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In association with the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies held a three-day conference (January 21-23, 2016) to study the developments associated with the Arab Spring in the intervening five years.

​Five years prior, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies brought together a group of young activists whose dedication and courage gave ris eto what would become the Arab Spring. The group of activists, gathered again in Doha on January 15-16, 2016, appeared to have been completely changed by the intervening months. With the initial ecstasy of the fall of tyrants across the region now faded, the young revolutionary activists had matured ideologically and politically. It was a maturity born of suffering and setbacks, and revealed a realism towards the coming battle for freedom. One unchanging fact was their continued hope for freedom, and their belief in its possibility.

​In this interview, Cheikh Rached Ghannouchi recounts his experiences of working with his “brothers” in the Ennahda movement,who, he claims, criticized his “ad hominem” attacks on ousted president Benali, in contrast to party policy—at the time—which forbade direct criticism of the former president. Cheikh Ghannouchi also reasserts his previous position that Islamists should avoid taking the reins of power—even when they win elections. This is to acknowledge, he says, the regional and global orders whichs imply would not tolerate Islamists in power.

Examined in this article are a number of aspects of Tunisia's 2014 constitution, specifically, the relationship between the presidency and the parliament; the status of the newly created constitutional court; the higher judicial council; constitutional controls and restrictions; the role of religion and the status of women in the new constitution; and administrative decentralization within the constitution. Adopting a comparative approach, the author examines each of these topics in their proper regional and historical context. This allows for a clearer understanding of what factors have allowed Tunisia's constitutional politics to advance so quickly when compared to other states in the region. Through successful dialogue, the Tunisian people were able to prove that ideological differences do not necessarily lead to conflict or stagnation. The author further argues that the pragmatic approach of Tunisian parties to the national dialogue provided a model of conflict resolution to be emulated across the globe.

The question of post-revolutionary transitional justice is a novel feature of Arab political and legal culture. During the early stages of what came to be known as the “Arab Spring”, human rights organizations at home and abroad presented principles of transitional justice not only as an essential means to address violations of human rights of the past through legal and judicial channels, but also as an important stepping stone to accomplishing the broader aim of a democratic transition in the Arab region. The extent to which political actors adopted these demands varied with the revolutionary zeal of the moment in question. Ultimately, however, revolutionary zeal and the maximalist demands of the revolutionaries prevented the implementation of lessons learned from earlier post-revolutionary transitions around the world. This paper will illustrate the above by examining examples of transitional justice in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and compare these to experiences in non-Arab countries. It affirms that social reconciliation, peace and prosperity will only be possible through the establishment of both “truth” and justice.

The major turning points of the Syrian revolution, beginning with the earliest public demonstrations on March 15, 2011, are here examined. The author revisits speeches made by President Bashar Al Assad in the early days of the uprising, in which he was quoted as discounting the likelihood of a revolution affecting Syria the way it did other Arab countries on the grounds that his government’s policies were in line with public sentiment. The paper then revisits the regime’s excessively violent repression of the first peaceful protests, which led to the militarization of the revolution. The author holds the international community, including the Arab League and the United Nations culpable for ensuing large scale slaughter of Syrian civilians, standing idly by even as it became apparent that Assad was mercilessly killing his own people. Meanwhile, Syria has become the site for a number of world and regional powers—including the United States, the United Kingdom, France Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, China, Iran and Russia—to advance their fundamentally incompatible policies. As a consequence of these competing foreign interventions, the author contends that the return of normalcy in Syria will be impossible for the foreseeable future.

This paper adopts the assumption that the series of foreign interventions which served to transform the Syrian crisis from a domestic revolution into a regionalized, and later globalized, conflict were not the result of factors intrinsic to the revolution itself, but rather the consequences of dramatic changes sweeping across the entire Middle East following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. The fallout from 2003 included the collapse of the former tripartite of Arab regional powers: Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. For the first time, the non-Arab regional powers of Turkey and Iran came to be directly involved in intra-Arab affairs. The latter effectively had an overland border tying it to Syria's Mediterranean coast once the US withdrew the bulk of its military forces from Iraq in 2011. While the Syrian regime had worked to strengthen its ties to both Ankara and Tehran in the wake of its losses following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Syria would fall victim to regional power politics between its two regional neighbors. Once the Syrian revolution was militarized, in response to the Damascus regime's iron-fisted approach to peaceful popular protests, Turkish-Iranian rivalry over the future of Syria quickly became bloody. In an attempt to limit the extent of influence not only by Turkey but also its ally Iran, the Syrian regime resorted to seeking out additional foreign support, latterly from Russia.

This paper presents Arab public attitudes towards the popular revolutions which arose in 2011. The results, adapted from a series of Arab public opinion surveys conducted in a number of countries over several years, show that 34% of the Arab public view positively the Arab popular revolutions and the accomplishments achieved by the revolutions (either “very positive” or “positive to some extent”). This contrasts with 59% of the public which had varyingly negative (either “negative to some extent” or “very negative”) views of the Arab revolutions and the changes they brought. Only 7% of respondents declined to offer an opinion. Notably, only 10% of respondents offered the view that the revolutions and their outcomes were “very positive”, compared to 34% who held that they were “very negative”.

​This report highlights some of the major milestones of the Arab democratic transition during 1/11/2015- 27/12/2015

This report chronicles some of the most significant developments relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict during 1/11/2015 -30/12/2015​