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​A one-day academic symposium hosted by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies will bring together experts from Russia, the Arab world and the region to examine Moscow’s latest military intervention in Syria, on Saturday, October 24, 2015. While Russia’s decision to intervene directly in the conflict in Syria comes as the culmination of more than four years of diplomatic and military support for the Assad regime, the move by the Kremlin to deploy its military forces has come as a surprise to many observers, becoming a turning point not only in the militarized revolution within Syria, but also in the broader Middle East and indeed in a larger global arena. To better study the circumstances which gave rise to the Russian maneuver and the outcomes likely to result from it, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies will convene “Russian Military Intervention in Syria: Motives, Objectives and Repercussions”. In the highly volatile climate which the Middle East is presently witnessing, selected participants at the meeting will be asked to examine the fallout of Russia’s actions on the future stability of the region.

Despite the great pains made over the years since the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership passed the European Neighborhood Policy to support programs for democratic reform in the phase following the Arab uprisings. The EU's conditional policies to support democratic transformations in the Southern Mediterranean Countries have revealed many structural imbalances. These countries did not gain the desired political and democratic momentum that the Eastern European countries. There was also a growing trend towards European Countries prioritizing security considerations at the expense of supporting democracy, especially after the increased security cooperation to combat terrorist threats and irregular migration. These uprisings thus formed an experiment and a real challenge to the credibility and effectiveness of the EU's conditional democratic policies. To what extent have the European policies associated with democratic conditionality succeeded in supporting the dynamics and interactions of the Arab uprisings? Does maintaining security and stability and combating terrorism void European democratic conditionality at its hard core?

This study deals with transnational Shiism and the dynamics of relations between the Shiʿi religious establishment and the post-colonial state in Iraq. It sheds light on two aspects of transnational Shiism. First, the evolution and internal dynamics of religious authority, especially in terms of adapting its transnational domain to the Iraqi national context. The study argues that the relationship between Shiʿi religious establishment and the state was often characterized by tension, as the state sought to consolidate its power within its borders. Yet, after 2003, the nature of relations between the two has significantly changed, leading to new configurations of authority. Second, the increasing polarization between activist transnational Shiism, which is today led by the Iranian state, and Iraq-centric Shiism became a key factor in shaping power relations in post-2003 Iraq.

​The fall of authoritarian regimes across the Arab region has uncovered a range of structural fissures within Arab society, unleashing unprecedented, pernicious exploitation of identity politics adopted by a range of local and international actor. Today, sectarian prejudice and stereotypes have seeped into not only the media in the Arab region, but also its academic discourse.

​Settlement and occupation of Arab lands constitute paramount values in Zionist ideology and are highly important in the politics of all Zionist currents, be they secular, religious, leftist or rightist. Settlement in the West Bank and the occupied Eastern Jerusalem is a constant central colonial policy through which Israel seeks to achieve what it failed to do in the 1948 war, that is control the largest surface area of lands accommodating the least number of Arab-Palestinian citizens. As soon as Israel occupied the remaining Palestinian territories in the six-day war in June 1967, it started building settlements. Since 1967, Israel has gradually developed its colonial settlement project in the occupied Palestinian territories. This paper examines the stalling policy that Israel is adopting by using double standards: it caves to international pressures at times, while it expedites its settlement pace at other times.

This study analyses the constructivist perspective of security and establishes the constructivist contribution to security studies, particularly in terms of the conventional and critical constructivist approaches, arguing that constructivism has constituted an intellectual turning point. It demonstrates how constructivism, or rather constructivisms, has enriched and developed the concept of security and security studies on three levels. First, it approaches security as socially constructed and intersubjective. Second, it has undertaken a critical revision of major rationalist concepts, notably anarchy and the security dilemma. Third, it has introduced concepts of identity, interests, and norms to the field of security studies. However, there are shortcomings in the constructivist contribution on identity and security, in addition to inter-constructivist disagreements, which have prevented the evolution of a clear theoretical framework, even within critical constructivism, which has made the most innovative contributions to the field. The study concludes that constructivism has not formulated a distinct theory of security. However, its innovative contributions and its role as a theoretical reference point for new approaches to security constitute a constructivist perspective within International Relations. Both critical and non-critical strands of the new security approach have developed security theories grounded in constructivist insights. This constitutes the central theoretical achievement of constructivism in the field of security studies.

This paper investigates the factors that hindered the accomplishment of the Arab Maghreb Union, despite the economic, political, social, and security challenges posed to its countries by globalisation. The paper focuses mainly on the reasons that held back Algerian politicians from supporting the efforts of the regional countries and the international community for putting an end to the dispute over the Western Sahara, along with acknowledging the historical rights of Morocco in it. As a way out of this gridlock, Morocco proposed a political solution through a Saharan self-rule; a move that is widely welcomed by the international community as a viable means for the economic and social development, as well as for facing anticipated future challenges.

Hardly a day passes without seeing or hearing the terms 'extremism' or 'extremists.' Used today to describe political views and attitudes, or methods in political action, the terms today are linked to particular images, and hold specific implications charged with prejudice, half-truths, and presumption. This paper asks: Is the term extremism useful to understand the ideas, views, or practices of those who are labeled as such? Are there common traits among those labeled as extremist that renders this label a useful concept in the classification of the ideas of political groups and their objectives and methods? Or, is 'extremist' simply an expression of a negative attitude agreed to by those with a specific view with the aim of ostracizing specific groups? It then poses an even larger and more critical question: How do groups of people reach the point of burning bridges with existing reality in order to carry out a fight using violent methods? The paper argues that analyzing ideology per se to reach an answer to this question is futile, be this ideology nationalistic, religious, classist, or otherwise.

In association with the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies held a three-day conference (January 21-23, 2016) to study the developments associated with the Arab Spring in the intervening five years.

Examining the conditions of active groups in the Yemeni political arena, this paper will highlight the groups' most important wagers in managing the conflict. The many groups, each carrying out vendettas against past acts, create complex intersections. The coalition of the "clique" and Al-Islah party with the General People's Congress Party in the war of the summer of 1994 is one example, as is the alliance between the Houthis and the former regime against the forces of February 11, 2011 that drove Saleh out of power. So too can the role of Maj. Gen. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar in the confrontations with the Houthis in the six wars between 2004 and 2006 be read into the current political scenario. In explaining the division of national identity into southern and northern groups, and the popular mood against everything that is northern, the paper tackles the escalating sectarian conflict and the systematic undermining under Saleh's regime of the foundations of a modern civil state. It further addresses the weakening of modernizing forces in favor of traditional ones, and the weakening of the center in favor of the peripheries. The paper argues that any treatment that does not address these issues will be unsuccessful. It suggests that any political settlement among the warring parties could only postpone cyclical war and instability, and act as a gap for foreign intervention and tutelage.