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According to the World Bank indicators, the Maghreb youth unemployment rate is among the highest in the world. After the Arab Spring uprisings (2011), the youth aspirations and expectations clashed with the economic difficulties and political reality in the Maghreb countries, which are unable to provide employment opportunities and efficient solutions to youth major problems. In the light of this situation, we analyzed (using quantitative methods) the satisfaction degree of young people under the effect of economic challenges and political transformations in the Maghreb region. It is clear from the results that the Maghreb youth adhere more to the economic priority, despite other priorities related to administrative corruption, the lack of public services, the fight against terrorism and insecurity. The second conclusion is that the youth economic expectations create a kind of homogeneity in this region. In all the observed countries, most young people consider the economy as the first priority, as well as the entire population.

The changing structure of International Law has always been a contentious issue because of the analytical and practical contradictions imposed by the concept of Solidarity whether its international or humanitarian sense.

This study discusses the institutional legacy of economic liberalization policies in shaping the contemporary reality of civil-military relations in Arab Spring states, and the future challenges of democratic transformation in these countries. It argues that economic openness through the application of liberalization policies has led to the emergence of a military oligarchy operating under a civilian cover, formally extending the dominance of the Arab armies from the political to the economic sphere. The outcome of this dynamic was the consolidation of the positions and political dominance of the military, which poses great challenges to the future of democratic transition in these countries. The study reviews its hypothesis through the cases of Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan and Algeria, and draws analytical comparisons between them.

This study examines the ability of network technology to challenge despotism regimes. It thus applies two theoretical approaches. The first is the "Prisoner's dilemma" and the "despot/jailer's dilemma" and the second is the "case study", which studies a number of cases of "network technology", whether used by protest groups or by authoritarian regimes, to determine the extent (and direction) of their impact in practice. The study concludes that network technology — through challenging the logic of the "prisoner's dilemma" and reversing it to become the "jailer's dilemma" — can, theoretically, pose an element of weakness for despotism regimes. However, in reality, network technology can be used by these regimes with the same effectiveness, to respond to mass protests supported by technology. This indicates that network technology can be seen as a neutralizing factor, the impact of which should be studied relative to the impact of other factors.

This study examines the ability of network technology to challenge despotism regimes. It thus applies two theoretical approaches. The first is the "Prisoner's dilemma" and the "despot/jailer's dilemma" and the second is the "case study", which studies a number of cases of "network technology", whether used by protest groups or by authoritarian regimes, to determine the extent (and direction) of their impact in practice. The study concludes that network technology — through challenging the logic of the "prisoner's dilemma" and reversing it to become the "jailer's dilemma" — can, theoretically, pose an element of weakness for despotism regimes. However, in reality, network technology can be used by these regimes with the same effectiveness, to respond to mass protests supported by technology. This indicates that network technology can be seen as a neutralizing factor, the impact of which should be studied relative to the impact of other factors.

This study argues that relying on the United States for of security and defense has led to the neglect of the Arab Gulf states to varying degrees. These countries failed to build an independent regional security capacity or develop broad security relations with third parties besides the United States. Since President Barack Obama took office in 2009-2016, before Donald Trump replaced him, questioning the regional balance of power, this reliance has destabilized the most stable part of the Arab world. This study examines the implications of the unprecedented regional reality regarding the strategic and security relations between the United States and the Gulf in the context of the divergent views of Washington and its local partners on regional security management methods, in particular the role of the GCC in managing peace and security.

This study examines the impact of securitization on the democratization of three countries in the in the Horn of Africa: Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan. The three countries, all members of the Arab League, represent diverse but integrated securitization models. The study assumes that securitization in the region has left democratic transformation low in the list of priorities for the major powers, at a time when counterterrorism rhetoric is overwhelming. The paper raises the following questions: Why has securitization discourse overpowered talk of democracy in the Horn of Africa? How do the mechanisms of the securitization discourse interact with political reality? What is the role of regional institutions in enhancing securitization discourse?

​​​​​This study examines the role of civil society organizations in supporting and enhancing youth participation in peacebuilding within the current peace process in Yemen. It investigates how these organizations' programs affect the type and effectiveness of youth participation in the peacebuilding process. The study uses in-depth interviews with representatives of civil society organizations as well as youth activists who participate in the peacebuilding programs. The results demonstrate that while organizations play an important role in supporting youth participation in peacebuilding, their programs do not necessarily lead to substantive and effective participation for youth either in the negotiation process or decision-making. Furthermore, the study highlights the differences between youth and civil society organizations regarding the peace process definition, the expected roles of actors involved, and the program outcomes. Additionally, it identifies several factors that influence the effectiveness of programs, including the expected role of the United Nations vs. reality, the coordination process between civil society organizations and alliances, the impact of funding, and challenges posed by the conflict environment in Yemen and its effects on program implementation and youth participation. Overall, this study provides a detailed analysis of the insights, challenges, and opportunities for youth engagement in the peacebuilding process through civil society in Yemen, offering observations and results that can be applicable and useful in other conflict contexts.

This study reads the performance of Egyptian political forces from the time of Mohamed Morsi’s election as president of the republic to the coup against him on July 3, 2013. In its first section, the study concludes that the behavior of all political actors can be understood as a search for allies from within the old regime’s centers of power; this despite the fact that these forces were the targets of the January 25 Revolution. Nonetheless, political parties seek out old guard forces hoping they will provide leverage for a position of power. This reality allowed the old regime – with its enormous capabilities—to rejoin the map of political forces instead of being held accountable. In its second section, the study tries to read the map of the protest movement on June 30, comparing this new map with one of the nation’s politics during the crisis of the constitutional declaration in November 2012. It concludes that the most important development in the nation’s political sphere has been the ability of the “deep state” to learn the skills of popular mobilization in the street. This came after it had failed to do so in the previous 36 months. Using its connections with a wide spectrum of social groups through networks of patronage and influence, which it had not thought of using in the spectacular “battle of the squares,” the “deep state” was able to become an active and influential political player capable of taking matters back to square one.

The relationship between Iran, Syria and Hezbollah and its effect on the Lebanese state is here examined. Divided into five parts the study first tackles Iran’s movements in Lebanese space and their connection to Hezbollah’s evolution. The second part focuses on Syria’s intervention in Lebanon and on Hezbollah as an intervention tool. The third part describes Hezbollah’s relationship with Lebanon since the party’s creation as well as the Taif Agreement and the subsequent change in the foundations of that relationship. The fourth part sheds light on the intervention of Iran and Syria in the relationship between Hezbollah and the Lebanese state. Finally, the fifth part explores Hezbollah’s intervention in the Syrian crisis and its repercussions on Lebanon.