective action; exaggerated emphasis on the third approach deprives social actors of their effectiveness. Hence this study proposes situating Hamas in the intersection of these three approaches.

This testimony provides a qualitative understanding of the diversity of Kurdish positions on the Syrian revolution, and the evolution of Kurdish attitudes over the course of the revolution. The position of the Kurds, like all Syrians, was never homogenous. Within this context, the writer distinguishes three declared positions (pro-revolution, pro-regime, and observer), as well as another, hesitant position that interacts with the situation and waits. The writer concludes that Syrian Kurdish communities are now witnessing a clear distinction between two main political positions. The first is represented by the Kurdish National Council, which works within the Syrian opposition institutions. The second position is represented by the Democratic Union Party, and the parties in its orbit. This trend is a regional project that does not intersect with the Syrian national project.

This study explores the perceptions of Britain's main political parties towards the Palestinian Islamist faction Hamas throughout the period between 2003 and 2016. It explores also the extent of variation between the major political parties in the UK towards Hamas. The author argues that the lack of a value-based outlook on the part of the British ruling establishment as well as a lack of respect for the tenets of international law—which enshrines the right to resist occupation—have driven that establishment to embrace the UK's colonial legacy, and to regard their government as the founder and protector of the State of Israel. It is this establishmentarian discourse, argues the author, which drives the criminalization of Hamas within British politics.

This article looks at Algeria's security policy in general and its security doctrine in particular, analysing its changes and dilemmas in a turbulent regional environment and in the context of an internal Hirak. It argues that these doctrines have undergone minor changes to meet regional security needs, which precludes fundamental change at this stage. It also argues that the tension between the moral-normative imperative and the security imperative, on the one hand, and the principle of dual non-interference (political and military), on the other, constitute two major dilemmas confronting Algerian politics and security doctrine. Starting from these two elements, the article, after setting out my concept of the subject, examines the formation and nature of Algerian politics, ideology, and transformations. It then looks at the constitutional decision on the participation of Algerian armed forces in international peacekeeping operations, analysing their context (domestic and foreign), their motives and justifications, and the reservations they face. Finally, it analyses Algeria's regional security strategy as an alternative to intervention. The article comes to three main conclusions. First, there is a limited adjustment to the issue of external interference depending on the needs of the security interest. Second, the end of the absolute refusal to use armed forces outside the borders. Third, it is likely that the tension between moral-normative and security considerations will escalate if the unrest continues within its geographical boundaries.

The study takes up the topic of the evolution of Hamas' military action from the foundation of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades between 1987 and 1992, the movement's military wing, and beyond, drawing upon memoirs and testimonies of the movement's political and military leaders in Palestine and on available data regarding military confrontations with the Israeli occupation. The study starts from the assumption that the evolution of Hamas's military action as an active "agent" in the region differs across the different stages of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on the one hand, and with the development of the movement's political thought and relations with regional and international systems on the other. These stages have been formational of the movement's variable identity, one that has led it to defining its regional interest and role on the basis of military strength. It transformed into a "semi-classical" army in Gaza specifically, after having been a movement of modestly equipped and armed groupings, as it continues to be to this day in the West Bank. This study attempts to monitor this evolution across the successive confrontations with the Israeli occupation in the wars of 2008, 2012 and 2014.

The paper provides indications and analysis of the positions of the most influential Shia powers and parties in Iraq after the fall of the predominantly Sunni city of Mosul and the rise of the Islamic State group in 2014. In addition to the Najaf-based supreme Shia religious authority led by ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the Shia parties represented in government since 2003, the paper shed light on the increasingly powerful Iran-backed armed groups Popular Mobilization (Hashd Sha'abi) and how their appeal, visibility and influence had changed after the fall of Mosul. The question of the Iraqi national identity and how it interacts with the Shia identity is addressed in the paper in light of the discourse of the Shia powers and relations between Shia Iraqis and other communities.

This article deals with the post-2003 consociationalist experiment in Iraq. It examines the reasons why this experiment has failed in producing a reasonably coherent governing formula. It argues that, because of their emphasis on identity politics and not on making mutual concessions in the interest of serious statebuilding, the main players in this experiment (Shia, Sunni and Kurdish political elites) failed to appreciate the complexity of the consociationalist arrangement, let alone use it for public interest. The article focuses on the central role that the Shia Islamist parties played in making this failure happen, highlighting, as reasons, their insistence on an essentially sectarian rhetoric and their attempt to enforce it as a national identity. The article finally proposes a different rhetoric that can accommodate Iraq's ethnic and religious diversity.

This article deals with the post-2003 consociationalist experiment in Iraq. It examines the reasons why this experiment has failed in producing a reasonably coherent governing formula. It argues that, because of their emphasis on identity politics and not on making mutual concessions in the interest of serious statebuilding, the main players in this experiment (Shia, Sunni and Kurdish political elites) failed to appreciate the complexity of the consociationalist arrangement, let alone use it for public interest. The article focuses on the central role that the Shia Islamist parties played in making this failure happen, highlighting, as reasons, their insistence on an essentially sectarian rhetoric and their attempt to enforce it as a national identity. The article finally proposes a different rhetoric that can accommodate Iraq's ethnic and religious diversity.

​This paper will present a study of the challenges posed by the Tunisian transitional phase since the country's successful popular revolution; specifically, it will examine the problem from the perspective of the Tunisian General Labor Union. Any appropriate discussion of the Tunisian post-revolutionary transitional phase would call for an understanding of the theory of transitional phases, the author has chosen to focus primarily on the conceptual framework of civil society. He did this, however, only after highlighting some of the theoretical limitations of the concept of a civil society. With this in mind, Tunisia's General Labor Union remains one of the most significant pillars of Tunisian civil society. For the purposes of this paper, "civil society" is defined as those social forces which defend the ideals of justice and dignity and which fight to undo the subcultures and structures which have hindered political freedoms in Tunisia.