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This study discusses Saudi-Iranian rivalry in the Persian Gulf, focusing on political, economic, strategic, historical, and religious dimensions. It details the escalation of tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran since 1979 up until 2019, before delving into the agreement to restore diplomatic relations between the two countries in March 2023. The study concludes that countries in the international system tend to maximize their capabilities and enhance their power; which sometimes leads to escalation in hostilities and the pursuit of an arms race. Iran's security strategy also includes enhancing its power and capabilities in pursuit of regional hegemony. Saudi Arabia sees Iran as its greatest security threat, whereby Iran poses multiple air, sea, and cyber security challenges to the Kingdom.​

​​​This study examines virtual public reactions on X regarding BRICS expansion to include three Arab countries: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. It uses a deep learning approach for sentiment analysis to understand reactions expressed by individuals in the 22 Arab League countries. The study aims to understand public opinion towards this expansion and assess how it was received at the bottom-internal level. Given the difficulty of measuring public opinion in non-democratic contexts, the study tracks public reaction to the expansion on X. Tweets from August 24, 2023, to January 7, 2024, are analyzed. The methodology involves collecting a large dataset of tweets, cleansing and tokenizing the data, and attributing sentiment scores using specialized Arabic text-processing tools. The results are presented through data visualization and machine learning models, ensuring a comprehensive analysis while addressing ethical considerations. The findings indicate that public sentiment is predominantly neutral (38.91%), compared to positive (31.72%) and negative (30.09%). This highlight concerns about education, political disengagement, and the technical limitations of applying a data science approach to political science research. It also suggests the inherent challenges of using this method to reflect internalization or engagement in the way surveys and referenda can.​

We seek, through this special issue, to contribute to the broader scholarly effort aimed at rethinking the trajectory of the formation of the Arab state and its evolution into its current form, by deconstructing its internal structure and analyzing its dynamics in light of its own conditions and contexts. The studies included in this issue also aim to move beyond ready-made and complete interpretive frameworks by approaching the Arab state as a historical, political, and social entity with its own internal logic and distinct paths of development, rather than reducing it to imported explanatory models or external normative projections.

The causal link between economic and political freedom is a complex and interesting debate in the domain of social sciences. To enrich the academic debate on this issue, we have examined the Arab context based on econometric instruments, especially the test of causality. Based on the results of the study, the interactions between economic and political freedom in the Arab world appear to be generally in line with the thesis strongly defended by liberal thinkers, in particular Milton Friedman and Frederick Hayek, that there is a unilinear causality in which the first variable leads to the second. This result may seem self-evident in a transformed Arab context, but the reality seems to be more complex. Economic freedom indeed guarantees freedom, the constructing of the national identity and the conditions necessary to ensure individual well-being. However, such freedom is not understood in isolation from political freedom and its social context interactions and cultural structures, in contrast with restricted collective consciousness.

This study argues that relying on the United States for of security and defense has led to the neglect of the Arab Gulf states to varying degrees. These countries failed to build an independent regional security capacity or develop broad security relations with third parties besides the United States. Since President Barack Obama took office in 2009-2016, before Donald Trump replaced him, questioning the regional balance of power, this reliance has destabilized the most stable part of the Arab world. This study examines the implications of the unprecedented regional reality regarding the strategic and security relations between the United States and the Gulf in the context of the divergent views of Washington and its local partners on regional security management methods, in particular the role of the GCC in managing peace and security.

This study attempts to determine the latest changes in the US-Saudi alliance and reflect on its destabilization. Specifically, it aims to determine whether the current crisis in US-Saudi relations might actually lead to a rift. Alternatively, the current events could be nothing but a temporary breakup depending on each country’s vision of its interests, after which relations could resume. The study reached some important results. It concluded, for example, that the speculation of a collapse of the US-Saudi alliance and its replacement with the US-Iranian alliance is farfetched and lacks depth. It is politically impossible and strategically inoperable for the US to side with Iran at the expense of Saudi Arabia amid the current polarization.

This study advances a new approach to theorizing the Arab state after the popular uprisings. It does this in two steps. Suspending the western European model of state formation and bringing the Arab world's experience in conversation with other parts of the Global South, it examines alternative state formation and state building sequences, trajectories, and temporalities in the making of Arab states. It thus historicizes the process of state formation and state building in the Arab world as compared to the western European one and other regions in the Global South. This first step liberates us from explicit and implicit comparisons with the European model of state formation. The second step surveys alternative theorizations of the Arab state after the uprisings. Tracing the causal assumptions embedded in these theories reveals how much they rely on the European model of state formation and state building as an implicit point of analytic departure and critical comparison. This survey unpacks the assumptions these theories make about the state, the difference between states and regimes, state and non-state actors, the private and public realms, and the formal and informal sectors. The objective of this study is to not only de-exceptionalize states in the Arab world, but, more importantly, borrowing from Gurminder Bhambra, 'unmake' our understandings of state formation and state building in the Arab world and thus contribute, following Walter Mignolo, to a knowledge production that serves a form of 'epistemic reconstitution' of alternative historical trajectories and possibilities.

India adopts a cautious policy towards the GCC states during the emergence of differences between them, such as the Gulf crisis of 2017 - 2021. This stems from many considerations: First, the principle of non-alignment. Despite Narendra Modi's government focus on proactive diplomacy and engagement abroad, it has reverted to the principle of non-alignment and neutrality in dealing with the crisis. Second, the special relationship with the GCC states. Given the depth of historical interdependence, geographic proximity and intertwining of economic interests, these states are India's most important trading partner and are home to the largest overseas Indian community. Third, the roles of other countries. Because the competing countries such as China and Pakistan have remained neutral, this has encouraged India not to take an active role in solving the conflict. United States' key role in mediation encouraged New Delhi to remain neutral, taking advantage of Washington's efforts and its influence in securing energy routes. Nevertheless, India has taken an active role in providing Qatar with essential needs and food products during the crisis.

Economic inequality is one of the most pressing issues in the twenty-first century, given that a small minority controls the global economy and most influential power. This has led to an escalation of political instability and a decrease in social inclusion, as evidenced by studies related to the Arab Spring and the ongoing turmoil in the MENA. This quantitative study investigates the effect of capital formation and the rate of return on capital on economic inequality in countries of the region. The results demonstrated that the factors used to measure the formation of capital, such as total domestic savings and total fixed capital formation, positively correlate with economic inequality - increasing the inequality gap. Conversely, factors used to measure the rate of return on capital, such as real interest and the interest rate on deposits, correspond negatively with economic inequality. When the interest rate on deposits increases, economic inequality decreases. It is necessary to review fiscal and monetary policies to reform taxes and benefits to increase their impact on equity and redistribution, and to avoid the impact of capital and power accumulation.

This paper elucidates Arab public opinion towards the international aerial campaign against ISIL (the “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant”) in Iraq and Syria, based on the findings of a dedicated opinion survey. The survey included representative, randomized samples in seven countries: Tunisia, Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, in addition to communities of Syrian refugees in three host countries (Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey). Respondents were asked the extent of their support for the aims of the international campaign as well as the conduct of the airstrikes. Survey questions also take in respondents’ views on a number of related issues. The findings show that the vast majority of Arabs are firmly opposed to ISIL, with only 11% of respondents expressing views which are positive, to varying extents, towards the group.