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The struggle for political legitimacy has been central to political polarization in Egypt since the 2013 coup. Given the regime's pronounced authoritarian features, the traditional form of legal electoral legitimacy proved insufficient and ineffective. As a result, the regime adopted alternative strategies to reinforce its political legitimacy. Drawing on theories of political legitimacy and literature on citizenship in authoritarian regimes, this study explores the measures and practices implemented by the July 2013 regime to achieve legitimacy across its three dimensions: the system's effectiveness and competence, citizens' beliefs in its legitimacy, and their behaviours that signal recognition.

In recent years, phrases such as “migrant crisis” and “illegal migration” have gained increased currency as means of describing larger waves of migration to Europe. International law rests on the assumption that refuge and asylum are always “legitimate”, thus failing to provide a justification for the use of terms such as “illegal migration”. As a response, in this paper the author adopts the term “illicit migration” to refer to undeclared migration which does not pass through official channels, and which, he argues, is a clearer expression of the phenomenon currently underway, in which large numbers of migrants seek to secretly enter the borders of their destination countries. The topic under discussion has particular importance due to the reflexive way in which European countries tie migration to extremism. This has spurred European nations to increase reliance on an “iron shield” erected to isolate themselves from those landing on their shores from the southern end of the Mediterranean, and with no distinctions made between refugees legitimately seeking refuge from armed conflict and those seeking to “ride the wave”.

Current Russian policy is based on a nationalism that rests on state capitalism, and that speaks to nationalist sentiment built on the rejection of Western exploitation. This patriotic nationalist position becomes evident through the lack of any ideologically derived principles driving Russia’s position: state interests including national security are what drive current policy. The drivers for this new Russian policy mean that Russia can simultaneously suppress a separatist movement by armed force in one region and champion another separatist movement with armed force in another. In this sense, the Russian Federation has no fixed positions but only fixed interests, and even its interests can change. In Syria, critics suggest that the proximate aim of Russia’s policy is to defend the Assad regime, Moscow’s ally, from collapse. Saving the regime is not, however, an end in itself. Rather, it is a means of self-assertion and another step toward the goal of becoming a global superpower, this time in the Middle East. If the Syrian regime believes its rescue is the exclusive objective of Russia’s intervention, it is wrong. The exertion of Russian influence will at most provide a temporary respite. The mere fact of Russia’s military presence in Syria means that the regime is no longer master of its own destiny and no longer even a player on the international stage, since Russia is now its proxy at any international negotiations.

This paper uses the findings of the 2015 Arab Opinion Index to gauge Arab public attitudes towards the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action”, the international agreement which brought to a close a world crisis over Iran’s nuclear program. The paper also explores Arab attitudes towards the possibility of Iranian non-compliance with the terms of the agreement as well as the possible transformation of Iran into a nuclear capable state. The findings reflect a sharp division within Arab public opinion: 43% of respondents expressed the belief that Iran would abide by the terms of the agreement, with 46% predicting that the country would not follow through with the terms of the multilateral treaty.

Morocco's participation in the Saudi-led coalition was formed to confront the expansion of Houthi rebel control over the Yemeni state. This study gives an overview of the factors that led to the expansion of the geopolitical and geostrategic depth of the Gulf States to include a number of Arab countries, all the way to the Kingdom of Morocco. The paper discusses the gains Morocco made as a result of joining Operation Decisive Storm. Morocco faces similar challenges from extremist groups, making participation in the operation an opportunity it can benefit from later in the event it needs to tackle similar militias in the Sahara. In addition to the economic and political reasons for joining the coalition, the geostrategic shifts in the Arab region and the rise of the threat of extremist ideological forces in the region has prompted Morocco and the Gulf States to develop a new vision for relations on the basis of cross-border national security. The paper finally tackles the shift Morocco's participation has represented, examining King Mohammed VI's preference for more rapprochement with the European neighborhood.

Since the mid-1990s Morocco has traversed several stages of political and constitutional reforms. These were characterized by a restructuring of the political field in keeping with constitutional methodology and political consensus and were the precondition for the process of rapprochement between political actors. However, if this rapprochement or political openness transformed the electoral process into something diminished in practical terms, it in turn intensified the expansion of the protest arena, the accumulation of skills and experience among protesters, the development of more independent coordination capabilities, and the weakening of the regime's polarizing tendencies. This development imposes upon the political class a renewal of its discourse and means and modalities of communication, in the short and medium terms, to prevent continued erosion of its credibility.

The contemporary Yemeni state is characterized by strife and complications involving all aspects of the state and society. These complexities go back to the era of its inception and continue today, leaving serious implications for the political, geographic and social unity of Yemen. There are very clear intersections between the internal (political, economic, social) and external components, which contribute to the sustained crisis in the Yemeni state. Successive Yemeni governments have failed to fulfill their assumed duties and functions, thus preventing them from dealing with all kinds of foreign interventions. Moreover, tribal and sectarian roles in Yemen have historically prevailed over other Yemeni political roles, which have not succeeded in transferring Yemen to civil rule. Nor have they managed to build a democratic model that achieves stability and allows Yemenis to participate actively in the political and economic process, consolidate the concepts of citizenship and the rule of law, and safeguard the various rights and freedoms of all members of Yemeni society.

By studying Tunisian foreign policy in the decade after the 2010 popular uprisings, this article contributes to Role Theory by explaining how regional audience expectations influence foreign policy roles. The article first demonstrates how achieved roles develop expectations among regional states as the audience. Then it explains how these expectations condition role enactment. The article shows how Tunisia developed and established a foreign policy posture of strategic distance, defined by neutrality in regional conflicts, adherence to legalism, and pursuit of economic interests. Strategic distance came to be expected by North African states.

​This paper agrues that although the Arab Gulf is strategically located and of economic importance to China, the Gulf states did not fall along the original routes demarcated by the Belt and Road initiative roadmap. Nevertheless, both China and these states have begun to engage with the initiative and its projects by signing strategic partnerships, and to enmesh these projects with perspectives on national development in the Gulf. This has unsettled the United States and its allies, some of whom have begun to view this expansion as a serious challenge. As a result, there has been an attempt to impede the initiative's projects through debt-trap debate, geopolitical alliances, and putting forth alternative economic proposals. This study argues that the Gulf is of great concern to China and the requirements of the Belt and Road initiative, identifying where the Arab Gulf states are located on the initiative map and illustrating the way in which each state has gradually become involved in associated projects. It considers Western mechanisms and alternative projects in response to respond to and impede the initiative and the degree to which these mechanisms may apply to the Gulf states. The paper presents deductive observations as to China's likely approach in the event that the initiative is obstructed and its interests undermined. Will it modify its foreign strategy – and will this impact the Gulf?

ISIL is the legitimate child of the crisis of the political regime that developed in Iraq after 2003. The eight-year rule of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki instituted a monopoly