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ﺗﺴﻌﻰ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ إﻟﻰ اﺳﺘﻜﺸﺎف أﻧﻤﺎط اﻟﺘﻌﺒﺌﺔ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ ﻣﻨﺬ اﻧﻘﻼب اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻣﻦ ﺗﻤﻮز/ ﻳﻮﻟﻴﻮ 2013. وﺗﺨﺘﺒﺮ ردة ﻓﻌﻞ اﻟﻘﻮى اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻘﻤﻊ اﻟﺸﺪﻳﺪ اﻟﺬي ﻳﻤﺎرﺳﻪ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﻟﻤﺼﺮي ﺗﺠﺎﻫﻬﺎ، وﺗﺠﺎدل ﺑﺄﻧ ﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﺘﻀﻴﻴﻖ واﻟﻘﻤﻊ اﻟﺘﻲ ﻳﻤﺎرﺳﻬﺎ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم ﺗﺠﺎه اﻟﻘﻮى واﻟﺤﺮﻛﺎت اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ واﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ، ﻓﺈن ﺛﻤﺔ أﺷﻜﺎﻟ ﺎ وأﻧﻤﺎﻃ ﺎ ﻣﺘﻨﻮﻋﺔ ﻟﻠﺘﻌﺒﺌﺔ واﻻﺣﺘﺠﺎج ﻇﻬﺮت ﺧﻼل اﻟﺴﻨﻮات اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻴﺔ ردة ﻓﻌﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺎت اﻟﻘﻤﻌﻴﺔ. وﻗﺪ راوﺣﺖ ﻫﺬه اﻧﻤﺎط وا ﺷﻜﺎل ﺑﻴﻦ ﺗﻌﺒﺌﺔ ﺳﻠﻤﻴﺔ وأﺧﺮى ﻋﻨﻴﻔﺔ، ﻛﻤﺎ اﺧﺘﻠﻔﺖ ﻃﺒﻴﻌﺔ اﻟﻘﻀﺎﻳﺎ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺮﻛﺰ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺘﻌﺒﺌﺔ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻗﻀﺎﻳﺎ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ واﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ وﺣﻘﻮﻗﻴﺔ. ﻟﺬا ﺗﺤﺎول اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ اﺧﺘﺒﺎر اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ اﻟﺠﺪﻟﻴﺔ ﺑﻴﻦ اﻟﻘﻤﻊ وأﺷﻜﺎل اﻻﺣﺘﺠﺎج ودرﺟﺎﺗﻪ، وﻣﺎ إذا ﻛﺎن اﻟﻘﻤﻊ ﻳﺆدي إﻟﻰ ﺗﻘﻠﻴﻞ اﻻﺣﺘﺠﺎج أم زﻳﺎدﺗﻪ وﺗﺼﻌﻴﺪه، ﺑﻄﺮق وأﺳﺎﻟﻴﺐ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: اﻧﻘﻼب 2013، اﻟﺘﻌﺒﺌﺔ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ، اﻟﻤﻘﺎوﻣﺔ، ﻣﺼﺮ. This study explores political mobilization in Egypt after the coup of July 3, 2013, and the way in which regime oppression shaped the responses of political forces within the country. The author argues that novel and varied forms of political mobilization have emerged in Egypt in the past few years in spite of regime oppression. The nature of the response was also dictated on the relevant group’s focus. This paper shall attempt to unravel the dialectical relationship between state repression and political dissent in Egypt, seeking to determine the ways in which state repression shapes the form and intensity of political dissent

This paper adopts the assumption that the series of foreign interventions which served to transform the Syrian crisis from a domestic revolution into a regionalized, and later globalized, conflict were not the result of factors intrinsic to the revolution itself, but rather the consequences of dramatic changes sweeping across the entire Middle East following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. The fallout from 2003 included the collapse of the former tripartite of Arab regional powers: Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. For the first time, the non-Arab regional powers of Turkey and Iran came to be directly involved in intra-Arab affairs. The latter effectively had an overland border tying it to Syria's Mediterranean coast once the US withdrew the bulk of its military forces from Iraq in 2011. While the Syrian regime had worked to strengthen its ties to both Ankara and Tehran in the wake of its losses following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Syria would fall victim to regional power politics between its two regional neighbors. Once the Syrian revolution was militarized, in response to the Damascus regime's iron-fisted approach to peaceful popular protests, Turkish-Iranian rivalry over the future of Syria quickly became bloody. In an attempt to limit the extent of influence not only by Turkey but also its ally Iran, the Syrian regime resorted to seeking out additional foreign support, latterly from Russia.

ﺗﺸﻬﺪ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ ﻣﻨﺬ أواﺧﺮ أﻳﺎر/ ﻣﺎﻳﻮ 2017 أزﻣﺔ دﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻋﺪد ﻣﻦ دول ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﺘﻌﺎون اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻲ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ، ﻫﻲ ا ﻛﺜﺮ ﺣﺪةً ﻣﻨﺬ ﺗﺸﻜﻴﻞ اﻟﻤﺠﻠﺲ ﻋﺎم 1981. ﺑﺪأت ا زﻣﺔ ﺑﺤﻤﻠﺔ إﻋﻼﻣﻴّﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ دوﻟﺔ ﻗﻄﺮ، ﻗﺎدﺗﻬﺎ وﺳﺎﺋﻞ إﻋﻼم ﺳﻌﻮدﻳﺔ وإﻣﺎراﺗﻴﺔ. وﺑﺨﻼف أزﻣﺔ ﺳﺤﺐ اﻟﺴﻔﺮاء ﻋﺎم 2014، أﻗﺪﻣﺖ ﺛﻼث دول ﺧﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ ﻫﻲ اﻟﺴﻌﻮدﻳﺔ، واﻟﺒﺤﺮﻳﻦ، واﻣﺎرات ﻣﻊ ﻣﺼﺮ، ﻓﻲ اﻟﺨﺎﻣﺲ ﻣﻦ ﺣﺰﻳﺮان/ ﻳﻮﻧﻴﻮ 2017، ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﻄﻊ اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺎت اﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﺔ وﻓﺮض ﺣﺼﺎر ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﻄﺮ ﺛﻢ ﺳﻠ ﻤﺘﻬﺎ ﻗﺎﺋﻤﺔ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﺐ، وأﻣﻬﻠﺘﻬﺎ ﻋﺸﺮة أﻳﺎم ﻟﺘﻨﻔﻴﺬﻫﺎ أو ﻣﻮاﺟﻬﺔ ﺳﻴﻨﺎرﻳﻮﻫﺎت ﺗﺼﻌﻴﺪﻳﺔ. وﻓﻲ اﻃﺎر ﻧﻔﺴﻪ، ﺗﺴﻌﻰ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪول إﻟﻰ ﻋﺰل ﻗﻄﺮ دﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴًﺎ وﺳﻴﻠﺔ ﺟﺒﺎرﻫﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺨﻀﻮع، ﻏﻴﺮ أنّ اﻟﻘﻮى اﻟﻜﺒﺮى ﺗﻌﺎﻣﻠﺖ ﺑﻤﺴﺆوﻟﻴﺔ أﻛﺒﺮ ﺗﺠﺎه ازﻣﺔ، وﺑﺪأت ﺗﻘﻮم ﺑﺪور اﻟﻮﺳﻴﻂ ﻟﺘﺴﻮﻳﺘﻬﺎ. ﺗﺴﻠﻂ اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ اﻟﻀﻮء ﻋﻠﻰ ﺟﺬور ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ وﻣﺴﺎراﺗﻬﺎ اﻟﻤﺘﻌﺮﺟﺔ ﺑﺤﻜﻢ ﺗﺪاﺧﻞ أدوار ﻋﺪد ﻣﻦ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻠﻴﻦ اﻗﻠﻴﻤﻴﻦ واﻟﺪوﻟﻴﻴﻦ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ، ﺣﺼﺎر ﻗﻄﺮ، ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﺘﻌﺎون اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻲ. Since late May 2017, the Gulf region has been witness to the most intense diplomatic crisis since the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981. Tis paper attempts to highlight the roots of the present-day Gulf crisis and explore the potential, complicated outcomes, taking in the roles of various regional and global players. Te crisis begun with a vicious smear campaign against Qatar and led by Saudi- and Emirati-state owned media. In contrast to the 2014 diplomatic rif in which the Ambassadors of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain were withdrawn from Doha, this latest crisis also included a complete severing of diplomatic ties on the part of the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in addition to Egypt.To this was later added a complete blockade of Qatar by air, sea and land. Te countries leading the siege on Doha later presented a ten-point ultimatum to Qatar to fulfill within 10 days. A further attempt by the countries leading the blockade to isolate Qatar on the world stage failed, however, as leading world powers opted to play a more constructive role and mediate an end to the crisis.

The fall of Mosul on June 10, 2014 following the assault by armed factions, with ISIL at the forefront, represented a major point of transformation for the political scene in Iraq, particularly following the withdrawal of the Iraqi military and police, and the succession of cities in northern and western Iraq that fell to ISIL. This paper looks at the accelerating developments in the Iraqi crisis since 2014. It tries to understand and describe the event, and presents two current narratives: the first is that ISIL is the only actor responsible for the planning and implementation of what happened and is happening; and the second observes the revival of the Sunni opposition movements in the context of the Anbar uprising against the Iraqi government. The paper reviews the positions of the forces active internally: the Iraqi government and its allies, the armed factions and their allies, and the Iraqi political forces participating in the political process, and externally in the region and on the global scene.

This paper seeks to investigate the reasons behind the latest Palestinian national reconciliation, signed on April 23, 2014, and the circumstances in which it took place, and which prompted Fatah and Hamas to set aside their long-standing divisions which had pitted the West Bank against the Gaza Strip. The paper attempts to determine if this latest reconciliation between the two largest Palestinian political factions will be any more successful than previous attempts to end Palestinian in-fighting. It also seeks to understand what drove the present (Fatah-led) Palestinian National Authority based in Ramallah to defy both the White House and the Israeli government in seeking to turn a page with Hamas. Where do the prospects for the success of this latest reconciliation stand?

This article discusses the nuclear program agreement reached between the P5+1 group of nations and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The article sees the agreement as a historic achievement that may well have major effects in the region. The paper deals with the main features of the agreement and the circumstances that led to it, and enumerates its likely effects on the region and especially on the Palestine-Israel conflict, as well as Israel’s frustration with the Iranian nuclear program and its threats to strike it. The paper puts forth the possibility that the agreement will lead to positive results and cause stability in the region and lead to real improvement in Iranian-Gulf relations, particularly with Saudi Arabia, as well as resolve the problems of Shia minorities in some Gulf states.

Since the time of President Thomas Jefferson, and on through the presidents of the 20th century, the United States has talked about itself as the propagator, protector, and defender of democracy around the world. Yet America has never showed any qualms of forming military and political alliances with authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. The US justifies these international alliances on the basis that “not all dictatorships in the world are enemies of the United States, but all the United States’ enemies are dictatorships.” The US therefore adopted a two-track diplomacy: while working to spread democracy (directly or by means of international organizations and NGOs) the US has no issue in supporting autocratic governments when its interests are involved. How did US policy apply to the democratic transformation in the former Eastern bloc states in Europe on the eve of the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and subsequently, when American values and interests went hand in hand, and how did it then apply to the Arab Spring of 2011, when US values and interests were congruent in some cases and out of sync in others, according to the situation in each country and its strategic importance from America’s perspective? What are the results of these policies and what differences emerge from such a comparison of the Arab and East Europe cases.

China’s foreign policy is concerned with strengthening relations with states of significance in the world, whether large or small. Its strategic culture plays a key role in shaping its vision of the international order, its objectives, and the tools it employs to enhance its global standing. China has primarily relied on soft power instruments in its relations with other countries, particularly in the economic sphere, and it recognizes the importance of the State of Qatar within the Arab region in general and among energy-exporting countries in particular. Accordingly, China has concluded long-term contracts for the import of substantial quantities of natural gas and has been constructing massive liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers for Qatar. Although Qatar is considered a key ally of the United States, China and Qatar signed a strategic partnership in 2014 covering multiple fields. Both countries seek to further develop this partnership in alignment with China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Qatar’s National Vision 2030.

The potential impact of the Covid- 19 pandemic on populist governments has been the subject of a heated debate among specialists. There are scholars for who the pandemic will negatively impact populist governments. Here, populist governments are perceived as ill-equipped to respond to the multifaced challenges risen by the complexity of the pandemic. Conversely, many scholars that argue that the pandemic will strengthen populist governments because populism flourishes during crises. This article contests these two narratives. It asserts that any evaluation of the impact of the pandemic on populist governments should distinguish between their actions and their discourse. Thus, the study undertakes an analysis of US president Trump’s discourse, demonstrating that during the first year of the pandemic, it is twofold. First appears a “disconnected discourse” that continuously questions the reality of the pandemic, despite the important proactive actions taken by his government to mitigate the pandemic's economic, social, and sanitary impacts. Second, a “demonstrative discourse” arises, in which the pandemic was instrumentalized to enhance the legitimacy of one of the most important and controversial elements of the populist discourse: the idea of external threat.

A chemical weapons attack by the Syrian regime on August 21, 2013, led to a massacre of civilians in the towns of East Ghouta and West Ghouta on the outskirts of Damascus and marked a turning point in the Syrian conflict. US President Barack Obama had previously undertaken to respond militarily if such an attack took place, provided that Congress would support such a decision. Such a direct US military intervention remained likely despite opposition among the American public and within Congress itself, up to and until a Russian proposal, quickly accepted by the Assad regime in Damascus, which would place all of Syria’s chemical weapons under international supervision before they were destroyed by Moscow. This paper examines how the Obama White House dealt with the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. The paper also deals with declining international interest in a diplomatic resolution to the Syrian crisis, with the world community now shifting its focus from punishing the Assad regime to accepting the destruction of those weapons.