Latest Articles

​Arab narratives of the June, 1967 War remained limited in scope even today, 50 years after the cessation of hostilities. “The June, 1967 War” was held in Doha, Qatar from June 20-22, 2017, the three-day meeting was devoted to studying the events of the war and its ongoing repercussions through the prisms of military history and strategic analysis.

This paper explores the concept of “the Responsibility to Protect” (R2P), an outcome of the 2005 World Summit which entails that the international community has a moral duty to intervene in the domestic affairs of sovereign states in cases involving war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, or genocide. The author illustrates the historical legacy of the R2P, covering how early legal philosophers justified the intervention of European powers through theories such as just war, intervention in the name of humanity, and humanitarian intervention, before exploring whether R2P represents a violation of well-established principles of international law: the sovereignty of states and non-intervention in their affairs and the non-use of force in international affairs. The paper concludes that R2P does not provide for the use of force in a manner that does not already exist in the UN Charter.

Iraq’s former foreign minister Naji Sabri al-Hadithi provides an account of the details of the campaign led by the United States against Iraq on August 2, 1990. He explains the measures Iraq took in the period between March 1991 and March 2003 to avoid a second war that was clearly on the way. According to this testimony, the United States began its preparations to wage another war on Iraq the day after the end of the first war, which was brought about by Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. The testimony includes details of the egregious measures that prepared Western public opinion to accept waging another war on Iraq despite the cooperation the country exhibited with American demands. It also explains how many of the measures employed under the cover of international legitimacy aimed to impoverish Iraq and destroy its foundations.

This study investigates the circumstances under which military governments leave power. It shows that there is no single path to get the military out of power, as there are no general rules for all cases. Nevertheless, several lessons are learned of which the most important is that military officers never relinquish power on their own. Rather, they are usually forced to leave it. In most cases, forcing the military to hand over authority requires a democratic opposition bloc that reaches a national consensus and agrees on a clear political strategy with an explicit goal. This will get the military out of power and establish a civilian government. A consensus or democratic bloc enables reformist democrats to change the balance of power for the benefit of democratic transition.

​عقد المركز العربي للأبحاث ودراسة السياسات مؤتمره السنوي في قضايا التحول الديمقراطي في الوطن العربي، في مقر معهد الدوحة للدراسات العليا، حول موضوع "الجيش والسياسة في مرحلة التحول الديمقراطي في الوطن العربي". وبهذا يكون المؤتمر قد انعقد خمس دورات، منذ أول مرة عقد فيها؛ إذ بحثت دورته الأولى في موضوع "الإسلاميون ونظام الحكم الديمقراطي: تجارب واتجاهات" )تشرين الأول/ أكتوبر 2012 ، وتناولت ثانيتُها موضوع "الإسلاميون ونظام الحكم الديمقراطي: مسائل المواطنة والدولة والأمة"أيلول/ سبتمبر 2013، وبحثت ثالثتُها في "المسألة الطائفية وصناعة الأقليات في المشرق العربي الكبير" في البحر الميت/ الأردن )أيلول/ سبتمبر 2014 وناقشت رابعتُها "العنف والسياسة في المجتمعات العربية" في تونس أيلول/ سبتمبر 2015.

This paper adopts the assumption that the series of foreign interventions which served to transform the Syrian crisis from a domestic revolution into a regionalized, and later globalized, conflict were not the result of factors intrinsic to the revolution itself, but rather the consequences of dramatic changes sweeping across the entire Middle East following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. The fallout from 2003 included the collapse of the former tripartite of Arab regional powers: Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. For the first time, the non-Arab regional powers of Turkey and Iran came to be directly involved in intra-Arab affairs. The latter effectively had an overland border tying it to Syria's Mediterranean coast once the US withdrew the bulk of its military forces from Iraq in 2011. While the Syrian regime had worked to strengthen its ties to both Ankara and Tehran in the wake of its losses following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Syria would fall victim to regional power politics between its two regional neighbors. Once the Syrian revolution was militarized, in response to the Damascus regime's iron-fisted approach to peaceful popular protests, Turkish-Iranian rivalry over the future of Syria quickly became bloody. In an attempt to limit the extent of influence not only by Turkey but also its ally Iran, the Syrian regime resorted to seeking out additional foreign support, latterly from Russia.

This article aims to explain and review the theoretical and normative contexts of Transitional Justice (TJ). This is done as empirical studies or specific settings particularly in the Arab region need to be rooted much more in TJ theory. The article argues that data and statistics need to be used and evaluated and that there needs to be greater use of methodological processes including empirical studies. It is argued that at present, this is not always the case. Similarly, when models are presented or critiqued by practitioners, little regard is given to TJ theory, or the context within which those models operated. Therefore, it is difficult to see what lessons can be learnt for other places even where the context or circumstances are very similar.

The study takes up the topic of the evolution of Hamas' military action from the foundation of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades between 1987 and 1992, the movement's military wing, and beyond, drawing upon memoirs and testimonies of the movement's political and military leaders in Palestine and on available data regarding military confrontations with the Israeli occupation. The study starts from the assumption that the evolution of Hamas's military action as an active "agent" in the region differs across the different stages of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on the one hand, and with the development of the movement's political thought and relations with regional and international systems on the other. These stages have been formational of the movement's variable identity, one that has led it to defining its regional interest and role on the basis of military strength. It transformed into a "semi-classical" army in Gaza specifically, after having been a movement of modestly equipped and armed groupings, as it continues to be to this day in the West Bank. This study attempts to monitor this evolution across the successive confrontations with the Israeli occupation in the wars of 2008, 2012 and 2014.

Israel is following the strategic changes in the region arising from the Arab revolutions with great anxiety. It is aware that its chances to control the process of change underway, and all the changes arising from it, are limited. Despite this, it is trying its utmost to minimize the negative effects of these changes on its standing in the region. This article deals with Israeli positions towards these geostrategic changes, foremost among them the fall of a number of dictatorial regimes, some of which Israel relied upon to guarantee its security. The establishment of democratic regimes in a number of Arab states threatens to disrupt the balance that was tipped in favor of Israel's security. Examined in this study is the decline of American influence in the Arab region, the prospect of change in Israeli-American relations, as well as the possibility of Israel losing its monopoly over non-conventional weapons because of the Arab Spring. To conclude, a review of the Israeli position on the revolution in Syria is also offered.

​This review discusses the main findings of the report issued by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral entitled The Global State of Democracy 2021: Building Resilience in a Pandemic Era.