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The relationship between Iran, Syria and Hezbollah and its effect on the Lebanese state is here examined. Divided into five parts the study first tackles Iran’s movements in Lebanese space and their connection to Hezbollah’s evolution. The second part focuses on Syria’s intervention in Lebanon and on Hezbollah as an intervention tool. The third part describes Hezbollah’s relationship with Lebanon since the party’s creation as well as the Taif Agreement and the subsequent change in the foundations of that relationship. The fourth part sheds light on the intervention of Iran and Syria in the relationship between Hezbollah and the Lebanese state. Finally, the fifth part explores Hezbollah’s intervention in the Syrian crisis and its repercussions on Lebanon.

The Gulf states, collectively and individually, no longer enjoy the luxury of stability and security they did over the three decades that preceded the outbreak of the Arab Spring. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) now faces new kinds of threats more serious than any since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime at the hands of American forces in 2003. Notably, to date the GCC States have been among the states that have benefited most from the fall of dictatorial regimes in countries such as Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. The UAE, for instance, has benefited in particular, becoming the favored destination for direct foreign investment in the region. The growing spread of regional instability however has created what could be called an unstable backyard for the Gulf, as its security and stability is threated in unprecedented fashion on a number of fronts, locally, regionally, and internationally. The GCC states must therefore adjust and change their political and strategic practices and policies so as to become more capable and more flexible in confronting and managing conflicts and crises. Ultimately, it is not just their security which is under threat but their very existence.

Book Title: The Lost Narrative [Arabic] Author: Farouk Sharaa Edition: 1st Year of publication: 2015 Publisher: ACRPS, Doha/Beirut Pages: 495

​This study examines the management of ethnic and social diversity in the military by comparing the United States of America, a reference case, and Saudi Arabia, which is still in an early stage of institutionalization. It uses a military-sociological approach, which posits that the military reflects the socio-cultural structure of society. It focuses on four key societal indicators: ethnicity, gender, sectarian affiliation, and tribal identity. It argues that the effectiveness of diversity management depends on integrating both normative (legislation and policies) and practical (implementation) levels, while accounting for the societal specificity of each case. The US experience shows that the presence of both normative and practical frameworks does not necessarily yield an ideal type, due to persistent representation challenges, particularly at senior military ranks. In contrast, the Saudi case is characterized by the absence of a clear normative framework and the novelty of the experience, despite emerging indicators of openness, especially after 2017. The study concludes that managing diversity is not merely a social demand, but also a prerequisite for strengthening military effectiveness and institutional cohesion​.

This study adopts a comparative approach to investigate the impact of the reciprocal fears of internal and external parties on the stances of key actors during the 2011 transitions. Apparently, the uncertainty that accompanies any democratic elections has not been a local factor in the Arab cases because regional and international forces have an interest in hindering democracy, being a potential threat to the status quo. The study examines four interrelated problems related to external factors. It concludes that the external factors that have hindered democracy in non-Arab cases were not inevitable because addressing them seems to have been related to changes in the international system and the emergence of domestic democratic blocs that are able to exert pressure on external forces and get them to change their positions.

Armed Houthis under the banner of Ansar Allah took control of Yemen’s capital Sanaa by force on September 11, 2014. This date represented a milestone on the path of changes witnessed by Yemen in the recent past and whose features were outlined from the beginning of 2011. This paper considers the factors and reasons that led to the fall of Yemen to the Houthis, such as the nature of the various divisions in Yemen, the roles of the army, former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, Al Qaeda, the truth about the conflict between the Houthis and the Islah Party, the dispute between president Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi and prime minister Mohammed Salim Basindawa, the role of the Gulf states and Iran, and the ambitions of the Houthis. The paper also touches upon the outcome of the conflict and the future of Yemen in light of continued Houthi efforts to spread their control over the biggest possible part of the country.

This paper explores Arab public attitudes towards the proliferation of nuclear weapons across the Middle East. The results of the Arab Opinion Index presented here indicate that a majority of the Arab public has an in-principle opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Nonetheless, there are important caveats to this opposition: Israel’s present-day monopoly of nuclear weapons is a limiting factor to this principled opposition. Respondents to the survey, who also overwhelmingly view Israel as the country which poses the single greatest to regional security, contend that Israeli possession of nuclear weapons justifies other states in the region seeking to obtain them.

The literature on state capacity is often at odds with what constitutes state capacity, how to operationalize it, and how to measure it. Nevertheless, it is important for us to attempt this endeavor given the importance of state capacity, and its effect on a number of political and social dynamics. With the proliferation of quality surveys in the Arab world in recent years, we also have an unprecedented opportunity to examine state capacity in a new light, according to citizen perceptions in addition to material measures. Thus, in this paper I will examine variations of state capacity measurements using the Arab Opinion Index data. I will provide evidence to show that many political phenomena can only be understood if the conditions surrounding state capacity are accounted for.

The study concerns the armed Shiism in Iraq and its most prominent embodiment, the Mahdi Army (MA). It deals with the relationship between the MA and the Sadrist movement, as a case og the relationship between political organizations and their armed wings. It explores the specificity of this relationship, whereby the MA arose within the Najaf Shiite's Hawza . Hence, the MA was not a typical armed wing, but was more like a general beacon of mobilization for the Shiite community in Iraq. MA was the first organizational step for the movement as much as its presence as the armed wing remained an essential pillar, controlling and determining the development of the movement. The study argues that the debate over the extent of armed action led to a struggle over the identity of the movement, between two wings: remaining an armed organization, or turning to political action. Therefore, the leadership's efforts to control MA were intersects with the political struggle between its wings.

US and Gulf relations are based on more than self-interest, but common selfinterest is always a key (or the key) factor in shaping an alliance and strategic relationship. The key common self-interests that drives US and Arab Gulf relations are security – the need to deal with Iran, fighting extremism, and securing the flow of petroleum exports out of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula to meet the needs of the global economy, and to provide the key source of income for the Gulf states. This study explains why the United States maintains close ties with its Arab strategic partners in the Gulf. The study finds out that the US and its Gulf strategic partners face serious challenges, including domestic political change in the US, divisions between Arab states, the impact of regional conflicts and instability, and the growing role of non-Western powers.