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In association with the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies held a three-day conference (January 21-23, 2016) to study the developments associated with the Arab Spring in the intervening five years.

Since the time of President Thomas Jefferson, and on through the presidents of the 20th century, the United States has talked about itself as the propagator, protector, and defender of democracy around the world. Yet America has never showed any qualms of forming military and political alliances with authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. The US justifies these international alliances on the basis that “not all dictatorships in the world are enemies of the United States, but all the United States’ enemies are dictatorships.” The US therefore adopted a two-track diplomacy: while working to spread democracy (directly or by means of international organizations and NGOs) the US has no issue in supporting autocratic governments when its interests are involved. How did US policy apply to the democratic transformation in the former Eastern bloc states in Europe on the eve of the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and subsequently, when American values and interests went hand in hand, and how did it then apply to the Arab Spring of 2011, when US values and interests were congruent in some cases and out of sync in others, according to the situation in each country and its strategic importance from America’s perspective? What are the results of these policies and what differences emerge from such a comparison of the Arab and East Europe cases.

Beginning with a review of existing theories of international relations that discuss policies of penetration, this study examines current politics of the Arab regional order. Four different aspects of penetration are reviewed, including intra-Arab threats, rivalry between Arab states to occupy a central position, historical legacy, and multinational companies. The role of Arab elites in processes of penetration by means of their links with international powers and interests is also considered. The study looks at ‘soft’ penetration through an analysis of language, education, media, and civil society organizations, as well as “blatant penetration” like the occupation of Iraq and the spread of foreign military bases. Beyond Arab state actions, the paper also considers intervention by neighboring regional states. The paper finds that variation in the development of political, social, and economic systems has a corresponding influence on the levels of foreign penetration, infiltration, or influence. It also finds that analyzing the Arab region as a single regional system reveals a deep level of military, social, and economic penetration on all levels.

Looking at the results of the mid-April 2015 presidential and parliamentary elections in Sudan, the paper reviews the changes that have occurred amid the last presidential cycle under al-Bashir (2010-2015). The election results are analyzed against a background of the South's succession when Sudan lost two-thirds of its oil revenues and entered a severe economic crisis, and a period when war erupted in the South Kordofan and the Blue Nile states, and unrest continued in the Darfur states. This will also be put into the context of a collapse of Islamist powers in Sudan, the decline of the role of the Islamic movement in the political process, President Bashir's exclusion of Islamist leaders who defected form Sheikh Hassan al-Turabi, the rise of generals to power, and their control of the leadership of the Islamic movement itself. Further, the implications of the broad boycott of the elections, the loss of trust in the national electoral commission, and the implication of the growing number of independent candidates are taken into account. Finally, the paper examines Sudan's disengagement with Iran its attempt to return to the Arab fold as a last attempt to buy additional years for the ruling regime.

A close look at negotiations seeking a truce deal between Israel and Hamas reveal a conflict approached by the two parties using game theory. Seeking to understand Hamas’ shift toward active player status in directing the Palestinian question, this paper asks: How far can Hamas get involved in negotiations with Israel as a way to resolve the conflict? Can communications and negotiations between the two sides evolve into direct negotiations to end the conflict? This study aims to understand the positions of Israel and Hamas on direct and indirect negotiations and their willingness to participate in direct negotiations. It will look at the negotiations for a truce during Israel’s Operation Protective Edge as a case study.

​This paper proposes an approach to studying the impact of the Internet on political culture through the concept of collective memory. Departing from the traditional approaches that confine political culture to knowledge, orientations, and behavior, to constructive and interpretive frameworks that define it through the process of "meaning-making," collective memory emerges as an essential component of political culture with its meanings, symbols, and narratives about political life. The paper concludes – from examining the case of the Egyptian Revolution of January 25, 2011 – that the development of the Internet may limit the role of the state and the elite in shaping political culture and collective memory, but it may also increase the severity of political and social polarization and weaken the culture of tolerance towards the other, and the chances of achieving social reconciliation, which is what we call the "paradox of collective memory".

This study deals with the war of aggression launched by Israel against the Gaza Strip at dawn on July 8, 2014. The war lasted for 50 days, during which the Israeli army committed a series of war crimes and crimes against humanity against Palestinian civilians, killing around 2,150 people and injuring 10,870. Thousands of homes were destroyed and around 400,000 Palestinians were made homeless. The paper gives an overview of the background to the assault, its stated and unstated goals, and the means adopted by Israel to achieve these goals, which basically meant the commission of successive massacres against Palestinian civilians. The paper considers the decision making process in the cabinet committee for security affairs (the Israeli security cabinet) and the debates and disagreements that occurred concerning the war aims and the means to achieve them. It also casts light on Israel’s fears concerning the formation of an international commission of inquiry, and on the economic losses to Israel caused by the war. Finally, it looks at the effect of the war for the future of Benjamin Netanyahu on the Israeli political party map.

The translation of this book falls within this continually evolving field of knowledge. The book includes an introduction, five main chapters, a comprehensive index, and a bibliography.

Most initial readings have exhausted their explanations for failure, or stumbling, of the democratic transition process in Tunisia. Given the country’s weak political performance, lack of economic achievement, and worsening corruption, the need has emerged to consider the role of political culture in events since the Tunisian revolution up until President Kais Saied declared a state of emergency on 25 July 2021. Contrary to the prevailing trend in the literature on democratic transition, which has often overlooked the importance of a minimum level of civil political culture taking root, there is an urgent need to recognize its vital role in ensuring the success of any transitional process, especially in the early stages. This paper argues that the absence of a minimum level of political culture has contributed to the fragility of the transitional process in Tunisia, making democracy vulnerable to failure and to the reproduction of authoritarian patterns. Therefore, strengthening this culture becomes a necessity to ensure the sustainability of the democratic transition and avoid setbacks.

Following the ouster of President elect Mohamed Morsi after only one year in power, this paper looks at the future of elections in Egypt. Without any political party that holds the support of the masses, or the possibility of making up for this by building strong partisan alliances, the paper examines the rules of political practice and the nature of legislations based on the 2014 constitution in order to find a way forward amid a current deadlock. It finds a current legal and legislative condition that has restored Mubarak-era rules, characterized by weak partisan influence and a lack of the necessary political pluralism that accompanies democracy. It finds that, despite accelerating steps towards building partisan alliances and electoral consensuses, there are still structural obstacles hindering the establishment of a genuine parliamentary system, partly due to the weakness of political parties and the limitation of their legislative and procedural structure.