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This study investigates the circumstances under which military governments leave power. It shows that there is no single path to get the military out of power, as there are no general rules for all cases. Nevertheless, several lessons are learned of which the most important is that military officers never relinquish power on their own. Rather, they are usually forced to leave it. In most cases, forcing the military to hand over authority requires a democratic opposition bloc that reaches a national consensus and agrees on a clear political strategy with an explicit goal. This will get the military out of power and establish a civilian government. A consensus or democratic bloc enables reformist democrats to change the balance of power for the benefit of democratic transition.

​This article seeks to understand the secession of Somaliland by exploring its historical, political and legal motives and rationales. It suggests that the secession is a notable outcome of the structural, political and cultural factors surrounding the emergence and unification of the Somali state post-independence. The article argues that the historical perspective offers a better understanding of not only the secession of Somaliland, but also why Somalia is a textbook case for the failure of the nation-state. The article starts with a general background on the modern socio-historical history of the Somali peninsula and analyses four key moments, starting from the history of the formation of the modern state in British and Italian Somaliland, leading to the establishment of Somalia as a unified nation-state. Accordingly, the article explains the rationale behind the secession of Somaliland from Somalia in 1991, as well as the obstacles to this secession, and concludes with an evaluation of the attitude and approaches of the international community.

This study investigates the role of the police apparatus in Egypt during the 2011 revolution and the subsequent counter-revolution following the 2013 coup. It begins by examining the relationships between the Military Council, President Mohamed Morsi, and the police apparatus. The study then explores how the Ministry of Interior and its security agencies reverted to their previous repressive practices, including extrajudicial killings and torture. The research highlights that the security apparatus remained fragmented, marked by overlapping authorities and a focus on resource competition rather than coordination. However, the existential threat posed by the 2011 revolution compelled the apparatus to unify against the tangible threat of popular unrest. Following 2013 , the military, security and intelligence agencies furthered the suppression of opposition in various forms, largely evading accountability.

​Events in Mosul, which was captured by ISIL on June 9, 2014, cannot be viewed in isolation from the severe political crisis afflicting the post 2003 Iraqi political regime. Generally speaking, radical groups cannot be separated from the political environment that fostered them. They are the product of a structurally imbalanced political situation. The growth of such groups in Iraq, from Al Qaeda to ISIL, provides a textbook lesson of this. They are the expression of an imbalance political situation, even if they develop and assume an independence from the political context that gave birth to them. They grow, develop, and draw oxygen from these imbalances and from sharp political and social divisions. Hence, it is not possible to defend the idea that these groups have autonomous power, rather their power derives from the acceptance of their social incubator in a political context that this incubator allows to play a role in correcting the balances of power, as a tool or revenge, pressure, influence, or the like.

Examining the dimensions of the constitutional crisis in Libya, this paper begins by explaining the situation of the country’s political factions. On this backdrop, it looks at how the interim Constitutional Declaration of Libya’s 17 February revolution – which has seen seven amendments – has led to large-scale changes in the legal positions of political institutions and has caused a disturbance in the state’s constitutional framework. Analysis shows how the declaration has disrupted the country’s transitional path, and outlines the ways that this has taken place including: the diverse results from the National Congress’s legislative elections where no political party or movement secured an absolute majority, the growing disputes following the adoption of the political and administrative isolation law, and the emergence of alternative proposals for a third transitional period. This paper tackles the factors leading up to the amendments of the interim Constitutional Declaration, issued on August 3 2011, and their impact on Libya’s political crisis. Analyzing the constitutional framework allows a closer look into the role of Libyan political actors and an understanding of the elements that helped shape the path of the transitional period. It shows that the conflict over the constitutional framework has led to an armed conflict among parties to the Libyan revolution.

Most initial readings have exhausted their explanations for failure, or stumbling, of the democratic transition process in Tunisia. Given the country’s weak political performance, lack of economic achievement, and worsening corruption, the need has emerged to consider the role of political culture in events since the Tunisian revolution up until President Kais Saied declared a state of emergency on 25 July 2021. Contrary to the prevailing trend in the literature on democratic transition, which has often overlooked the importance of a minimum level of civil political culture taking root, there is an urgent need to recognize its vital role in ensuring the success of any transitional process, especially in the early stages. This paper argues that the absence of a minimum level of political culture has contributed to the fragility of the transitional process in Tunisia, making democracy vulnerable to failure and to the reproduction of authoritarian patterns. Therefore, strengthening this culture becomes a necessity to ensure the sustainability of the democratic transition and avoid setbacks.

This study conducts research on the traditional academic methods used in the Arab scholarly community. Specifically, it employs the case of legal science when addressing the following questions: Is the Arab academy in its field suffering from academic dependency? What forms does this take and what are the reasons behind it? Where does reviewing theoretical or conceptual frameworks of legal science fall in this? This study focuses on law as a method of social control in the methodological crisis undergone by the social sciences. This study refers to two crises examined by Arab legal science: identity crisis and functional crisis. These are illustrated by two main indicators: The gap between the quantitative growth of the number of law students and the weak production of legal research knowledge, the gap between the quantitative development of the educational institutions of law and of legal structures.

Our study aims to put under scrutiny the Algerian army tasks and roles through different periods of time and this requires going back to the roots when the national liberation army was established, returning to the present as the army has become the institution protecting the state. An institution which has an everlasting organic relation with politics, embodying one of its central tasks. The study needs to highlight the above cited issues in its attempt to grasp and understand the army role during the 1992s' political crisis, and in so doing a particular attention is given to the ways how the army dealt with the crisis and what is the nature of its contribution in tackling and facing it. Finally, the study is concerned with the army role in the near future from a prospective approach.

International protection for internally displaced persons, who far exceed the number of refugees, has become a major issue in recent years. This is reflected in the international community's search for solutions, by providing them with internal humanitarian assistance so that they do not have to seek help beyond the borders of their states, affirming their right to remain in their country in security and dignity and not to become refugees. However, reality has shown that the international community's attention to the protection of internally displaced persons is not so much a humanitarian consideration as it is an inevitable consequence of state reservations to welcome refugees on their territory. European states in particular have attached urgency to protecting internally displaced persons arbitrarily to justify the closure of their borders to refugees.

This paper discusses what it sees as turmoil in Turkish policy towards the Syrian crisis, a policy that is marked by constant fluctuations. For example, the passive stance towards ISIL’s occupation of the Kurdish town of Ain al-Arab/Kobani stood in contradiction to Turkey’s subsequent air attacks on ISIL positions inside Syria following the explosions in Suruc, only for Turkey to then change tactic again by bombarding the rear lines of the PKK in northern Iraq. Even after Turkey opened up the Incirlik airbase to coalition forces, Turkey did not participate in the campaign against ISIL beyond a few strikes, while its air power was continuously targeting PKK positions. Turkish policy in Syria has not developed much, and is being pulled into the political crisis and acts of violence at home, which have crippled the country since the elections of June 7, 2015. In addition, the situation in Syria has forced Turkey to focus on its southern borders, putting it in contact with the various active parties in Syria with their conflicting interests. Furthermore, the Syrian crisis has forced Ankara to reconsider its management of the Aegean coast and its northern borders, to keep refugees on its territory and so maintain good relations with the EU.