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This study distinguishes between three Interrelated theoretical approaches prevalent in writings of researchers seeking to understand the emergence of the Islamic Resistance Movement, "Hamas". The first of these approaches examines the movement from the portal of ideology, stressing the importance of international and regional dimensions and the rise of political Islam after the "setback" (Naksa) of the 1967 Six Day War. The second approaches Hamas as representing a social movement seeking to revisit the historical narrative of Palestinian society. The third considers it to be the heir of the Palestinian national liberation movement, attributing its rise to transformations witnessed in Palestinian identity and the Palestinian community's definition of itself. Although the three readings do not contradict each other, a focus on one of them can lead to oversimplification or exaggeration: emphasis on the first approach is at risk of overlooking transformations in the movement in its later stages and a marginalization at the micro level of local dimensions; emphasis on the second approach can result in the overestimation of the effectiveness of collective action; exaggerated emphasis on the third approach deprives social actors of their effectiveness. Hence this study proposes situating Hamas in the intersection of these three approaches.

Beginning in 1995, Qatar underwent a major transformation in its foreign policy, adopting an independent and neutral foreign policy as a result of being located in an important vital, geopolitical and economic region, with tensions between the influential regional powers. Given the importance of mediation in resolving disputes and bringing peace to a region raging in conflict, Qatar adopted a foreign policy approach of dialogue, good offices, mediation, and preventive diplomacy, and worked to settle disputes and crises peacefully, remaining impartial and independent, in accordance with the provisions of international law and the Charter of the United Nations. This study explores Qatar policy and experience in mediation and dispute settlement and highlights its active role and contribution over the past twenty years, by clarifying the features of its foreign policy, strategy, and principles, and highlighting case studies of previous Qatari mediation.

Since the mid-1990s Morocco has traversed several stages of political and constitutional reforms. These were characterized by a restructuring of the political field in keeping with constitutional methodology and political consensus and were the precondition for the process of rapprochement between political actors. However, if this rapprochement or political openness transformed the electoral process into something diminished in practical terms, it in turn intensified the expansion of the protest arena, the accumulation of skills and experience among protesters, the development of more independent coordination capabilities, and the weakening of the regime's polarizing tendencies. This development imposes upon the political class a renewal of its discourse and means and modalities of communication, in the short and medium terms, to prevent continued erosion of its credibility.

​If deterrence fails and diplomacy falters, how can small states defend themselves against adversaries that outnumber, outgun and outmatch them? This study seeks to contribute to the ongoing scholarly discourse on how "the few" can achieve a military upset - not just a political or a propaganda one- against "the many." In an era where asymmetric war has become the most anticipated type, understanding the innovative ways of warfare that enable the smaller forces to endure and even prevail is of paramount importance to strategic analysts, military commanders, and policymakers alike. To do so, the study coins a definition for the concept of "Hybrid Defence," contributes a new definition of "Multi-Domain Combined Arms Operations" and examines their correlations with, and impacts on, "Military Effectiveness" and "Combat Effectiveness." It then analyses selected operational arts and tactical adaptations employed by the relatively smaller forces - such as the Ukrainian Military and Security Forces, as well as nonstate forces, exemplified by the Palestinian Resistance Factions in Gaza - for confronting numerically and technologically superior adversaries. The study extracts seven key lessons and concludes with their comparative implications for the defence policies of small states, particularly in the Arab world and beyond.

India adopts a cautious policy towards the GCC states during the emergence of differences between them, such as the Gulf crisis of 2017 - 2021. This stems from many considerations: First, the principle of non-alignment. Despite Narendra Modi's government focus on proactive diplomacy and engagement abroad, it has reverted to the principle of non-alignment and neutrality in dealing with the crisis. Second, the special relationship with the GCC states. Given the depth of historical interdependence, geographic proximity and intertwining of economic interests, these states are India's most important trading partner and are home to the largest overseas Indian community. Third, the roles of other countries. Because the competing countries such as China and Pakistan have remained neutral, this has encouraged India not to take an active role in solving the conflict. United States' key role in mediation encouraged New Delhi to remain neutral, taking advantage of Washington's efforts and its influence in securing energy routes. Nevertheless, India has taken an active role in providing Qatar with essential needs and food products during the crisis.

​For centuries, Arabs and Kurds have shared not only the same geographical space, but also the same cultural sphere. Even during periods of heighten awareness of their ethnic differences, it would have been impossible to speak of anything approaching a “Kurdish Question” within the Arab world prior the twentieth century and the advent—and global spread—of the nation-state model born in the 19th century, which, in its Middle Eastern variant, was always rooted in ethnicity. This was complicated by the need of the emergent nation-states to absorb and integrate nascent political identities born of these ethnic groups.

​Over the past decades, the four Gulf states—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar—have emerged as active donor countries, playing prominent roles in fragile and conflict-affected areas in the humanitarian, developmental, and peace-related fields. While most of their foreign aid is visible in humanitarian and development sectors, their peace-related assistance remains directionally unclear and lacks sufficient analysis due to the absence of an official documentation system issued by Gulf donors in this area. To address this gap, this paper examines the foreign aid flows of Gulf donor countries through the lens of the Humanitarian- Development-Peace Triple Nexus. The analysis suggests that Gulf donor countries do not align their aid with the reform movement led by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) regarding the HDP Triple Nexus. The results reveal that the challenges to fully implementing this approach in the foreign aid policies of these countries include weak coordination among Gulf donors, the absence thereof, inadequate exchange of data, information, and joint .analysis, in addition to operating within a framework of bilateral funding.

​This article debates the significance of cultural differences in the identification and application of principles of sport governance. It attempts at refuting the underlying assumption that the ‘progress’ achieved and enjoyed within sport governance in the West represents the model to be emulated by the non-west. It argues that modernisation of sport is liable to take on subtly different forms in different local contexts which are modern but not uniform, supporting in effect a form of ‘multiple modernities’. Sport governance, like modernity itself, is not a homogeneous phenomenon, as its (cultural, political, and/or economic, and thus sport) forms varies as much as cultural contexts do, and their characteristics overlap rather than tend to take a unitary set of features attributable to a single model.

Politicians are increasingly adopting populist rhetoric that is appealing to people's emotions and biases rather than their rational judgments. This rhetoric includes claims of representing the people (us) as opposed to the establishment and the traditional elite (them). Anti-elitist populism manifests in its opposition to facts, with populists becoming the main players who distort facts and spread disinformation. Therefore, populism and disinformation reinforce one other, creating a cycle of manipulation that undermines democracy. By conducting a comparative qualitative analysis of the speeches of Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in Egypt and Kais Saied in Tunisia, this study argues that there are four tactics, rely on disinformation, used by authoritarian populists to legitimize the obstruction of constitutional and institutional constraints and suppress the opposition: (1) constructing the people by creating the enemy; (2) attacking the media and democratic institutions; (3) creating illusion by amplifying achievements; and (4) employing conspiracy theory and misinformation to justify failure at fulfilling promises.

This introductory essay highlights the considerations that prompted this in-depth look at the state of political science in Arab academic institutions, and made it essential. For political science, and the humanities and social sciences more generally, play a central role in any societal renaissance. Our experience of teaching graduate level political science at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies has already indicated to us that the situation of the discipline in Arab universities was not at all rosy. This impression was confirmed by many studies, conferences, and forums organized by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, which revealed a huge gap of knowledge in the field. This made it imperative to undertake an evaluation of what Arab universities were offering in their efforts to guide students to master the discipline up to global standards. The studies in this special issue, and the following one, highlight a multi-layered crisis in the field, impacting teaching, research, and employment prospects. The studies point to the late arrival of the discipline in the region, the limited areas covered, inadequate resources, and a lag behind international achievements in the field. The crisis is complicated by a number political, economic, social and structural obstacles that hold the discipline back from achieving its potential. This introduction summarizes and assesses the findings of the studies included in this special issue, and the second part in the following one, one emergence, evolution and achievements of the discipline, and the impediment obstructing its progress and maturity in the region. It focuses on case studies from Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, and Tunisia, adding surveys and reflections on methodologies and theoretical challenges. It concludes that despite some major achievements and progress, the biggest obstacle to progress in the discipline remains the absence of viable scholarly communities, both regionally and nationally in in each country. The essay offers proposals to address this problem.