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Oil is not just related to economics but is also connected to political development. This paper looks at the effect of oil on democracy by relying on a theoretical and empirical study using the tools of descriptive statistics, regression analysis, and statistical tests in the light of political economy in the form of the “resource curse.” It studies how authoritarian regimes have used hydrocarbon resources to prevent democratization by means of a range of mechanisms such as the tax impact, group formation, the effect of spending, and repression. The statistical analysis reveals that there is a statistically-significant inverse relationship between democracy and oil production. It can be said therefore that the oil states are less likely to become democratic. Although most Third-World states have been afflicted by the resource curse, it is not possible to view it as inevitable, but rather the result of dependence on the track represented by the inability to diversify resources or weakness in doing so. The resource curse does not apply to all states rich in natural resources, such as Norway.

We seek, through this special issue, to contribute to the broader scholarly effort aimed at rethinking the trajectory of the formation of the Arab state and its evolution into its current form, by deconstructing its internal structure and analyzing its dynamics in light of its own conditions and contexts. The studies included in this issue also aim to move beyond ready-made and complete interpretive frameworks by approaching the Arab state as a historical, political, and social entity with its own internal logic and distinct paths of development, rather than reducing it to imported explanatory models or external normative projections.

This paper relies on the academic literature on rebel movements and armed rebellions to better the insurrection presently underway in the Egyptian provinces of the Sinai. The paper seeks to understand the implications for counter-insurgency policies, asking why the insurgency has proven so resilient, and at times expanded. The military capabilities and resources available to the militants will also be scrutinized, along with the Egyptian Army's blundering attempts at counterinsurgency and the prevailing political environment. The paper then moves to studying the tactical patterns and the overall strategy of the ISIL affiliated group active in the Sinai. The author concludes that the failure of counterinsurgency efforts, the continued absence of national reconciliation, the failure to review and revise counterinsurgency policies serve to make the Sinai region fertile ground for insurgents.

Forty days after the outbreak of the Yemeni Revolution, on March 21, 2011, General Ali Mohsen Saleh al-Ahmar (commander of the northwestern military district and the 1st Armoured Division), Major General Mohammad Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (commander of the eastern military district) and a number of commanders of other military units declared their support for the revolution. The Yemeni army divided into two: “supporters of the revolution army” and the “family army,” according to the characterization by the forces of the revolution. This development exposed to the public the hidden divisions within the structure of the Yemeni Army, taking it to the point of no return. The capital Sanaa and some other Yemeni cities witnessed limited armed confrontations between the two armies and between the militias supported by them. That is why the executive mechanism of The Gulf Cooperation Council’s initiative (the Gulf Initiative) included a special term for uniting the army, restructuring it, and ending its division. With the split as its background and the Gulf Initiative as its point of departure, this paper aims to show what was achieved in terms of restructuring the army. It describes the course of this restructuring operation, the difficulties it entailed, the tasks that have not yet been accomplished, as well as its impact on national unity, social integration, and confidence-building between the parties participating in the national dialogue conference.

This study deals with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) as a non-state actor. It examines the internal environment in Turkey and the PKK's material strength before moving on to the external environment and the PKK's entry into an international conflict, focusing on historical development since the end of the Cold War. The paper argues that non-state actors contribute to international anarchy and conflict through competition with the state over the monopoly of power and the acquisition of territory, identity and resources. It also stipulates that the PKK benefited from the internal and external environmental variables contributing to international conflict. The study concludes that the entry of the PKK, which originated in Turkey, into an international conflict took place in several stages: the competition with the state for power; the influence of its foreign policy choices; the acquisition of new territories; and extra-territorial action.

This study attempts to determine the latest changes in the US-Saudi alliance and reflect on its destabilization. Specifically, it aims to determine whether the current crisis in US-Saudi relations might actually lead to a rift. Alternatively, the current events could be nothing but a temporary breakup depending on each country’s vision of its interests, after which relations could resume. The study reached some important results. It concluded, for example, that the speculation of a collapse of the US-Saudi alliance and its replacement with the US-Iranian alliance is farfetched and lacks depth. It is politically impossible and strategically inoperable for the US to side with Iran at the expense of Saudi Arabia amid the current polarization.

​This paper tackles the Algerian-Moroccan rivalry over the position of central state in North Africa and explores the stages of the Algerian-Moroccan conflict. According to the author, the rivalry between these two Arab neighbors over the position of “unitary state” is the main factor behind the tense relations between the two states, tension that inevitably affects the action plan of the Arab Maghreb Union. The relative balance of power between Algeria and Morocco explains why the conflict is centralized between them rather than other states of the Arab Maghreb. Libya, Tunisia and Mauritania are well aware that they do not have the qualifications to occupy the position of “unitary state”.