Latest Articles

Military interventions in Sudanese politics can be attributed to a number of factors, most pertinently: excessive politicization throughout society, social institutions, trades unions and syndicates as well as educational and religious institutions. In this sense, the Sudanese was not an exception, merely one of many highly politicized institutions. This paper concludes that the three different military coups which took power in Sudan were only able to do so with the aiding and abetting of civilian political forces, such as the National Umma Party, the Islamic Front and an array of leftist forces all—to varying extents—colluded with the military to further their political aims. With the military ranks reflecting wider societal politicization, military coups were effectively an extension of the political process by other means.

Why did the January 25, 2011 revolution in Egypt descend into a state of violent oppression of the revolutionaries on the grounds of securing stability and fighting terrorism? This paper examines how the manner in which regime change took place following the January 25 revolution impacted on the democratic transition and its trajectory. The author looks specifically at those transformations which served to divert the course of revolutionary momentum, turning an uprising previously centered on "democratization" in the broadest sense, including the change in the system of government and the protection of personal and social liberties, into a movement which is often described in academic literature as an "electoral revolution". In other words, revolutionary momentum was focused exclusively on procedural questions and the filling of vacant executive and legislative positions following the collapse of the Mubarak regime before the more fundamental precursors to democracy could be established. This first transformation took place before the "electoral revolution" was itself diverted into a "counter revolution" which targeted all of the revolutionary forces behind the original uprising, making way for the establishment of a totalitarian mode of government.

Since the time of President Thomas Jefferson, and on through the presidents of the 20th century, the United States has talked about itself as the propagator, protector, and defender of democracy around the world. Yet America has never showed any qualms of forming military and political alliances with authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. The US justifies these international alliances on the basis that “not all dictatorships in the world are enemies of the United States, but all the United States’ enemies are dictatorships.” The US therefore adopted a two-track diplomacy: while working to spread democracy (directly or by means of international organizations and NGOs) the US has no issue in supporting autocratic governments when its interests are involved. How did US policy apply to the democratic transformation in the former Eastern bloc states in Europe on the eve of the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and subsequently, when American values and interests went hand in hand, and how did it then apply to the Arab Spring of 2011, when US values and interests were congruent in some cases and out of sync in others, according to the situation in each country and its strategic importance from America’s perspective? What are the results of these policies and what differences emerge from such a comparison of the Arab and East Europe cases.

The concept of soft power continues to receive significant attention from researchers, relevant actors in the international community, and small and rising powers alike. This paper discusses the nature of soft power, how it works, how it can be employed, its effectiveness, and its limits. It critically engages with the existing literature on soft power and argues that soft power does not exist by itself, but rather is made. Accordingly, soft power is not just a strategy as is the case with smart power, nor it can be purchased in its raw form, as is the case with hard power, and it is not of unilateral negative nature, as is the case with sharp power. The paper asserts the need to distinguish between sources of soft power and its tools. It contends that soft power resources can be mobilized and directed towards the target using soft power tools. The paper aims to contribute to discussion of what soft power is and how it works; thus, it offers a theoretical framework on the working mechanism of soft power that takes into account using soft power against non-democratic systems: autocracy, totalitarian, or theocracy.

Forty days after the outbreak of the Yemeni Revolution, on March 21, 2011, General Ali Mohsen Saleh al-Ahmar (commander of the northwestern military district and the 1st Armoured Division), Major General Mohammad Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (commander of the eastern military district) and a number of commanders of other military units declared their support for the revolution. The Yemeni army divided into two: “supporters of the revolution army” and the “family army,” according to the characterization by the forces of the revolution. This development exposed to the public the hidden divisions within the structure of the Yemeni Army, taking it to the point of no return. The capital Sanaa and some other Yemeni cities witnessed limited armed confrontations between the two armies and between the militias supported by them. That is why the executive mechanism of The Gulf Cooperation Council’s initiative (the Gulf Initiative) included a special term for uniting the army, restructuring it, and ending its division. With the split as its background and the Gulf Initiative as its point of departure, this paper aims to show what was achieved in terms of restructuring the army. It describes the course of this restructuring operation, the difficulties it entailed, the tasks that have not yet been accomplished, as well as its impact on national unity, social integration, and confidence-building between the parties participating in the national dialogue conference.

ﺗﺴﻠﻂ اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ اﻟﻀﻮء ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺮاﻛﺰ اﻟﺒﺤﻮث واﻟﻤﻨﺎﺑﺮ اﻋﻼﻣﻴﺔ اﻣﻴﺮﻛﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﻨﺘﺠﺔ ﻟ{ﻓﻜﺎر واﻟﺘﺤﻠﻴﻼت اﻟﺘﻲ ﻛﺎن ﻟﻬﺎ دور ﺣﺎﺳﻢ ﻓﻲ ﺻﻨﻊ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺔ اﻟﻮﻻﻳﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪة اﻟﺨﺎرﺟﻴﺔ، واﻟﻤﻨﺎخ اﻟﺬي أﺷﺎﻋﺘﻪ ﻓﻲ ﺗﺸﻜﻴﻞ "ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﺗﺮاﻣﺐ". وﺗﺒﻴﻦ اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ اﻟﺴﻤﺎت ا ﺳﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻟﻬﺬه اﻟﻜﺘﺎﺑﺎت ﻓﻲ ﻣﺠﺎل اﻟﺘﺄﺛﻴﺮ ﻓﻲ ﺻﻨﻊ اﻟﻘﺮار اﻟﺨﺎرﺟﻲ اﻣﻴﺮﻛﻲ، ﻛﻤﺎ ﺗﺘﻨﺎول اﻟﻌﻨﺎﺻﺮ اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺑﺎﺗﺖ ادارة اﻣﻴﺮﻛﻴﺔ اﻟﺤﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﺗﺴﺘﻠﻬﻢ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﺑﻌﻀ ﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻨﻄﻠﻘﺎﺗﻬﺎ اﺳﺎﺳﻴﺔ إزاء اﻟﻤﻮﻗﻒ ﻣﻦ دوﻟﺔ ﻗﻄﺮ، ﺑﺤﻴﺚ ﺟﺮى اﻟﺘﺮﻛﻴﺰ ﻋﻠﻰ أﻧﻪ ﻣﺎ داﻣﺖ ﻗﻄﺮ ﺗﺴﺘﻤﺮ ﻓﻲ دورﻫﺎ ﻣﺼﺪرًا ﻟﺘﻤﻮﻳﻞ اﻟﺠﻤﺎﻋﺎت ارﻫﺎﺑﻴﺔ واﻟﻤﺘﻄﺮﻓﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺸﺮق اوﺳﻂ، وﺗﺠﻴّﺮ ﻗﻮﺗﻬﺎ اﻟﻨﺎﻋﻤﺔ ﻟﻤﺼﻠﺤﺔ اﺳﻼم اﻟﺮادﻳﻜﺎﻟﻲ، ﻓﻤﻦ اﻟﻤﻌﻘﻮل ﻃﺮح اﻟﺴﺆال إن ﻛﺎن ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻴًﺎ اﺳﺘﻤﺮار إدارة دوﻧﺎﻟﺪ ﺗﺮاﻣﺐ ﻓﻲ "اﺳﺘﺌﺠﺎر أﺻﻮل" ﻣﻦ دوﻟﺔ ﺗﺆﻳﺪ ﻣﺜﻞ ﻫﺬه اﻟﻄﺒﻌﺔ ﻣﻦ اﺳﻼم. واﻟﻬﺪف، ﺑﺤﺴﺐ ﻣﺎ ﺗﺤﺎﺟﺞ اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ، ﻫﻮ أن ﺗﺒﻘﻰ ﻗﻄﺮ ﺗﺤﺖ اﻟﻤﺠﻬﺮ، ﻣﻜﺒّﻠﺔ اﻟﻴﺪﻳﻦ ﻋﻦ اﻟﺘﺤﺮك وﻓﺎﻗﺪة اﻟﻤﺒﺎدرة، وﻓﻲ اﻧﺘﻈﺎر ﺳﺎﻛﻦ ﺧﺎرج ﺣﻠﺒﺔ اﻟﻤﺴﺮح اﻗﻠﻴﻤﻲ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: ﻗﻄﺮ، ﻣﺮاﻛﺰ اﻟﺒﺤﻮث اﻣﻴﺮﻛﻴﺔ، ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ. This paper highlights US research centers and platforms producing ideas and literatures that have played a crucial role in shaping US foreign policy and the climate that has shaped it in the formation of the "Trump's World", and outlines the main features of these writings in influencing US foreign policy-making. Furthermore, the paper discusses the intellectual elements that the current US administration is drawing form some of its basic premises on the attitude towards Qatar. These writings emphasizes that as long as Qatar continues to play its role as a source of funding for terrorist and extremist groups in the Middle East, the question raises weather Tramp administration would continue to "lease assets" from a country that supported such a version of Islam, but the goal is to keep Qatar inactive and waiting outside the regional theater.

The youth revolution in Yemen at the beginning of 2011 kindled a ray of hope that the walls of tyranny could be broken down and the country could be pulled back from the clutches of narrowly defined identities. It sharpened the will that formed a “historical bloc” capable of rendering democratic transition successful. However, the youth revolution never transcended the ecstasy of a romantic revolutionary act to reach the stage of building institutions capable of enforcing respect for the law and accommodating ethnic, tribal, sectarian and political pluralism. This study addresses the impact of the Saudi-Iranian role on Yemen's transition. It is premised on considerable importance attached regional factors, which perhaps have even greater influence than domestic factors on the outcome of the Yemeni revolution. The study stresses that the effects and limits of regional factors are related to several variables, such as the vicissitudes of international politics; international and regional balances and interests; as well as the strategic location of the country subject to interference; its resources; its internal dynamics; the maturity of local elites; the weight of political opposition; and the quality of institutions.

Examining the negative effects on the economies of oil-exporting Arab countries as a result of the current imbalance in the international monetary system, this paper finds that the imbalance is mainly represented in the continuation of the dollar as the central reserve currency of the Gulf States. As long as this imbalance exists, it postulates, the surpluses achieved by these countries in their balance of foreign payments ends up as dollar-denominated reserves deposited in the US government treasury or as US bonds. In other words, as loans countries with financial surpluses Gulf States give to the richest economy in the world in return for meager interest rates instead of investing them in high-yielding productive projects that could increase demand in the global economy, drive up employment rates, and help protect against crises and instability. This study aims to start a debate about the need for the Gulf countries to take part in efforts to reform the international monetary system, and join developing nations that spend on infrastructure and sustainable development instead of on defense. This paper sees such a move as ensuring that the Gulf States would then participate in reforming global governance and the development of the international monetary system. Gulf countries should seriously consider joining the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Bank, as well as establish a trans-regional bank between Asian and Arab countries, as a more advanced step.

ﺗﺘﻨﺎول ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ اﻟﺒُﻌﺪ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮي ﻓﻲ اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ، ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ﺗﺴﻠﻴﻂ اﻟﻀﻮء ﻋﻠﻰ ا دوار اﻟﺘﻲ اﺿﻄﻠﻌﺖ ﺑﻬﺎ اﻟﻘﻮات اﻟﻤﺴﻠﺤﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪول اﻟﺘﻲ اﺟﺘﺎﺣﺘﻬﺎ رﻳﺎح اﻟﺜﻮرات؛ إذ ﻧﻠﺤَﻆ أن اﻟﺠﻤﺎﻫﻴﺮ اﻟﺸﻌﺒﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﺤﺘﺠﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ اﺻﻄﻔﺖ إﻟﻰ ﺟﺎﻧﺒﻬﺎ ﻫﺬه اﻟﻘﻮات ﻧﺠﺤﺖ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻠﻮغ ﻣﺮادﻫﺎ، ﺑﻴﻨﻤﺎ ﻟﻢ ﺗﺴﺘﻄﻊ اﻟﺸﻌﻮب اﻟﺘﻲ ﻟﻢ ﺗﺪﻋﻤﻬﺎ اﻟﺠﻴﻮش اﻟﺼﻤﻮد ﻓﻲ وﺟﻪ ﻗﻤﻊ اﻟﻘﻮات اﻟﻨﻈﺎﻣﻴﺔ. إن ا دوار اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ أﺧﺬت اﻟﺠﻴﻮش اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ ﺗﺆدﻳﻬﺎ اﻟﻴﻮم ﻻ ﺗﺆﻛﺪ ﻓﺎﻋﻠﻴﺔ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺠﻴﻮش وأﻫﻤﻴﺘﻬﺎ وﺣﺴْ ﺐ، وﻟﻜﻨﻬﺎ ﺗﺤﺚ أﻳﻀ ﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ إﺻﻼح اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺒﻠﺪان. وﻗﺪ أﺧﺬ ﺳﺆال إﺻﻼح ﻗﻄﺎع اﻣﻦ واﻟﺪﻓﺎع ﻳﺒﺮز ﺑﻘﻮة ﻓﻲ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﺔ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻌﺪ اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ، ﺗﺠﺎوﺑًﺎ ﻣﻊ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﺘﻀﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻻﻧﺘﻘﺎﻟﻴﺔ. وﻓﻲ ﻫﺬا اﻃﺎر، ﺗﺮﻛﺰ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺠﻮاﻧﺐ اﻟﺒﻨﻴﻮﻳﺔ ﺻﻼح اﻟﻘﻄﺎع اﻣﻨﻲ واﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮي ﻓﻲ دول اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: اﻟﺠﻴﻮش اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ، إﺻﻼح ﻗﻄﺎع اﻣﻦ، اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ. This paper explores the military aspect of the Arab Spring, and specifically the role played by formal armies in the Arab Spring states. Specifically, this paper focuses on the fact that popular revolutions during the Arab Spring were successful in those countries in which the military sided with the protestors, whereas revolutionary momentum could not face down the regimes in those countries where the armies did not side with the revolution. The political functions which Arab armies carry out serve to highlight not only their significance and effectiveness as institutions, but also the need for military reform. The question of military and security sector reform has become increasingly pressing in the post-Arab Spring transitional phase, driving the author to probe the structural aspects of reform to the military and security sectors of the Arab Spring states.

Forced migration from Iraq and Syria today are reminiscent of the Palestinian Nakba of the late 1940s, underscoring the need for a revision of Arab knowledge in the field of forced migration. This paper attempts to offer a starting point for researchers interested in the subject, and attempts to expand the specifically Sudanese experience across the Arab world. The paper also takes in those academic studies which explore the violent aspects of forced migration as well as the extent to which Sudanese government policy on refugees is tied to the social values of the Sudanese people. One conclusion made in this regard is the possibility that the integration of refugees can be used to address structural instabilities in Arab societies. The author highlights the importance of the interested parties—including governments, grassroots movements and returned refugees—to cooperate in effecting the integration of refugees who return to their home countries, a challenge more complicated than hosting refugees abroad.