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Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s call for national dialogue marks a critical turning point in the nation’s recent politics. This paper presents the conditions that led to Bashir’s call for the first time after his nearly 25-year rule, and describes the serious and genuine nature of this call, as well as the positions of the opposing parties. It then goes on to explain some of the challenges that might hinder the success of Bashir’s call for dialogue, in particular the extent of concessions that president Bashir and his ruling party will have to make in order for the dialogue to be successful. It further examines the extent of the flexibility that the civil and armed oppositions should maintain if this last opportunity is not to be missed to save the country from falling into a state of turmoil. This internal Sudanese situation is read within the context of the regional and international conflicts that impact the call for dialogue. Finally, the paper sets out the possible negative and positive impacts of the international situation regarding the possibility of Sudan’s recovery from its current deteriorating situation.

Since the publication of Horowitz's Ethnic Groups in Conflict, comparative political scientists have increasingly converged on their classification of ethnic identities. But there is no agreement on the definition that justifies this classification— and the definitions that individual scholars propose do not match their classifications. I propose a definition that captures the conventional classification of ethnic identities in comparative political science to a greater degree than the alternatives. According to this definition, ethnic identities are a subset of identity categories in which membership is determined by attributes associated with, or believed to be associated with, descent (described here simply as descent-based attributes). I argue, on the basis of this definition, that ethnicity either does not matter or has not been shown to matter in explaining most outcomes to which it has been causally linked by comparative political scientists. These outcomes include violence, democratic stability, and patronage.

External influence has played a central role in the Yemeni conflict. Powers seeking to extend power and establish dominance have manipulated Yemen’s diversity as a way to gain influence. Other powers seem to be using Yemen as a way to step into regional power vacuums. At the same time, diplomatic activity has been used as a way to maintain interests and sustain polar uniqueness. Each of these areas of influence are key to understanding the current conflict and for determining a path ahead. This paper examines these avenues and specifically looks at key developments leading up to the current conflict. These include the six wars waged by Ali Abdullah Saleh against the Houthis, the political game shifts in Yemen, the weakening of the state and other factors that led to the take-over Yemen’s capital city of Sanaa.

This paper explores the roots and developments of the rivalry between the Houthis and the Salafis, based on the recent Houthi blockade and armed attack on Dammaj town in Saada governorate in north Yemen. Illustrated by the author is a sectarian map of the region and its three components: the dominant Zaidi sect and the two emerging sects in the region—Houthis and Salafis. The paper also sheds light on the historical circumstances that bred the status quo and tackles the Yemeni government’s sectarian manipulation during the rule of deposed President Ali Abdullah Saleh. This led to the militarization of the region and turned it into a hot spot. The paper also describes the stance of the current government vis-à-vis the violence in Saada, and notes how its negative reaction could result in the expansion of strife in Yemen and could push the country into a civil war.

This text is an introduction to ACRPS published The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Daesh). It deals with a range of methodological questions to help understand the appearance of Islamic State (Daesh) as a phenomenon. It argues that as a complex, political, social and religious phenomenon, Daesh requires an approach that takes multifaceted and pluralistic perspectives. Hence, an integrated methodological approach, in which disciplines simultaneously overlap and reflect, examines Daesh within its context without neglecting its intellectual and religious characteristics. This paper argues that the existence of Daesh relies solely on war and expansion; once expansion ceases, extinction begins. It is a system that is built around a hostile environment, only remaining viable through a continuous state of expansion and regression. This introduction argues that the existence of Daesh relies solely on war and expansion; once expansion ceases, extinction begins. It is a system that is built around a hostile environment, only viable through a continuous state of expansion and regression.

From an economic standpoint, this study aims to comprehend the reasons for the popular uprising outbreak, as well as the chances for democratic transition from a political economy angle. It examines the influence of the rentier state economic growth regime on the political prospects of citizens, particularly young people, who are convinced that such a regime will not lead to their ultimate safety, but rather to their economic marginalization due to the system's poor performance. It turns out that adopting a more comprehensive and long-term growth approach has become even more critical. As time goes by, it became evident that reform comes at a hefty cost on all fronts. Rather than being a tributary and assistance to the continuance of economic reforms, political reforms became an impediment and took on even greater importance than economic reform itself. The Algerian situation, according to the study, is an example of the intractable model of democratic transition in all its manifestations, since the incumbent system was pleased with restricted constitutional arrangements, notably elections. This has strengthened the rentier state in all its forms, including the political system's fragility and the succession of crises it has faced since independence till today.

​This introductory essay highlights the considerations that prompted this in-depth look at the state of political science in Arab academic institutions, and made it essential. For political science, and the humanities and social sciences more generally, play a central role in any societal renaissance. Our experience of teaching graduate level political science at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies has already indicated to us that the situation of the discipline in Arab universities was not at all rosy. This impression was confirmed by many studies, conferences, and forums organized by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, which revealed a huge gap of knowledge in the field. This made it imperative to undertake an evaluation of what Arab universities were offering in their efforts to guide students to master the discipline up to global standards. The studies in this special issue, and the following one, highlight a multi-layered crisis in the field, impacting teaching, research, and employment prospects. The studies point to the late arrival of the discipline in the region, the limited areas covered, inadequate resources, and a lag behind international achievements in the field. The crisis is complicated by a number political, economic, social and structural obstacles that hold the discipline back from achieving its potential. This introduction summarizes and assesses the findings of the studies included in this special issue, and the second part in the following one, one emergence, evolution and achievements of the discipline, and the impediment obstructing its progress and maturity in the region. It focuses on case studies from Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, and Tunisia, adding surveys and reflections on methodologies and theoretical challenges. It concludes that despite some major achievements and progress, the biggest obstacle to progress in the discipline remains the absence of viable scholarly communities, both regionally and nationally in in each country. The essay offers proposals to address this problem.

The study aims to investigating the matter of constructing a statistical index to measure the level of political culture in the Arab countries, based on methodological triangulation; that is, using more than one tool to identify the characteristics of political culture and its component elements, as well as collecting and classifying data and determining the optimal statistical method to calculate the sub-indices with a focus on quantitative measurement. Depending on the results of the exploratory study, the level of the political culture indicators in concerning the cognitive and affective dimensions is slightly below average (50 points out of 100), which is an encouraging outcome in a context characterized by low educational level and rural concentration. On the other hand, the political culture index concerning the evaluative dimension recorded a rather low score (37 points out of 100), reflecting an insufficiency of interest in making judgments and attitudes towards political institutions and issues in the community study.

In December of 2013, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan reshuffled his cabinet, dismissing four ministers linked to a nationwide corruption scandal. Some of the ministers ousted from their positions were involved in the Halkbank scandal, a financial institution involved in the processing of payments for Iranian natural gas supplied to Turkey, and which the US has long accused of violating the terms of international sanctions on Tehran. Erdogan has accused exiled Turkish cleric Fathallah Gulen, a former ally of the AKP leader, of orchestrating these scandals within a wider “international conspiracy” aimed at bringing the AKP government down in retaliation for its regional and international policies. This paper shall examine how the present conflict between Erdogan and his erstwhile ally Gulen will influence Turkish politics, noting that Gulen’s acolytes pose a much greater risk to the AKP than all of the secular Turkish opposition parties combined. ​

​يتضمــن هــذا التقريــر توثيقًــا لأهم الوقائــع الفلســطينية والأحداث المرتبطــة بالصــراع العربي - الإسرائيلي في المدة 1 كانون الثاني/ يناير - 28 شباط/ فبراير 2018.