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It is not easy to talk about the future of the Houthi movement given the current circumstances in Yemen. The facts on the ground are changing rapidly, making it difficult to predict the course of events and the future of the actors. Making things more difficult is the complexity of the landscape, the opposing agendas of internal and external actors, and the nature of the Houthi movement itself, which has mysterious objectives and organizational structure as well as limited experience and secret internal and external alliances. Accordingly, what can be said about the future of the Houthi movement cannot go much beyond theoretical opinions, whose conclusions could change as a result of events that are not taken into account. Therefore, this paper will develop scenarios that could benefit future studies where the level of certainty is very low. This approach gives us the ability to forecast the future with a high level of coherence within the prevailing conditions, despite some apparent contradictions.

In September 2018 it will have been thirteen years since the referendum on the reconciliation plan in Algeria. This paper considers the details and achievements of the plan by investigation of the concept and objectives of national reconciliation and the historical framework of the Algerian crisis, critiquing the plan in order to establish new horizons for reconciliation. It examines the historical context of Algeria's national reconciliation, and then the chronology of the path to national reconciliation. It then moves on to study the Algerian journey of reconciliation through a thorough reading of the draft Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation. Finally, the paper determines the extent of the advances made in establishing peace and coexistence in the Algerian homeland and also identifies some of the gaps in the reconciliation experience, and suggests ways to unlock potential achievements.

Book Title: De quoi la Palestine est-elle le nom? [Translated into Arabic]

The youth revolution in Yemen at the beginning of 2011 kindled a ray of hope that the walls of tyranny could be broken down and the country could be pulled back from the clutches of narrowly defined identities. It sharpened the will that formed a “historical bloc” capable of rendering democratic transition successful. However, the youth revolution never transcended the ecstasy of a romantic revolutionary act to reach the stage of building institutions capable of enforcing respect for the law and accommodating ethnic, tribal, sectarian and political pluralism. This study addresses the impact of the Saudi-Iranian role on Yemen's transition. It is premised on considerable importance attached regional factors, which perhaps have even greater influence than domestic factors on the outcome of the Yemeni revolution. The study stresses that the effects and limits of regional factors are related to several variables, such as the vicissitudes of international politics; international and regional balances and interests; as well as the strategic location of the country subject to interference; its resources; its internal dynamics; the maturity of local elites; the weight of political opposition; and the quality of institutions.

According to the World Bank indicators, the Maghreb youth unemployment rate is among the highest in the world. After the Arab Spring uprisings (2011), the youth aspirations and expectations clashed with the economic difficulties and political reality in the Maghreb countries, which are unable to provide employment opportunities and efficient solutions to youth major problems. In the light of this situation, we analyzed (using quantitative methods) the satisfaction degree of young people under the effect of economic challenges and political transformations in the Maghreb region. It is clear from the results that the Maghreb youth adhere more to the economic priority, despite other priorities related to administrative corruption, the lack of public services, the fight against terrorism and insecurity. The second conclusion is that the youth economic expectations create a kind of homogeneity in this region. In all the observed countries, most young people consider the economy as the first priority, as well as the entire population.

Given the unrest boiling in the region, this paper considers the possibility of partitioning the countries of the Levant. Given the state of affairs and current political indicators in Syria and Iraq, which suggest the Kurds have started to regain their national unity and awareness, the group is now the only faction in the Levant fighting on nationalist or ethnic bases. What makes it easier for them to establish a viable Kurdish entity, at the local level, is the fact that they have huge economic, political, human, and military potential. This paper examines local and international contexts and obstacles to the establishment of a Kurdish state. It also argues that it will be unlikely, meanwhile, that sectarian entities could be created in Syria and Iraq given current local and international circumstances. Indeed, sectarian tension is nothing more than social tension that is the result of imbalance in the distribution of wealth and power, and the result of political authoritarianism. Therefore, the warring groups are not part of the framework of separatist tendencies; though they are liable to turn into sectarian nationalisms due to foreign intervention and agendas.

European Jihadism has evolved since it first appeared in the 1990s. In many European countries, at the outset, it tended to be restricted to the "disaffected youth! from the poor suburbs (France) or poor inner city areas (UK), but it rapidly spread to the middle classes, whether Muslims or converts. In 2013, with the civil war in Syria, Jihadism underwent major changes. Before that it was restricted to a few hundred people, but it has now risen to several thousand. At the same time, adolescents have become numerous and the number of girls and converts has sharply increased. The aim of the article is to propose an understanding of the mindset of these new social actors in the light of the internal conditions of European societies.

ISIL is the legitimate child of the crisis of the political regime that developed in Iraq after 2003. The eight-year rule of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki instituted a monopoly

ﻓﻲ ﺧﻀﻢ اﺧﺬ واﻟﺮدّ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﺳُ ﻤّﻰ إﻋﻼﻣﻴًﺎ "ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ"، ﺑﻴﻦ دوﻟﺔ ﻗﻄﺮ واﻟﺪول ا رﺑﻊ؛ اﻟﺴﻌﻮدﻳﺔ، وا ﻣﺎرات، واﻟﺒﺤﺮﻳﻦ، وﻣﺼﺮ، ﻳﻤﻜﻦ ﻣﻘﺎرﺑﺔ ﻫﺬه اﻟﻤﺴﺄﻟﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻋﺪة ﻃﺮق ﺗﺤﺎول اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ ﺗﺴﻠﻴﻂ اﻟﻀﻮء ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ. وﻳﺴﺘﻠﺰم اﺧﺘﻼط اوراق ﻓﻲ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻤﺸﻬﺪ اﻟﻤﻌﻘﺪ، اﻟﺘﻔﻜﻴﻚ وإﻋﺎدة اﻟﺘﺮﻛﻴﺐ؛ ن ﺛﻤﺔ "ﺗﺸﺎﺑﻜ ﺎ" ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ، و"اﺷﺘﺒﺎﻛ ﺎ" ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ أﺧﺮى، وﺛﻤﺔ "إﺟﻬﺎض" ﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ ﻋﺮﺑﻲﱟ ﻣﺄﻣﻮلٍ، وﺛﻤﺔ دﻛﺘﺎﺗﻮرﻳﺔ ﺿﺎرﺑﺔ ﺟﺬورﻫﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﻨﻒ، وﻫﻨﺎك ﻗﻮى ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﺑﺎوﻫﺎم، وأﻃﺮوﺣﺎﺗﻬﺎ ﻣﻔﺎرﻗﺔ ﻟﻠﻌﺼﺮ. ﻻ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ وﺻﻒ اﻟﺨﻼﻓﺎت ﺑﻴﻦ ﻗﻄﺮ واﻟﺪول ارﺑﻊ ﺑﺎﻟﺤﺪﻳﺜﺔ. وﻟﻜﻦ ﺳﺎد اﻋﺘﻘﺎد ﻟﺪى اﻟﺒﻌﺾ أنّ ﻛﻞ ذﻟﻚ اﻟﺘﺎرﻳﺦ أﺻﺒﺢ وراء اﻟﺠﻤﻴﻊ، وﺗﻢّ ﺗﺠﺎوزه ﺑﺴﺒﺐ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺠﺪات اﻟﺘﻲ أﺣﺪﺛﻬﺎ ﻗﻴﺎم اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ اﻟﺤﺪﻳﺜﺔ، وﻫﻮ ﺗﻮﺻﻴﻒ ﻏﻴﺮ دﻗﻴﻖ ﺑﺪﻟﻴﻞ ﺗﺠﺪد ازﻣﺔ ﺑﺤﺪة أﺷﺪ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ، اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ، اﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻮن، ارﻫﺎب. This paper will attempt to approach the present crisis between Qatar and a group of four countries formed of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt from a number of perspectives. The complexity of the present situation means that a process of deconstruction is required before the problem can be solved. Specifically, the present crisis reveals how the countries involved are both intertwined and in conflict, simultaneously; and how the players in question are in conflict over attempts to undo the Arab Spring. The conflicts between Qatar and the remaining countries have roots which stretch into history, and they also demonstrate that any belief that the birth of the modern nation-state would end those rivalries was misguided.