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​This study examines the management of ethnic and social diversity in the military by comparing the United States of America, a reference case, and Saudi Arabia, which is still in an early stage of institutionalization. It uses a military-sociological approach, which posits that the military reflects the socio-cultural structure of society. It focuses on four key societal indicators: ethnicity, gender, sectarian affiliation, and tribal identity. It argues that the effectiveness of diversity management depends on integrating both normative (legislation and policies) and practical (implementation) levels, while accounting for the societal specificity of each case. The US experience shows that the presence of both normative and practical frameworks does not necessarily yield an ideal type, due to persistent representation challenges, particularly at senior military ranks. In contrast, the Saudi case is characterized by the absence of a clear normative framework and the novelty of the experience, despite emerging indicators of openness, especially after 2017. The study concludes that managing diversity is not merely a social demand, but also a prerequisite for strengthening military effectiveness and institutional cohesion​.

The causal link between economic and political freedom is a complex and interesting debate in the domain of social sciences. To enrich the academic debate on this issue, we have examined the Arab context based on econometric instruments, especially the test of causality. Based on the results of the study, the interactions between economic and political freedom in the Arab world appear to be generally in line with the thesis strongly defended by liberal thinkers, in particular Milton Friedman and Frederick Hayek, that there is a unilinear causality in which the first variable leads to the second. This result may seem self-evident in a transformed Arab context, but the reality seems to be more complex. Economic freedom indeed guarantees freedom, the constructing of the national identity and the conditions necessary to ensure individual well-being. However, such freedom is not understood in isolation from political freedom and its social context interactions and cultural structures, in contrast with restricted collective consciousness.

ﺗﻄﻤﺢ ﻫﺬه اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ إﻟﻰ ا ﺟﺎﺑﺔ ﻋﻦ اﻟﺴﺆال اﻟﺘﺎﻟﻲ: "ﻟﻤﺎذا أدرﺟﺖ دول ﺣﺼﺎر ﻗﻄﺮ ﻃﻠﺒًﺎ ﺑﺈﻏﻼق ﺷﺒﻜﺔ اﻟﺠﺰﻳﺮة ﺿﻤﻦ ﺟﻤﻠﺔ اﻟﻤﻄﺎﻟﺐ اﻟﻤﻘﺪﻣﺔ ﻟﻬﺎ؟". وﻟﻢ ﻧﺸﺄ أن ﺗﻜﻮن ا ﺟﺎﺑﺔ ﻣﺒﺎﺷﺮة أو ذات ﻃﺒﻴﻌﺔ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ راﻫﻨﺔ. ﺣﺎوﻟﻨﺎ أن ﻧﺴﺘﻘﺪم، وﻓﻖ ﻣﻨﻈﻮر ﺗﺎرﻳﺨﻲ وﺟﻴﻮﺳﻴﺎﺳﻲ، اﻟﺴﻴﺎﻗﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﺸﺎﺑﻜﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﻧﺸﺄت ﻓﻴﻬﺎ اﻟﺠﺰﻳﺮة وﺗﻄﻮرت. وﻋﻤﺪﻧﺎ إﻟﻰ رﺻﺪ اﻟﺮﻫﺎﻧﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ ﺷﺮﻋﺖ ﻟﻮﺟﻮدﻫﺎ، واﻟﻤﺴﺎرات اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺤﺮﻛﺖ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ، واﻟﻤﻀﺎﻣﻴﻦ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺳﻌﺖ إﻟﻰ ﺗﺮوﻳﺠﻬﺎ. وﺗ ﺨﻴﺮﻧﺎ أن ﻧﺒﺤﺚ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﻣﺤﺪدة ﺗﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﺎﻟﻤﺤﻴﻂ اﻗﻠﻴﻤﻲ وردات اﻓﻌﺎل اﻟﻤﺤﺘﻤﻠﺔ واﻟﻤﺘﺤﻘﻘﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺑﻌﺚ ﻗﻨﺎة ﻓﻀﺎﺋﻴﺔ ﺗﻘﻄﻊ ﻣﻊ إﻋﻼم اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻴﺔ ووﻇﺎﺋﻔﻪ اﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴﺪﻳﺔ وﺗﺒﻨﻲ ﻓﻀﺎءً اﺗﺼﺎﻟﻴًﺎ ﻟﻤﺼﻠﺤﺔ اﻟﺠﻤﻬﻮر وﻟﻴﺲ ﻟﻤﺼﻠﺤﺔ اﻟﺴﻠﻄﺔ. وﻧﺰﻋﻨﺎ، ﻓﻲ إﻃﺎر اﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﻋﻦ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﻴﺔ ﻫﺬه اﻟﻈﺎﻫﺮة، ﻧﺤﻮ ﺗﺘﺒﻊ اﻟﺤﺎﻟﺔ ا ﻋﻼﻣﻴﺔ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺳﻨﺔ 1996 وﻣﺎ ﺗﻜﻮن ﻗﺪ أﺳﻬﻤﺖ ﺑﻪ اﻟﺠﺰﻳﺮة ﻓﻲ إﺣﺪاث ﻧﻘﻠﺔ ﻧﻮﻋﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻤﺎرﺳﺔ اﻟﺼﻨﻌﺔ اﻋﻼﻣﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻧﺎﺣﻴﺔ، وﺗﺸﻜﻴﻞ رأي ﻋﺎم ﻳﺘﺠﺎوز اﻃﺎرﻳﻦ اﻟﻤﺤﻠﻲ واﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ ﻣﻦ ﻧﺎﺣﻴﺔ أﺧﺮى. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: ﻗﻨﺎة اﻟﺠﺰﻳﺮة، ﻗﻄﺮ، ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ. This paper seeks to determine why the countries blockading Qatar during the summer of 2017 demanded the closure of the Al Jazeera media network. The author sought to avoid conclusions rooted only in the immediate situation and instead worked towards a historical and geopolitical understanding of the interconnected factors in which Al Jazeera emerged and evolved. The paper also explores a number of the responses which Qatar's regional neighbors could be expected to take to a satellite broadcaster which broke with the tradition across the region of loyalist television stations which promoted the government's vision of the world. This paper seeks to understand the impact of Al Jazeera on the creation of a supra-national identity.

​This study is about the state-building impasse in the Arab World in General, and in Libya in particular. These states have suffered, since the beginning of the Arab Spring, from lack of political prospects, eruptions of civil wars, and obstacles of political settlements among different actors in the public space. These elements have inhibited the achievement of state building, the formation of a pluralist political system and the realization of an integrated national identity. This study endeavors to analyze the obstacles that have obstructed state-building in Libya until now. It focuses on tribalism and regionalism as main obstacles to that process. In addition, it analyzes the role of external factors and actors in the light of tribalism and regionalism. It argues that state-building in Libya has stumbled and has not followed a gradual path of modern state-building and formation, and it has not gone through the necessary stages of political transition. The former has trapped Libya within narrow loyalties which are short of the wider loyalties necessary for the national state.

Given the unrest boiling in the region, this paper considers the possibility of partitioning the countries of the Levant. Given the state of affairs and current political indicators in Syria and Iraq, which suggest the Kurds have started to regain their national unity and awareness, the group is now the only faction in the Levant fighting on nationalist or ethnic bases. What makes it easier for them to establish a viable Kurdish entity, at the local level, is the fact that they have huge economic, political, human, and military potential. This paper examines local and international contexts and obstacles to the establishment of a Kurdish state. It also argues that it will be unlikely, meanwhile, that sectarian entities could be created in Syria and Iraq given current local and international circumstances. Indeed, sectarian tension is nothing more than social tension that is the result of imbalance in the distribution of wealth and power, and the result of political authoritarianism. Therefore, the warring groups are not part of the framework of separatist tendencies; though they are liable to turn into sectarian nationalisms due to foreign intervention and agendas.

​This introductory essay highlights the considerations that prompted this in-depth look at the state of political science in Arab academic institutions, and made it essential. For political science, and the humanities and social sciences more generally, play a central role in any societal renaissance. Our experience of teaching graduate level political science at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies has already indicated to us that the situation of the discipline in Arab universities was not at all rosy. This impression was confirmed by many studies, conferences, and forums organized by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, which revealed a huge gap of knowledge in the field. This made it imperative to undertake an evaluation of what Arab universities were offering in their efforts to guide students to master the discipline up to global standards. The studies in this special issue, and the following one, highlight a multi-layered crisis in the field, impacting teaching, research, and employment prospects. The studies point to the late arrival of the discipline in the region, the limited areas covered, inadequate resources, and a lag behind international achievements in the field. The crisis is complicated by a number political, economic, social and structural obstacles that hold the discipline back from achieving its potential. This introduction summarizes and assesses the findings of the studies included in this special issue, and the second part in the following one, one emergence, evolution and achievements of the discipline, and the impediment obstructing its progress and maturity in the region. It focuses on case studies from Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, and Tunisia, adding surveys and reflections on methodologies and theoretical challenges. It concludes that despite some major achievements and progress, the biggest obstacle to progress in the discipline remains the absence of viable scholarly communities, both regionally and nationally in in each country. The essay offers proposals to address this problem.

This study advances a new approach to theorizing the Arab state after the popular uprisings. It does this in two steps. Suspending the western European model of state formation and bringing the Arab world's experience in conversation with other parts of the Global South, it examines alternative state formation and state building sequences, trajectories, and temporalities in the making of Arab states. It thus historicizes the process of state formation and state building in the Arab world as compared to the western European one and other regions in the Global South. This first step liberates us from explicit and implicit comparisons with the European model of state formation. The second step surveys alternative theorizations of the Arab state after the uprisings. Tracing the causal assumptions embedded in these theories reveals how much they rely on the European model of state formation and state building as an implicit point of analytic departure and critical comparison. This survey unpacks the assumptions these theories make about the state, the difference between states and regimes, state and non-state actors, the private and public realms, and the formal and informal sectors. The objective of this study is to not only de-exceptionalize states in the Arab world, but, more importantly, borrowing from Gurminder Bhambra, 'unmake' our understandings of state formation and state building in the Arab world and thus contribute, following Walter Mignolo, to a knowledge production that serves a form of 'epistemic reconstitution' of alternative historical trajectories and possibilities.

Examining the conditions of active groups in the Yemeni political arena, this paper will highlight the groups' most important wagers in managing the conflict. The many groups, each carrying out vendettas against past acts, create complex intersections. The coalition of the "clique" and Al-Islah party with the General People's Congress Party in the war of the summer of 1994 is one example, as is the alliance between the Houthis and the former regime against the forces of February 11, 2011 that drove Saleh out of power. So too can the role of Maj. Gen. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar in the confrontations with the Houthis in the six wars between 2004 and 2006 be read into the current political scenario. In explaining the division of national identity into southern and northern groups, and the popular mood against everything that is northern, the paper tackles the escalating sectarian conflict and the systematic undermining under Saleh's regime of the foundations of a modern civil state. It further addresses the weakening of modernizing forces in favor of traditional ones, and the weakening of the center in favor of the peripheries. The paper argues that any treatment that does not address these issues will be unsuccessful. It suggests that any political settlement among the warring parties could only postpone cyclical war and instability, and act as a gap for foreign intervention and tutelage.

The debate over the most appropriate model for governing Somalia continues. This article begins by synthetizing that debate using interviews, discussion groups, as well as document and literature analyses. It addresses issues of complaint with the current system, including lack of confidence, demands for democracy, access to basic services, and for a fair share of resources. These form the core of local interest in decentralized proposals. It analyses the regional and international context, as well as tribal politics as forces pushing for the current tribal federal project. The suitability of proposals for confederacy, federalism, government by consensus, and decentralization contained in the published literature are analyzed in this context, alongside the literature available on the subject. The paper finds that a decentralized system is the most appropriate governance model for Somalia, explaining how the flexible tools it involves will work to keep the country united, address local grievances, and legitimate interests of external Parties.

This study examines the constitutional management for political transition in Algeria following the popular movement of February 2019. After setting out the basic tenets of Transitional Constitutionalism, the study investigates the extent to which peaceful political change can be achieved through constitutional mechanisms or arrangements derived from inherited texts. In contrast to similar Arab cases, the Algerian experience was characterized by the adoption of a political plan to manage the transitional phase, based on constitutional measures derived from the texts in force. But it was not convincing for a large segment of the popular movement, who believed that these arrangements would restrict the path of change to reproduce the existing system at the expense of achieving peaceful political change. In this sense, managing the transitional political phase according to the applicable constitutional texts did not set a precedent. Rather, in Algeria, a kind of precedent was set in the restriction of the concept of constitutional solution to the literal requirements of the functional constitutional text, without partial constitutional amendments, nor a fundamental revision of the inherited legislative structure.