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The basic hypothesis of the study is summarized in Israel's ongoing efforts to maintain its monopoly on nuclear weapons in the Middle East for as long as possible, and its various political, diplomatic, security, military, and economic activities to prevent Iran and any other country in the Middle East from obtaining nuclear weapons. The study examines Israel's policy, which calls for imposing the maximum international economic sanctions on Iran, manifested in its complete abandonment of the nuclear project or the overthrow of the Iranian regime. It presents Israel's policy towards the negotiations to return to the Iranian nuclear deal and the strategic confusion in which Israel finds itself due to many mistaken assumptions adopted by the Benjamin Netanyahu government regarding the Iranian nuclear project. It also discusses Israel's goals in the "war between wars" it wages against Iran and the major strategy against Iran advocated by the Israeli military establishment, as well as Israel's efforts to establish an Israeli-Arab-American military alliance against Iran. The study also presents the Israeli vision of the Israeli military attack on Iranian nuclear facilities and the risks and problems it faces.

Following the election of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani last August, Iranian-American relations now appear set for a major breakthrough, overturning more than three decades of enmity between the two sides. Such a breakthrough, should it come to pass, has the potential to completely transform the bilateral relations over a number of issues, including most importantly the Iranian nuclear program, Iran’s regional role and its involvement in the Middle East’s “hot button” issues, including in the Gulf. The eventual success of efforts to bring Iran and the United States closer together, however, relies also on the roles played by regional players, particularly Israel. This paper explores the reasons behind Israeli anxiety surrounding a potential breakthrough in Iranian-American relations, and Tel Aviv’s ability to influence the outcome of a possible agreement over Iran’s nuclear program and whether such an agreement shall extend to Iran’s regional influence.

This article aims to contribute to the academic debate underway over the concepts of political modernity and modernization, and in particular to address the theories and theses that deal with the problematic in terms of its epistemological premises and foundations. There is then a focus on the main contributions of the various schools of political science while evoking the complexity inherent in the subject and the overlap between the field of philosophy and political theory in this area. The justification for this choice is not limited to the nature of the topic and developments under the influence of the assumptions of western liberalism that represent the various contemporary schools of political science, but transcends this to include the variety of historically successful experiences, and how social values represent the avenue for raising conceptual problems and constructing new problems for the political power that is the custodian of the historical experience of those societies.

This study centers on the phenomenon of 'paradiplomacy' that has become prominent in Western industrialized liberal-democracies. It begins by distinguishing three layers of paradiplomacy, arguing that paradiplomacy can be a multifunctional vehicle for reinforcing interests and protecting identity. It then discusses the various choices that are made when developing a paradiplomacy, including designing new structures and selecting partners. Next, the study addresses the issue of intergovernmental relations in the context of paradiplomacy and, more specifically, the attitude of central government towards a sub-state units developing activities that could be classified as constituting paradiplomacy, when these last nourish nationalist aspirations. Finally, the last section offers a brief discussion of the implications of paradiplomacy for democracy, democratic consultation and representation.

This study explores the origins of Qatari-US relations, the foundations on which they are based, and the rules that govern them. It begins by examining relations between the two countries from the 1970s up until the Trump era. The paper finds that Qatar's need for US security assurances did not prevent it from adopting independent policies that occasionally contradicted US strategy. Accordingly, the Qatari-US relations have been upended, and exposed to crises due to diverging interests, concerns and challenges. While Qatar has embraced a foreign policy independent of Washington, it has also tried not to alienate it and has established itself as an asset for the US, both in terms of the military facilities it provides and the unique role it plays through maintaining ties with parties that the US cannot communicate with directly. Mutual dependency has enabled Qatari-US relations to overcome all the challenges they have faced over the past three decades, including those that emerged under the Trump administration.

​Simon Anholt evaluates the processes of building a national brand based on the presence, or absence, of three necessary factors: a well-defined strategy, the substance on which the strategy is based, and accompanying symbolic steps. Building on Anholt's work, this study explores Qatari strategy, which utilises media and sports as two public diplomacy tools to create a positive international reputation of a newly emerging country that, despite its size, has become a major global actor. The paper reviews Doha's strategy to combine organising and participating in huge sporting events, build state of the art sports facilities, and invest media presence in events. The study unpacks characteristics of this strategy in building the national brand through media and sports, while identifying the most important steps taken to achieve the goals of this strategy.

This study monitors the role of external factors in the stability of Moroccan authoritarianism and controling the liberalization methods pursued by the government over two stages: the final years of the Cold War and the 2011 Arab Spring. As much as these factors contributed to widening the margin of liberalization in the Moroccan political arena, they also contributed to limiting this liberalization (September 11, the post-2013 counterrevolutionary movement), especially given the lack of internal will to mature it. While it is true that these factors have made an impact, this remained within certain limits that allowed actors abroad (the United States, the European Union and donor institutions) to control the transformations of Moroccan politics and to manage contradictions, thus creating an environment hostile to democratic transition in Morocco.

This study traces the evolution and divergence of state–society relations in the Middle East and North Africa through the lens of social pacts and welfare regimes. It asks how governments across the region have responded to popular mobilization during and after the Arab uprisings, and what these responses reveal about the nature of the Arab state – or, more accurately, Arab states – in the region. By situating post-uprising developments within longer post-independence trajectories, the study traces sharply divergent paths since 2010. These varied responses underscore the absence of a single "Arab state" model. Instead, welfare regimes and social pacts across different types of political economies in the region reflect at least three distinct models of Arab statehood. In the oil-rich Gulf monarchies, fiscal surpluses sustain generous welfare systems and ambitious development strategies, while rulers cautiously promote expanded roles for the private sector under tight control. In middle-income states, initial post-uprising concessions, such as expanded social spending and employment, quickly gave way to austerity, debt crises, targeted assistance, and rising repression, resulting in declining welfare provision and shrinking opportunities for the middle class. In low-income and conflict-affected countries, protracted wars and state fragmentation have devastated welfare infrastructures, leaving humanitarian actors to fill governance vacuums.

​Over the past decades, the four Gulf states—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar—have emerged as active donor countries, playing prominent roles in fragile and conflict-affected areas in the humanitarian, developmental, and peace-related fields. While most of their foreign aid is visible in humanitarian and development sectors, their peace-related assistance remains directionally unclear and lacks sufficient analysis due to the absence of an official documentation system issued by Gulf donors in this area. To address this gap, this paper examines the foreign aid flows of Gulf donor countries through the lens of the Humanitarian- Development-Peace Triple Nexus. The analysis suggests that Gulf donor countries do not align their aid with the reform movement led by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) regarding the HDP Triple Nexus. The results reveal that the challenges to fully implementing this approach in the foreign aid policies of these countries include weak coordination among Gulf donors, the absence thereof, inadequate exchange of data, information, and joint .analysis, in addition to operating within a framework of bilateral funding.

Globally, many countries are implementing decentralization programs as a means of promoting both democratic and developmental objectives. Unfortunately, however, scholarship has yet to offer a comprehensive framework within which to assess and reform central-local relations. This article seeks to overcome the "division of labor" that has long separated analyses of administrative and political structures, and to provide stronger conceptual vocabulary for describing and analyzing the complexities of centralization and decentralization in both administration and politics. After developing two distinct continua of administrative and political centralization/ decentralization, the paper then combines them in a single matrix able to highlight the wide range of strategies and outcomes that emerge from the complex interplay of the two spheres. Depending on where a country lies within the matrix, it is argued, decentralization strategies may do more harm than good. Devolution strategies are especially problematic in settings with strong local leaders, and should never be attempted without careful analysis of the preexisting character of central-local ties.