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This study discusses successive Palestinian governments and provides a reading of their features, focusing on the 15th, 16th and 17th governments, five years after Rami Hamdallah became prime minister. The first section examines the emergence and development of governments since 1994. The second section gives an overview of the three cabinets in question and their agendas while the third section examines the failures of these governments and the impact of that failure on the Palestinian political scene. The final section examines the traditional operating assumptions of the political system. The study argues that the origin of the problem lies in the political system that has emerged since 1994 which restricts the operations of Palestinian governments, and that the formation of "technocratic" cabinets has only exacerbated the Palestinian political crisis.

Russia has not specified its national interests in the Middle East or the Arab World since the 1990s. This paper discusses Russia’s shift toward a more active and effective role in the Middle East, in particular after Vladimir Putin came to power. Putin’s attempts to strengthen Russia in the Middle East were driven by a mixture of nostalgia and strategic national interests. With the events of the Arab Spring, Russia sensed that Arab revolutions could result in geostrategic changes in the region, which may not comply with its growing ambitions. It is this background against which Russia’s different stances toward each Arab Spring country and the outcomes of their respective uprisings can be read. Putin expressed anti-change reservations in Libya and Egypt, and even more so in Syria, making it one of the major actors in the Syrian crisis. At the same time, however, Moscow had no strong stance on Yemen, Tunisia, or Bahrain. The motives behind Russia’s role can be understood through a look at its internal situation, which is being influenced by waves of democratic change in the Arab Region, as well as its impact on the future of Central Asian countries, particularly Russia’s allies (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus). This paper discusses all of these entanglements in the context of the current Arab situation.

In September 2014, US President Barack Obama announced a “comprehensive strategy” to degrade and destroy ISIL. Obama stated, “I will not hesitate to take action against ISIL in Syria, as well as Iraq. This is a core principle of my presidency: If you threaten America, you will find no safe haven.” But despite this announcement, questions over the nature, goals, and instruments of US policy towards ISIL still continue to be asked in the context of a debate between those who think that the US is not doing enough to take on ISIL and those who think it would be better for the US not to expand its military involvement in the conflict. This debate has been influenced by internal American political polarizations in the form of the critical position taken by leading Republicans such as Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham, who view the Obama policy as weak, and Middle Eastern regional rivalries over the position towards ISIL and the nature of the political choices that must frame the confrontation with it.

​The fall of authoritarian regimes across the Arab region has uncovered a range of structural fissures within Arab society, unleashing unprecedented, pernicious exploitation of identity politics adopted by a range of local and international actor. Today, sectarian prejudice and stereotypes have seeped into not only the media in the Arab region, but also its academic discourse.

​This paper agrues that although the Arab Gulf is strategically located and of economic importance to China, the Gulf states did not fall along the original routes demarcated by the Belt and Road initiative roadmap. Nevertheless, both China and these states have begun to engage with the initiative and its projects by signing strategic partnerships, and to enmesh these projects with perspectives on national development in the Gulf. This has unsettled the United States and its allies, some of whom have begun to view this expansion as a serious challenge. As a result, there has been an attempt to impede the initiative's projects through debt-trap debate, geopolitical alliances, and putting forth alternative economic proposals. This study argues that the Gulf is of great concern to China and the requirements of the Belt and Road initiative, identifying where the Arab Gulf states are located on the initiative map and illustrating the way in which each state has gradually become involved in associated projects. It considers Western mechanisms and alternative projects in response to respond to and impede the initiative and the degree to which these mechanisms may apply to the Gulf states. The paper presents deductive observations as to China's likely approach in the event that the initiative is obstructed and its interests undermined. Will it modify its foreign strategy – and will this impact the Gulf?

This paper applies the categorization of welfare state systems set out by Esping-Andersen in 1990 to the welfare state in Egypt. It analyzes the relationships between state, market, and society over the 10 years from 1995 to 2005, which were marked by a shift to a market economy and a confrontation with the historical legacy of the state’s social role. The best description for the current welfare state in Egypt is “conservative/unorganized” in that social security entitlements are limited to work in the formal sector, which makes the family, religious institutions, and patronage networks take on important roles in meeting the social needs of the large informal sector. Additionally, the study proposes some modifications to the Esping-Andersen categorization with the aim of understanding welfare programs in developing countries. When analyzing welfare systems in general, particularly in the developing countries, it is necessary to take into account methodologically aspects of mismanagement, considerations of quality, the gap between stated aims and their implementation, the disparity resulting from differences between countryside and city and between the sexes, and the role of the informal sector.

The parliamentary experience in Morocco continues to excite the interest of politicians, researchers, academics, and those working in the press and media. This importance is heightened with the experience of the sixth parliament (1997-2002), which followed the adoption of the 1996 constitution, and which witnessed a decisive historical landmark in the form of two prominent events: the first peaceful transition of power in Morocco, and the transfer of rule from the late King Hassan II, who died on July 23, 1999, to King Mohamed VI. This experience made King Mohamed VI keen on historical continuity and the approach of the bicameral system (representative and consultative), and the rotation of power. The importance of this study derives from the relative paucity of relevant studies, and its attempt to understand this experience. This requires examining the constitutional amendments, the legislative elections and what accompanied them, as well as the outputs and successes of the practice of the parliamentary process.

The study criticizes the general framework that has governed the broader current of the researchers in civil-military relations, their method of thinking about the military institution since the inception of the field, the paper presents the theoretical and practical gaps in that literature, in particular the researchers of "Coup-Proofing". The study shows the weakness of the explanatory capabilities of the field in extrapolating and analyzing the historical era that the research seeks to reveal its theoretical and historical ambiguities, which is the phase of political pluralism in Syria between 1954-1958, which the researchers viewed as a democratic phase. The paper examines why did the army step down from the presidency and allowed civil forces to engage in political action at the time, in spite of that phase is in the midst of two series of coups. The paper is based on a basic premise that the army as a military institution do represent wings, sectors, units, brigades, and power relations, before it is an expression of any other social segments, which is in contrast to what the literature says in examining the sociological backgrounds of the officers.

Military interventions in Sudanese politics can be attributed to a number of factors, most pertinently: excessive politicization throughout society, social institutions, trades unions and syndicates as well as educational and religious institutions. In this sense, the Sudanese was not an exception, merely one of many highly politicized institutions. This paper concludes that the three different military coups which took power in Sudan were only able to do so with the aiding and abetting of civilian political forces, such as the National Umma Party, the Islamic Front and an array of leftist forces all—to varying extents—colluded with the military to further their political aims. With the military ranks reflecting wider societal politicization, military coups were effectively an extension of the political process by other means.

Algerian Security Policy: Determinants, Fields and Challenges [Arabic]